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Chapter 1. 
 
Introduction 
1 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The virtues and drawbacks of government regulation have been subject to long-
standing academic dissent. The proponents of government regulation have pointed to 
the fact that markets exhibit various types of malfunctions including monopoly 
power, negative externalities and asymmetric information. Starting with Arthur 
Pigou (1938) economists have argued that there is a prima facie case for state 
intervention once markets fail to perform efficiently. Government regulation could 
then serve as a remedy to counter the various market imperfections.  
 
The notion that public regulation will achieve more efficient social outcomes has 
been increasingly challenged since the second half of the last century. Regulation 
was claimed to exacerbate economic inefficiencies instead of correcting them. The 
classic public choice theorists Gordon Tullock and George Stigler developed this 
argument from two different angles. The work of Tullock (1967, 1971) focuses 
primarily on the resources, which are wasted in the process of competitive lobbying 
for specific regulation, i.e. rent seeking. In his model, entrepreneurs will invest funds 
in the attempt to form a regulation backed monopoly up to the point where the 
marginal cost of lobbying equals the discounted return from the increased market 
power. Social inefficiencies would therefore not only arise from the formation of a 
monopoly, but also come from the fact that many companies cannot obtain a 
monopoly and waste resources in hopes of attaining one. Stigler (1971), on the other 
hand, is more concerned with the fact that firms which have already acquired market 
power may have strong incentives to restrict entry to their market. In his view, 
regulation creates a rent for incumbents if they are able to effectively exclude 
competitors from the market. Because governmental authorities are captured by the 
industry, they will decrease social welfare by artificially sustaining monopolies or 
cartels, which will in turn lead to a welfare loss.  
 
In the late 1980s scholars have built upon these models by arguing that government 
officials may not only draft regulations for the benefit of the industry, but that 
regulation primarily exists to give bureaucrats the power to deny it and to take bribes 
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in return for permits (De Soto 1989; Shleifer and Vishny 1993). This strand of 
literature has been even more pessimistic regarding the merits of public regulation to 
increase social welfare. While in the rent seeking model of Tullock firms benefit 
from manipulating legislation by increasing the producer surplus, in what Simeon 
Djankov et al. (2002) call the ‘tollbooth view’ of regulation, the law solely creates 
additional costs to firms without providing any substantial benefit to them. The only 
beneficiary of regulation will be public administration, i.e. government bureaucrats. 
 
The debate about the drawbacks of government regulation has opened up another 
field of research, which explores the different mechanisms by which firms can 
overcome costly regulations (Romano 1985; Peterson 1988; Becht et al. 2008; 
Eidenmüller et al. 2009b, 2010b, 2010c). Historically, physical exit was the only 
possibility to escape national laws. While in some areas of the law – as for instance 
in tax law – this is still the case, the applicable legal regulations can be chosen freely 
in other fields without firms having to physically exit the country. The activity of 
choosing a more suitable regulation without altering the underlying economics of a 
business transaction is aptly referred to as ‘regulatory arbitrage’ (Fleischer 2010). A 
highly illustrative example of regulatory arbitrage is corporate law. Over the period 
from 2004 to 2006 roughly 40,000 German start-up firms adopted UK company law, 
mostly because of the higher minimum capital requirement of the German alternative 
(Becht et al. 2008). Some other areas in which firms are allowed to choose from a 
variety of different legal regimes include contract law, bankruptcy law and the rules 
governing the proceedings of an arbitration court.1 
 
As in every other market, the demand for regulation is matched with supply. 
Jurisdictions advertise their regulatory products and react sensitively to changes on 
the demand side (Eidenmüller 2011).2 States do so for various reasons, ranging from 
tax revenues to be collected form a flourishing legal service industry to the prestige 
                                                             
1  For an overview see O’Hara and Ribstein (2009). 
2  To advertise their legal products, the English Law Society has published a brochure with the 
title “England and Wales – the jurisdiction of choice” available at: 
http://www.lawsociety.org.uk/documents/downloads/jurisdiction_of_choice_brochure.pdf. 
The German Ministry of Justice countered with a brochure entitled “Law made in Germany” 
available at: http://www.lawmadeingermany.de/Law-Made_in_Germany.pdf. 
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the legislative receives from the utilisation of national laws. Moreover, in the last 
decade transparency with regard to national regulation was achieved through various 
rankings of the law in different fields and for almost every country in the world. Two 
of the most frequently cited reports are the ‘Global Competitiveness Report’ of the 
World Economic Forum and the ‘Doing Business Report’ annually published by the 
World Bank / International Finance Corporation. By making national regulation 
easily comparable, jurisdictions face considerable pressure to engage in regulatory 
competition and to offer attractive legal products. 
 
Whether regulatory competition leads to a socially superior outcome has not found a 
final answer yet. In the pure theory of fiscal federalism, Charles Tiebout (1956) has 
argued that legislation competes to attract consumers of the law by offering packages 
of services in return for different tax rates. In his view, the content of regulation 
would be matched effectively to the preferences of the consumers of the law. This 
notion has found support in the work of Ralph Winter (1977), Daniel Fischel (1982) 
and Roberta Romano (1987), who asserted – with respect to corporate charters – that 
competition between states would produce optimal legal rules rendering federal 
regulation dispensable and even harmful. In stark contrast, William Cary (1974) as 
well as Lucian Bebchuk and Assaf Hamdani (2002) have argued that corporate 
charter competition results in a ‘race to the bottom’, as a result of which the loosest 
standards will eventually prevail. Hans-Werner Sinn (1997, 2003) has recently come 
to a similar conclusion, stating that if government regulation is valuable in the first 
place (e.g. to overcome problems of collective action or asymmetric information) and 
then becomes subject to regulatory competition, an efficient equilibrium for such a 
competitive process does not exist. According to Sinn’s ‘selection principle’, 
regulatory competition will have adverse effects on social welfare, because unlike 
productive activities carried out by private agents, numerous (regulatory) products 
offered by the state are unsuitable for competition. In his view, this selection bias 
comes from the fact that the nation state intervened in the economy to correct for 
market failure. Regulatory competition will then revive the market’s malfunctions. 
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The conflicting arguments on regulatory competition that have been brought forward 
are the result of an analysis of various economic activities subject to multiple legal 
rules (e.g. corporate law, product standards, financial regulation). On the one hand, 
regulatory competition can provide an effective remedy to mitigate rent seeking and 
corruption by state officials. On the other hand, regulatory competition may reduce 
social welfare, if a strong state provides for government regulation which serves to 
correct market failures. The question whether regulatory competition leads to 
socially desirable outcomes or not depends thus on the economic domain subject to 
government regulation. Furthermore, to establish whether regulatory competition is 
socially desirable has to be decided on a case-by-case basis considering the empirical 
evidence available. This dissertation strengthens the factual basis by investigating the 
impact of regulatory competition in two highly relevant areas of business law: 
company law (chapter 2, 3 and 4) and the legal rules governing corporate debt 
securities (chapter 5 and 6). The following inquiry focuses on European jurisdictions. 
It applies advanced empirical models either to a new research context (re-
incorporations in the legal form of the Societas Europaea) or to data that has not been 
used so far in the literature (cross-border corporate debt issues). Moreover, chapter 5 
is the first study employing a panel gravity model to a law and finance context. Each 
of the following chapters can be read independently from the others as each was 
written as a stand-alone article with its own introduction and summary. 
 
Chapter 2 is based on a joint research project with Reiner Braun, Horst Eidenmüller 
and Andreas Engert (Braun et al. 2010). The study focuses on how company law 
reforms, in particular the reduction or abolition of the minimum capital requirement, 
in various European jurisdictions affect the decision of entrepreneurs to incorporate 
in the legal form of a private limited liability company (LLC). Since the landmark 
rulings of the ECJ in the years 1999, 2002 and 2003, start-ups have been able to 
choose the country of incorporation independently of their real seat.3 As a result, the 
proliferation of the British private company limited by shares has posed a 
                                                             
3  See ECJ, Case C-212/97 Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen [1999] ECR I-1459; 
Case C-208/00 Überseering BV v. Nordic Construction Company Baumanagement GmbH 
[2002] ECR I-9919; Case C-167/01 Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam 
v. Inspire Art Ltd. [2003] ECR I-10155. 
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competitive threat to many European legislators. Using a difference-in-difference 
framework, we analyse whether the reforms adopted in Spain, France, Hungary, 
Germany and Poland have promoted the popularity of domestic legal forms and 
encouraged entrepreneurship more generally. 
 
The analysis in chapter 3 was carried out in collaboration with Horst Eidenmüller 
and Andreas Engert (Eidenmüller et al. 2009a). It focuses on a new corporate legal 
form in the European Union, the Societas Europaea (SE). We find that after a slow 
start, the SE has become increasingly popular. Besides documenting the growth of 
this new company type, we examine whether firms choose to incorporate in the SE 
corporate form, because they engage in regulatory arbitrage by exploiting differences 
in legal rules between jurisdictions. We specify hypotheses on particular regulatory 
arbitrage motives. To validate the hypotheses, we use a broad telephone survey 
among SE users in Germany as well as a simple regression model based on a unique, 
hand-collected dataset on SE incorporations. We find strong evidence that firms use 
the SE to mitigate the effect of mandatory co-determination rules. Establishing a one-
tier board structure (in jurisdictions that impose a two-tier structure on their national 
public companies) and taking advantage of the SE’s mobility for tax purposes also 
seem to be driving SE formations. By contrast, the study fails to support the 
suggestion that firms use the SE to shop for the most favourable national company 
law to fill the gaps in the SE Regulation.  
 
Chapter 4 is again joint work with Horst Eidenmüller and Andreas Engert 
(Eidenmüller et al. 2010a). The research project uses an event study methodology to 
analyse a unique dataset of publicly traded firms that have announced to re-
incorporate under the SE Regulation. Even though the available data do not yet allow 
a reliable conclusion as to whether the new European Company appeals to 
diversified shareholders of public companies, the analysis reveals the general 
methodological difficulties and specific problems related to event studies in the 
European context. It further outlines an agenda for future research on the SE.  
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In chapter 5 the analysis turns to the last research project with Horst Eidenmüller and 
Andreas Engert (Eidenmüller et al. 2010b), taking the research focus to the 
regulation of corporate debt securities. In particular, we study the choice of issuer 
location and regulatory competition in the European corporate debt market. We find 
that, in absolute terms, Germany has by far the highest outflow of debt issues, while 
the Netherlands, the UK, Luxembourg and Ireland see the most inflows (in that 
order). We use a panel gravity model to investigate country specific factors attracting 
foreign subsidiaries as issuer. The data clearly support the prediction that the 
locational choice is positively influenced by a low withholding tax rate. There is also 
some evidence that corporate tax rates are of relevance. We do not find support for 
creditor protection rules in bankruptcy as a driver of cross-border debt securities 
issues. Hence, countries aiming to attract issuers are well advised to reduce their 
withholding tax rates – creditor rights seem not to matter. 
 
Finally, chapter 6 is once again concerned with regulatory arbitrage regarding 
corporate debt securities. It takes a critical stance as to whether regulatory arbitrage, 
which is a necessary precondition for regulatory competition, can actually be 
attributed to an active choice by the consumers of a regulation as compared to mere 
path dependence in corporate decision making. Using a dynamic panel data model, I 
find that in the short run (one year) regulatory arbitrage is indeed subject to strong 
path dependence. The effect largely disappears after this period. The evidence shows, 
that path dependence is more intense (and persistent) regarding the corporate entity 
issuing the debt security and less pronounced with respect to the applicable contract 
law. 
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2. Does Charter Competition Foster Entrepreneurship? A Difference-in-
Difference Approach to European Company Law Reform∗ 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
Entrepreneurial activity is a key driver of economic growth and development. 
Workable policies to encourage business ventures are, therefore, in strong demand. 
In this regard, the entrepreneurship literature has recently taken a vivid interest in 
regulation as a potential constraint on start-up activity. The new line of inquiry 
originates from the more general research on the impact of law and regulation on 
economic development. The law and finance literature holds that ‘law matters’ for 
the financing of economic activities and hence for the comparative success of 
economies (La Porta et al. 1997, 1998). To make their case, law and finance scholars 
try to identify a link between legal rules and institutions in the various jurisdictions 
and economic performance. While their research has covered many fields of law and 
regulation, one major strand has been the ‘regulation of entry’ (Djankov et al. 2002). 
The World Bank has been foremost in promoting a strategy of legal reform to foster 
economic development. Since 2002, it has been monitoring the legal and regulatory 
conditions for ‘doing business’ in various economies (World Bank / International 
Finance Corporation 2010). The general claim of this research is that stricter 
regulation tends to stifle start-up activity. Yet its empirical underpinning is rather 
weak as it rests mostly on cross-sectional data (see the survey in Djankov 2009).4 
Accordingly, it is hard to tell if less onerous regulation leads to more 
                                                             
∗ This chapter appeared under the same title in the ECGI working paper series in finance. We 
gratefully acknowledge helpful information on the relevant Polish reform from Anna 
Rojewska of the Morawski & Wspólnicy law firm (Warsaw). We are furthermore indebted to 
Scott Baker, Douglas Cumming as well as the participants in the CFS/LEMF Summer School 
“Law and Economics of Contracts”, the 8th Annual Conference of the German Law and 
Economics Association as well as the 6th Annual Conference of the Italian Society of Law 
and Economics. 
4  For instance, in a cross-section of 95 countries, Klapper and Love (2010) report a negative 
relationship between the cost of incorporation (i.e. number of procedures, time and expenses) 
in 2004 and the average number of LLC incorporations relative to the working population 
during 2005-2009. Similarly, in their survey on more than 3 million companies in 21 
European countries, Klapper et al. (2006) find that high costs of incorporation reduce the 
number of new firms. By contrast, using data from 39 countries, van Stel et al. (2007) find 
only the minimum capital requirement to bear a statistically significant relation with 
entrepreneurial activity while the number of procedures, the time and expenses needed for 
incorporation appeared to be irrelevant. 
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entrepreneurship or if countries with more start-up firms, for whatever reasons, tend 
to be less restrictive. Recently, Levie and Autio (2010) employ a panel of 54 
countries from 2004 to 2008 to show that a very general measure of ‘regulatory 
burden’ (including aspects of labour and bankruptcy law) exerts a negative influence 
on entrepreneurial activity. 
 
Major changes in European company law during the last decade provide the 
opportunity for a fresh look at the interaction of legal restrictions and entrepreneurial 
activity. With a number of groundbreaking decisions starting in 1999, the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) enabled firms to opt out of the national company law of their 
home country and instead to avail themselves of the company law of another 
European Union (EU) member state.5 Legal constraints on company formation have 
ceased to be binding insofar as other company laws offer less restrictive rules. 
Conversely, states may find it in their interest to market their company law to foreign 
firms or, at the very least, to avoid losing their own firms to foreign jurisdictions. As 
a consequence, states can now compete for the company law most attractive to 
entrepreneurs and firms generally. Whether such regulatory competition leads to 
desirable results overall is an important policy question for European company law 
and the EU legislator. Evidently, if one were able to show that regulatory 
competition increases entrepreneurial activity, this would count as a substantial 
benefit. At the same time, it would validate the claim that ‘law matters’: If the 
opportunity to opt out of a restrictive legal regime causes more new firms to be set 
up then, apparently, cutting regulation is a way to foster entrepreneurship. 
 
State competition in company law (‘charter competition’) has been around in the 
United States (US) for more than a century. Accordingly, there is a large amount of 
empirical work on state competition for large public companies’ charters in the US 
(for an extensive survey see Bhagat and Romano 2007). Surprisingly little effort has 
been devoted on incorporation choices of small firms. Notable exceptions in the 
                                                             
5  See ECJ, Case C-212/97 Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen [1999] ECR I-1459; 
Case C-208/00 Überseering BV v. Nordic Construction Company Baumanagement GmbH 
[2002] ECR I-9919; Case C-167/01 Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam 
v. Inspire Art Ltd. [2003] ECR I-10155. 
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recent US literature are Dammann and Schündeln (2008, 2009) and Kobayashi and 
Ribstein (2010). These studies do not, however, relate charter competition to the 
regulatory barriers faced by start-up firms. By contrast, Becht et al. (2008) provide a 
careful and highly influential analysis of the incorporation choices of entrepreneurial 
firms in the EU following the ECJ’s landmark cases.6 Using a difference-in-
difference method, they show that the United Kingdom (UK) attracted a large 
number of incorporations from other EU member states (but not from jurisdictions 
outside the EU unaffected by the ECJ’s rulings). They also find that incorporations in 
the UK are driven mainly by the minimum capital required to establish a limited 
liability company (LLC) in other jurisdictions; the UK does not impose any such 
requirement. Evidently, start-up firms have taken advantage of the new opportunities 
created by the ECJ. 
 
In this article, we revisit the matter and extend the analysis of Becht et al. (2008) in 
two important directions: After the ECJ unleashed charter competition, at least five 
European jurisdictions have enacted company law reforms to facilitate LLC 
incorporations. All reforms aim at reducing formalities or accelerating the process of 
establishing an LLC. Four out of five states decreased or abolished the statutory 
minimum capital, i.e. the requirement that shareholders must provide their LLC with 
a minimum amount of equity funding. The reforms seem to respond to the new 
competitive pressure exercised by less restrictive company law jurisdictions, notably 
the UK. Figure 2.1 depicts the average minimum capital over all national company 
laws in the EU, divided in two subsets: Jurisdictions adhering to the ‘incorporation 
theory’ permitted start-up firms – in principle at least – to incorporate abroad even 
before the ECJ’s landmark decisions. Conversely, many European jurisdictions 
follow the ‘real seat theory’ and refuse domestic firms the right to incorporate out of 
state. The new ECJ case law effectively ruled out the ‘real seat theory’ in relation to 
other EU member states. It is suggestive that the ‘real seat’ jurisdictions maintained a 
markedly higher level of minimum capital before the ECJ exposed them to 
competitive pressure from other jurisdictions. After the rules of the game had 
changed, the average minimum capital declined in both groups of jurisdictions (the 
                                                             
6  In his survey, Djankov (2009) highlights Becht et al. (2008) as the ‘most creative study 
linking business registration and entry regulation’. 
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ECJ struck down not only the ‘real seat theory’ but also impediments to out-of-state 
incorporations in certain countries following the ‘incorporation theory’). We evaluate 
whether, by enacting company law reforms, the five jurisdictions succeeded in 
defending their home market against competition from the main contender, the UK 
private LLC.7 Our study for the first time considers the supply-side of charter 
competition in the EU and its interaction with the demand side. We thus provide both 
more detail and support to the original findings of Becht et al. (2008).  
 
Using a difference-in-difference approach, we show that EU member states can in 
fact promote their domestic LLC form by facilitating incorporations, particularly by 
cutting the statutory minimum capital. To this end, we collect time-series data on 
incorporations before and after the legal reforms in Spain, France, Hungary, 
Germany and Poland. Studying the effect of statutory amendments enables us to 
define a very clear-cut event, namely the specific day when the new law entered into 
force. Looking at five independent events in different countries during the decade 
from 2000 to 2010 should increase the external validity of our results. 
 
 
Figure 2.1  Average minimum capital requirement for private LLCs in the EU-27 
by jurisdictions following the ‘real seat theory’ and the ‘incorporation 
theory’ 
 
                                                             
7  Becht et al. (2008) show that one important reason for the UK’s leading position is the 
absence of a minimum capital requirement for private LLCs.   
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In addition, we confront the critical issue whether facilitating LLC incorporations 
actually increases the number of start-up firms. Becht et al. (2008) have shown that 
entrepreneurs from other EU member states have chosen to incorporate in the UK 
once the opportunity presented itself. Yet the rise in UK incorporations may have 
come at the expense of the domestic LLC forms in the entrepreneurs’ home states. 
Also, entrepreneurs do not have to incorporate to start a business. They can establish 
a firm in the form of a partnership or in their own name, i.e. as a sole proprietor. To 
demonstrate that lower incorporation costs spur new firm creation, we consider the 
possible substitution effects. We do so for the five reform countries by looking at the 
effect not only on domestic LLC incorporations but also on partnerships and UK 
private LLCs. When we include these substitutes, the impact of the reforms tends to 
slightly weaken but generally does not vanish. Apparently, the reforms succeeded in 
stimulating start-up activity rather than just luring firms away from other legal forms. 
It follows that facilitating LLC incorporations may be a policy tool to foster 
entrepreneurship.  
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2.2. Entrepreneurship and the costs of registration 
 
Our analysis starts from the fundamental choice whether to work as an employee or 
to start a new venture. This decision has often been modeled in the literature (see 
Lucas 1978 as well as Kihlstrom and Laffont 1979 for two early contributions), 
mostly to inform policy makers how to promote economic growth by encouraging 
entrepreneurship. The underlying assumption is that individuals choose the action 
that subjectively promises them the greatest utility (Eisenhauer 1995; Douglas and 
Shepherd 2000). Although individuals may derive their utility from multiple 
monetary and non-monetary factors, such as economic, personal, social, cultural and 
institutional determinants (Dreher and Gassebner 2007), we restrict ourselves to a 
very parsimonious setup. The main components of the individual utility functions are 
the existing assets of an individual denoted by A0, the expected net present value of 
future income resulting from the new firm E(Y) or from her salary Y0 in an 
employment, and a set of additional determinants C (e.g. the personal working 
conditions under each option). A simple decision rule is to choose self-employment 
if the utility exceeds the utility of employment in the wage sector: 
 
U(A0 + E(Y), C) > U(A0 + Y0, C)    (2.1) 
 
The expected net present value from setting up a new business is derived from the 
stream of profits Vt in periods t = 1, …, T, discounted at some rate R:  
 
E(Y) = ∑ [(E(Vt) / (1 + Rt)t] – K0    (2.2) 
 
The expected value of starting a business declines with regulatory costs K0 imposed 
by the government. Typically, there are direct regulatory costs of registering a new 
firm and operating it; examples include the notarisation of certain documents, the 
time needed for registration, financial reporting requirements etc. In addition, 
entrepreneurs may have to incur indirect costs such as a minimum capital 
requirement, i.e. an amount of equity funding that owners must pay or promise to pay 
when they establish the firm. While the firm can use the money to build its business, 
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the requirement nonetheless causes opportunity costs or costs of increased financial 
constraints of the owners (Becht et al. 2008). 
 
Of course, on a more optimistic account regulatory costs may be justified by 
countervailing benefits. The registration process can serve as a screening process for 
start-up firms to ensure minimum standards of quality, including integrity and 
financial soundness. Restricting start-up activity can protect uninformed creditors 
and reduce information asymmetries (Cassar 2004; Storey 1994). More specifically, 
minimum capital requirements may sort out ‘necessity nascent entrepreneurs’ who 
start a business only to escape unemployment. Such entrepreneurs are less wealthy 
(Block and Wagner 2010) and therefore more strongly affected by registration costs 
(van Stel et al. 2007). At the same time, they have been shown to have no beneficial 
effect on technological development (Acs and Varga 2005). Stricter requirements can 
thus serve to prevent market failures and lead to socially superior outcomes, as the 
‘public interest theory of regulation’ contends (Pigou 1938; Sinn 1997). The opposite 
view is that entry regulation serves mainly competitors and bureaucrats to extract 
rents (Djankov 2002). Accordingly, its effect is to stifle entrepreneurial activity 
without an offsetting gain. This perspective finds some support in the empirical 
literature referred to in the introduction. 
 
In this paper, we cannot resolve the matter conclusively. What we can do is to 
provide new and strong evidence that registration costs do indeed have a significant 
impact on entrepreneurial activity. To this end, we consider entrepreneurial activity 
as the result of supply and demand for entrepreneurship in the economy (Casson 
1995). The demand for entrepreneurship is the number of ‘entrepreneurial positions’ 
that can be filled in an economy (Choi and Phan 2006; Thornton 1999). Demand 
results from a variety of factors, e.g. the availability of entrepreneurial opportunities 
or the availability of appropriate financing such as venture capital (for a more 
comprehensive overview see Thornton 1999). The supply of entrepreneurship is 
determined by the pool of individuals which is ready to engage in self-employment 
(Choi and Phan 2006). The supply curve results from the individual decision rule as 
outlined in equations 2.1 and 2.2. Each point on the supply curve indicates the 
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number of individuals that perceive a higher utility from entrepreneurship than from 
dependent employment. As a consequence, the shape of the supply curve reflects 
regulatory costs K0 as part of equation 2.2 (Figure 2.2). This motivates our first 
hypothesis that reducing the costs of registering (incorporating) LLCs should, ceteris 
paribus, increase the number of LLC incorporations by ΔQ1. 
 
 
Figure 2.2  The reduction of incorporation costs (K) increases the quantity of 
domestic LLC start-up firms to Q1 
 
However, the number of LLC incorporations does not equal the number of start-up 
firms in the economy. Potential entrepreneurs face different options regarding the 
legal form to start a business. A new firm can take the form of a private LLC, a 
public LLC, a partnership or a sole proprietorship, to name the most important ones. 
While legal forms differ in important respects (e.g. personal liability, transferability 
of ownership, taxation), it is far from obvious that entrepreneurs are deterred merely 
because their most preferred legal form turns out to be too costly for them. It follows 
that slashing the regulatory costs of incorporating a private LLC, instead of creating 
new start-up activity, could simply redirect entrepreneurs from partnerships and sole 
proprietorships to the private LLC. Therefore, we need to take regulatory costs for 
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alternative legal forms into account. Registration costs K0 can be thought of as a cost 
vector containing all relevant legal forms, including those offered by foreign 
jurisdictions such as the UK private LLC: 
 
K0 {Kprivate LLC; Kpublic LLC; KUK private LLC; Kpartnership; Ksole proprietor; …}  (1.3) 
 
Hence, cutting LLC incorporation costs may shift the supply curve for 
entrepreneurial activity far less than suggested by Figure 2.2. As some entrepreneurs 
simply substitute the LLC for the legal form that they would have used before the 
reform, the effect on new firm creation can be much lower or nonexistent. Figure 2.3 
suggests that the variable of interest to policymakers should be the rise in total 
entrepreneurial activity rather than just LLC incorporations. Our second and more 
critical hypothesis therefore is that a reduction in LLC incorporation costs increases 
the number of all start-up firms, irrespective of legal form, by ΔQ2. 
 
 
Figure 2.3  The reduction of incorporation costs (K) increases the quantity of all 
start-up firms to Q2   
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2.3. Charter competition and company law reform in Europe 
 
In the US, firms have always been free to choose in which of the states to incorporate 
because corporations were generally recognised by all other states (see Tung 2006; 
Yablon 2007). Some states soon discovered that they could generate tax revenues by 
adapting their corporation law to firms’ preferences. ‘Granting charters’ for 
corporations became a service offered by state governments in a competitive market. 
By contrast, in much of continental Europe ‘charter competition’ arrived only at the 
turn of the millennium after a series of groundbreaking judgments by the ECJ 
(subsection 2.3.1.). Start-up firms were the first to take advantage of the newly 
available free choice of company law. Legislators in various EU member states have 
reacted by facilitating incorporation. The reforms of European company laws 
outlined in subsection 2.3.2. constitute the quasi-experiments that we study. 
 
2.3.1. Recognising foreign companies: Real seat vs. incorporation theory 
 
Suppose an entrepreneur intends to operate a coffee shop in Innsbruck, Austria. She 
would like to establish her firm as a LLC. Her default option would be to incorporate 
in Austria as a Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung (GmbH, Austrian private 
LLC). However, Austrian company law requires her to invest a minimum capital of 
€ 35,000 in the company as a precondition for incorporating and enjoying limited 
liability.8 The entrepreneur also learns that no such restriction exists under UK 
company law. Quite naturally, she would prefer to avail herself of this low-cost 
alternative. Yet Austrian law precluded this opportunity of evading the stricter 
requirement. Under the long-standing Austrian conflicts-of-law rule, a company is 
governed by the law of the state in which the ‘real seat of its main administration’ is 
located.9 Since the coffee shop is to be operated and managed in Innsbruck, the firm 
would be subject to Austrian company law. Incorporating in the UK would not have 
helped because Austrian courts refused to apply English law and hence to recognize 
                                                             
8  See § 6(1) Austrian Limited Liability Companies Act (Gesetz über Gesellschaften mit 
beschränkter Haftung). 
9  See § 10 Austrian International Private Law Act (Gesetz über das internationale 
Privatrecht). 
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the firm as an English company. Instead, the entrepreneur herself would have been 
considered the sole proprietor of the firm, exposing her to full liability for all debts 
incurred on behalf of the firm. 
 
The traditional Austrian conflicts-of-law rule exemplifies the ‘real seat’ (siège réel) 
theory which used to predominate in most jurisdictions throughout continental 
Europe. Obviously, the real seat theory is designed to prevent incorporators from 
choosing a company law of their liking. It protects national company laws against 
legal arbitrage and competitive pressure from other states. By contrast, other 
jurisdictions follow the ‘incorporation’ theory. Under this alternative conflicts-of-law 
rule, a company is governed by the law of the state in which it was incorporated. As 
firms can choose where to seek incorporation, the incorporation theory effectively 
implies free choice of the applicable company law. Under the incorporation theory, 
the entrepreneur mentioned above could establish a UK private company limited by 
shares (‘Ltd.’) even if she operated and managed her business only in Austria.  
 
Yet the ‘real seat’ theory prevented most European firms, including Austrian firms, 
from incorporating in another state than that in which they were managed. This 
situation changed profoundly when the ECJ ruled that the ‘real seat’ theory violated 
the fundamental freedom of establishment laid down in the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).10 As a consequence, jurisdictions 
following the ‘real seat’ theory must recognise companies established in another EU 
member state. The ECJ thus removed the main legal barrier against company law 
choice within the EU. Becht et al. (2008) show that a substantial number of firms 
from Germany and other continental European jurisdictions did use the new 
opportunities and opted to incorporate in the UK after the ECJ’s judgments. An 
additional study by Becht et al. (2009) provides evidence of remaining impediments 
to incorporating abroad in some member states. As the cost burden on legal arbitrage 
diminishes over time, the competitive pressure on national company laws is likely to 
increase. 
                                                             
10  For a recent overview and analysis see Bratton et al. (2009) and Ringe (2010). As of 
December 2009, Art. 49, 54 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union contain the 
relevant provisions. 
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2.3.2. Company law reforms 
 
We are interested in whether regulatory competition fosters entrepreneurial activity 
by lowering barriers for start-up firms. Given that firms quickly began using their 
newly gained freedom of choice, one would expect that jurisdictions engage in 
charter competition and at least try to keep domestic firms from using foreign law.11 
In fact, we observe that a couple of EU member states have reformed incorporation 
procedures and requirements after 1999. For some of them, the emerging market for 
company law has been a driver of change (Bratton et al. 2009; Schmidt 2008). Other 
legislators seemed less concerned with charter competition. For instance, the French 
and Spanish reform bills of 2003 did not mention the recent ECJ cases (Wachter 
2003; Cohnen 2005). As Djankov (2009) documents, many countries all over the 
world have amended their company laws to facilitate incorporation. The legislative 
changes often alleviate requirements for incorporation documents and formalities 
(like the use of notaries) to speed up the process and save on expenses. They also 
tend to reduce or abolish minimum capital requirements. Reforms in EU member 
states thus not only respond to charter competition but also reflect a general trend 
towards deregulation (see European Commission 1997). In our analysis, we focus on 
the most radical changes since 1999: either a reduction of minimum capital 
requirements or the creation of a new type of private LLC specifically for start-up 
firms, or both. As of mid-2010, such far-reaching reforms have become effective in 
five EU member states: Spain, France, Hungary, Germany and Poland (Table 2.1). 
We choose these jurisdictions to study the impact of reforms on firm entry. 
 
                                                             
11  According to Becht et al. (2008) at least 41,499 German start-ups adopted the British Ltd. in 
the period from 1997 to 2006, most of them from the year 2003 onwards. 
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Table 2.1 Company law reforms to facilitate LLC incorporations 
Country Enactment date Effective date Reduction of 
minimum capital?
New start-up 
company type?
Description of reform 
Spain 1 April 2003 2 June 2003 No Yes New company type Sociedad Limitada Nueva 
Empresa (SLNE): electronic filing of 
incorporation documents; registration within 
24 hours after filing; but notary still required; 
only natural persons can be shareholders of the 
SLNE  
France 1 August 2003 5 August 2003 Yes No Minimum capital reduced from € 7,500 to € 1; 
electronic filing of incorporation documents; 
incorporators receive a provisional certificate 
of filing (no notary requirement under French 
law even before reform)  
Hungary 15 June 2007 1 September 2007 Yes No Minimum capital reduced from HUF 3,000,000 
to HUF 500,000(I); electronic filing of 
incorporation documents; no notary required 
(but lawyer); registration within 15 days or 2 
days if standard articles of incorporations are 
used 
Germany 23 October 2008 1 November 2008 Yes Yes New company type Unternehmergesellschaft 
(haftungsbeschränkt): minimum capital 
reduced from € 25,000 to € 1; but notary still 
required 
Poland 23 October 2008 8 January 2009 Yes No Minimum capital reduced from PLN 50,000 to 
PLN 5,000(II) 
(I)  At an exchange rate of € 1 = HUF 287 (as of 23 July 2010), this corresponds to a reduction from around € 10,450 to around € 1,750. 
(II)  At an exchange rate of € 1 = PLN 4.07 (as of 23 July 2010), this corresponds to a reduction from around € 12,300 to around € 1,250.
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2.4. Methodology 
2.4.1. Company law reforms as quasi-experiments 
 
To identify the effect of the company law reforms on the formation of start-up firms, 
we conceive of the reforms as quasi-experiments. At first, we are interested in 
whether the legal changes make the domestic LLC more attractive to entrepreneurs. 
Therefore, our default treatment group consists of the domestic LLC form, for which 
we observe the number of incorporations at daily or monthly frequencies. The 
treatment consists of the reform. As entrepreneurs and their advisers knew of the 
changes in advance,12 we consider the entry into force of the reform as the start of 
the treatment. Our default observation period is one year before and after this date. 
For this period, we have incorporation data in all of our five reform jurisdictions. 
This research design offers two technical advantages over the older study by Becht et 
al. (2008): First, the implementation of a national company law reform can be 
determined precisely. By contrast, the treatment in Becht et al. (2008) consisted of 
the ECJ judgments in Centros (1999), Überseering (2002) and Inspire Art (2003). It 
is hard to predict when the case law had been sufficiently established to encourage 
firms to use their new freedom of choice. Second, the ECJ rulings are only a single 
incident whereas we have the opportunity to consider five different events, which 
underscores the external validity of our findings. 
 
Reforming the domestic private LLC may or may not increase its appeal but leaves 
another very similar legal form unaffected: the public LLC. We thus consider as the 
general population all companies (corporations), namely the private LLC and the 
public LLC. We use the public LLC as a control group because its key features 
closely resemble those of the private LLC: Both the private LLC and the public LLC 
are legal entities separate of their shareholders. They are managed by directors who 
need not be shareholders. Either company type shields its shareholders against 
personal liability for the firm’s debt (‘limited liability’). Perhaps most importantly, 
both are subject to corporate income tax. While one can find some of these features 
                                                             
12  The amendments entered into force at least two months after their enactment in Spain, 
Hungary and Poland (see Table 2.1). As it takes several months or even years to pass a 
reform bill, entrepreneurs and their advisers have plenty of time to prepare for the new rules. 
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in certain partnerships as well, their combination is characteristic of companies 
(private and public LLC) and distinguishes them from other legal forms. As Meyer 
(1995) suggests, we confirm that the similarity of our treatment group (private LLCs) 
and our control group (public LLCs) is also borne out in the data: The daily 
incorporations of private and public LLCs correlate substantially before the 
respective reforms took place (Table 2.2).13 For all control groups, except for 
Hungary, we find very strong and positive correlations of 0.5 – 0.8 which are also 
highly statistically significant. 
 
Table 2.2 Correlation between treatment and control group before the 
implementation of the company law reforms 
Country Basic treatment 
group
Control group Correlation 
coefficient
France SARL SA 0.69***
Germany GmbH AG 0.58***
Hungary Kft. Rt. 0.02***
Poland(I) Sp. z o.o. Sp. Akcyjna 0.81***
Spain SRL SA 0.51***
 (I) Due to the data restrictions, we use the monthly frequencies. 
 
Their similarity notwithstanding, private and public LLCs differ in certain respects. 
The public LLC is tailored to firms with a larger number of shareholders; its shares 
can be traded in securities markets (stock exchanges). As a consequence, the 
assignment into treatment and control group is not random, as a true experiment 
would require. However, for a quasi-experiment it is sufficient that legal forms can 
be thought of as if they were randomly assigned into treatment and control groups 
(Stock and Watson 2007). The main concern, therefore, is to ensure that the 
composition of treatment and control groups do not change as a result of the 
treatment itself (Angrist and Pischke 2009). A classic example of this potential pitfall 
                                                             
13  The correlation of public and private LLCs obviously depends on the degree the public LLC 
is used as a legal form by entrepreneurs, instead of being primarily serving as legal form for 
financial holding structures. For instance, the comparatively high correlation between SA and 
SARL in France might be attributed to the usage of the SA and SAS as legal form for 
business enterprises.  
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is the evaluation of labour market programs, where only the most motivated and 
talented individuals choose to participate. Under such circumstances the as if 
assumption does not hold anymore, with the quasi-experiment overestimating the 
program’s success. In the context of our analysis, the decision of a firm to 
incorporate as a public LLC or as private LLC must be statistically independent from 
the treatment, i.e. the private LLC law reform. This condition is generally met: For 
an entrepreneur determined to establish a public LLC, it does not make a difference 
if he learns that the minimum capital for private LLCs has been slashed. Throughout 
the EU, incorporating a public LLCs requires a higher minimum capital than private 
LLCs (even before any private LLC reform).14 For the same reason, it is highly 
unlikely that the reform triggers entrepreneurs to switch from the private to the 
public LLC. Another difference between the two legal forms lies in the fact that, in 
many states, transferability of LLC shares is restricted whereas public LLC shares 
are tradable. Yet again, this aspect remained unchanged by the reforms and should 
thus not alter how firms are assigned to either the private LLC or the public LLC 
form. 
 
Using the public LLC as a control group raises a problem in the two Eastern 
European reform jurisdictions. Hungary and Poland amended the legal rules not just 
for the private LLC but at the same time for the public LLC. Specifically, the 
minimum capital requirement was lowered for public LLCs as well (the Rt. and the 
Sp. Akcyjna, respectively). This implies that relying on the public LLC as a control 
group can lead us to underestimate the reform effect for the private LLC because the 
public LLC may also have become more attractive. However, the minimum capital 
requirement was lowered to a different degree for the private LLC and the public 
LLC. The discrepancy is quite large in Poland with a reduction to 1/10 for the private 
LLC (Sp. z o.o.) and to 1/4 for the public LLC (Sp. Akcyjna). In the case of Hungary, 
the minimum capital requirement was cut to 1/6 for the private LLC (Kft.) and to 1/4 
for the public LLC (Rt.). 
 
 
                                                             
14  Under Art. 6(1) Second Company Law Directive 77/91/EEC, member states must require a 
minimum capital of at least € 25,000 for public LLCs.  
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2.4.2. Sample construction 
 
The sample contains incorporations of firms over time and according to their legal 
form. By using this information we investigate how company law reforms and in 
particular the reduction or abolishment of a minimum capital requirement for private 
LLCs affect entry rates. For the three jurisdictions implementing company law 
reforms early on (Spain, France and Hungary), we rely on data from the AMADEUS 
database, which is processed and distributed by Bureau van Dijk. The AMADEUS 
data were also used by Becht et al. (2008), back then in the form of the FAME 
database (which is a sub-sample of AMADEUS containing only UK 
incorporations).15 For the more recent reform countries (Germany and Poland), we 
were able to obtain the data directly from the respective national company register.16 
This approach ensures comparability with the earlier results of Becht et al. (2008) 
and allows us to check for the representativeness of the AMADEUS sample. 
Fortunately, we find that the AMADEUS data represents well the population data 
from the German company register.17 As incorporations are reported with a delay, 
particularly in the AMADEUS database18, we disregard the two most recent 
company law reforms in Denmark and Sweden. This leaves us with data on 
incorporations in Spain, France, Hungary, Germany and Poland (Table 2.3). 
A major difficulty faced by Becht et al. (2008) was how identify the nationality of a 
firm. We largely rely on their approach and classify a German Ltd. as a company that 
has its directors as well as owners residing in and its business activities located in 
Germany. 
 
Because we extend our analysis to the UK private LLC as an alternative to the 
domestic private LLC, we need to identify domestic firms that have chosen to 
incorporate in the UK. To this end, we largely adopt the approach of Becht et al. 
                                                             
15  We thank the LMU-ifo Economic and Business Data Center (EBDC) for providing us with 
the AMADEUS data. 
16  We gratefully acknowledge the data on incorporations provided by the German 
Bundesanzeiger Verlag and the Polish Ministry of Justice.  
17  The correlation coefficient for the private LLC is 0.44 and significant at the 1-percent level. 
18  The ultimate source of the AMADEUS data is often Creditreform, a provider of credit 
information. This causes a time lag of around one year in the data provided by Bureau van 
Dijk. 
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(2008): We seek to classify an UK private LLC as a Spanish, French, Hungarian etc. 
firm if it carries out its main business activities in Spain, France, Hungary etc. The 
AMADEUS data contains the country of residence (as well as the full names and 
addresses) of all directors in UK LLCs. Based on this information, we calculate the 
total number of directors for each firm and the relative share of directors from a 
given country. We classify an UK private LLC as a firm from a particular country, 
say Spain, if a majority of directors reside in this country.19 Becht et al. (2008) show 
that this criterion provides a plausibly proxy for the location of a firm’s business 
activities outside the UK. Only in the case of Germany did we obtain data on UK 
private LLC registrations directly from the commercial registers.20 
                                                             
19  As a robustness check, we classify English private LLCs as foreign firms if all directors 
reside in the other country. We omit these results because they do not differ in substance 
from our reported findings. 
20  Foreign LLCs are required to register a ‘secondary establishment’ in the EU member state in 
which their management is located. 
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Table 2.3 Summary statistics – average daily incorporations of private and public LLCs in reform countries                                      
(standard deviations in parentheses) 
Country Private / public LLC Private LLC Public LLC UK private LLC(I) Obs. period Data source 
France(II) SARL / SA 120.1
(246.7)
2.7
(3.2)
0.05
(0.22)
2000 - 2008 AMADEUS 
sample 
Germany(III) GmbH / AG 265.6
(93.8)
5.7
(3.6)
13.99
(11.11)
2006 - 2010 German 
Gazette 
Hungary Felelosségu Társaság / 
Részvénytársaság
36.2
(21.3)
1.3
(0.6)
0.06
(0.26)
2000 - 2008 AMADEUS 
sample 
Poland(IV) Sp. z o.o. /
Sp. Akcyjna
53.3
(28.3)
2.6
(3.5)
0.15
(0.43)
2001 - 2009 Polish Ministry of 
Justice 
Spain(V) SRL / SA 173.0
(144.9)
6.8
(4.5)
0.86
(1.20)
2000 - 2007 AMADEUS 
sample 
(I)  Germany: Data from commercial register. Other countries: AMADEUS data based on ‘majority of directors’ criterion. 
(II)  The French private limited liability company incorporations do not include EURL incorporations. 
(III) The German private limited liability company incorporations do not include UG incorporations. 
(IV) Since the Polish data is only available at a monthly frequency, we divided monthly incorporations by 30 to arrive at daily incorporations. 
(V)  The Spanish private limited liability company incorporations do not include SLNE incorporations. 
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Table 2.4 Major legal forms in reform countries and the UK 
Company forms and minimum capital requirements before reforms 
 Public LLC Private LLC Cooperative 
Germany AG € 50,000 GmbH € 25,000 € eG € 0 
       
France SA € 37,000(I) SARL € 7,500 SC € 0 
   EURL € 7,500   
 SAS € 37,000(II)     
Spain SA € 60,101 SRL € 3,006 Sociedad 
Cooperativa 
€ 1,803 
      
Hungary Rt ~ € 69,690(III) Kft. € ~ 10,450 Szövetkezet € 0 
     Egyesüles  
Poland sp. a. ~ € 25,000 sp. z o.o. € ~12,300  Spółdzielnia € 0 
       
UK Plc ~ € 57,007 Ltd. € 0 Cooperative € 0 
(I)   Different minimum capital for publicly listed SA: € 225,000. 
(II)   The minimum capital for the SAS has been cut to € 1 in 2008. 
(III)  Different minimum capital for publicly listed Rt: ~ € 80,000. 
 
Partnership forms and minimum capital requirements before reforms 
 Civil code partnership General partnership Limited partnership 
Germany GbR € 0 OHG € 0 KG € 0(IV) 
France SCI € 0 SNC € 0 SCS € 0(V) 
Spain Sociedad 
Civil 
€ 0 Sociedad 
Colectiva 
€ 0 Sociedad en 
comandita 
€ 0 
Hungary Polgári 
Jogi 
Társaság 
€ 0 Kkt € 0 Bt € 0 
Poland s.c. € 0 sp.j. € 0 sp.k. € 0(VI) 
      
UK   General 
Partnership 
€ 0 Limited 
Partnership 
€ 0 
  Joint 
Venture 
€ 0 LLP € 0 
(IV)   For KGaA: € 50,000. 
(V)   For SCA: € 37,000; for publicly listed SCA: € 225,000. 
(VI) For sp.k.a.: ~ € 12,500. 
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2.5. Empirical findings 
2.5.1. Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 2.5 contains simple comparisons of daily incorporations before and after the 
respective reform date. In all reform countries, average daily incorporations 
increased considerably in the year after the reform came into force, most 
conspicuously in Hungary by around 85 percent. In Germany, incorporations are 
driven by the UG, for which the minimum capital requirement has been abolished. 
All private LLCs in the reform countries show two-digit growth rates with the 
exception of the German non-UG GmbH, which lost on average 3 percent after the 
reform went into force. The smallest increase in incorporations occurred in Spain, the 
only reform jurisdiction which did not cut the statutory minimum capital 
requirement. 
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Table 2.5 Average daily incorporations one year before and after company law reform and percentage change 
Country Legal form Reform date Pre reform Post reform Percentage change 
Spain SL 
SL (incl. SLNE)
02.06.2003 
02.06.2003
187.7
187.7
212.3
214.7
+13.1 
+14.4 
France SARL 
SARL (incl. EURL)
05.08.2003 
05.08.2003
117.9
138.4
145.8
175.3
+23.7 
+26.7 
Hungary Kft. 01.09.2007 20.7 38.3 +85.1 
Germany GmbH 
GmbH (incl. UG)
- 
01.11.2008
268.1
268.1
259.7
337.9
-3.1 
+26.0 
Poland(I) sp. z o.o. 08.01.2009 35.0 40.1 +14.5 
(I)  Since the Polish data is only available at a monthly frequency, we divided monthly incorporations by 30. 
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2.5.2. Does corporate law reform promote the domestic LLC form? 
 
The simple comparison of daily incorporations (before and after the company law 
reform came into force) shows that private LLCs gained 14 to 85 percent in the five 
reform jurisdictions. Because these findings might only reflect a general trend in 
incorporations, the business cycle or other factors unrelated to the reforms, we apply 
a difference-in-difference approach. Given that a standard ordinary least squares 
estimator is hardly suitable for count data such as company incorporations (in 
particular as there are no negative incorporations), we estimate the following 
negative binomial model: 
 
Pr൫y୧ଵ,y୧ଶ … y୧T൯ ൌ  F ሺβଵTreat1୧ ൅ βଶPostReform୲ ൅ βଷPostReform୲ כ Treat1୧ ൅ 
 
                                            γଵIndustryOutput୲  ൅  ∑ d ൅ ε୧୲ሻ  
 
where the dependent variable y୧୲ is the number of incorporations in the legal form i at 
a given point in time t. F(.) is a negative binomial distribution function as in Baltagi 
(2008). Treat1 is a dummy variable indicating whether the respective legal form was 
affected by the law reform. For the baseline specification, the treatment group 
consists only of the domestic private LLC. Therefore, Treat1 takes the following 
values:  
 
Treat1 = ൝  
 
PostReform is a dummy variable, which equals 1 for the period after the new 
company law entered into force and 0 for the period before. The coefficient of 
interest is the interaction term Treat1*PostReform as it identifies the change in 
private LLC incorporations that is not reflected in a corresponding change in public 
LLC incorporations. IndustryOutput is the seasonally adjusted industry output, which 
serves as a proxy for the business cycle. We also include country dummies to 
account for time invariant country specific effects.21 In what follows, we report 
incidence rate ratios as they can be conveniently interpreted as multiplicative effect 
                                                             
21 In unreported specifications we have also included time dummies, which did not change our 
results. 
0 if ݅ is a domestic public LLC 
1 if ݅ is a domestic private LLC 
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or semi-elasticity. This implies that all estimates below one indicate a negative 
effect, while estimates greater than one reveal a positive relationship. 
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Table 2.6 Results of quasi-experiment – Promotion of domestic LLCs 
Spain  France  Hungary  Germany  Poland  General Sample  Subsample(I)   
PostReform 0.89 * 0.80 * 1.89 *** 0.76 *** 0.69 *** 0.92   0.84 * 
  (0.08)   (0.09)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.29)   (0.06)   
Treat1 35.00 *** 123.17 *** 79.75 *** 44.12 *** 25.13 *** 48.82 *** 56.11 *** 
  (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   
PostReform*Treat1 1.28 *** 1.59 ** 0.98 1.65 *** 1.66 *** 1.49 *** 1.48 *** 
  (0.01)   (0.02)   (0.89) (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   
IndustryOutput - - - - - 1.00  * 1.00 
  (0.08)   (0.36) 
Log Pseudolikelihood -6520.01   -5415.02   -3660.83  -5998.74 -240.39 -1517.15 -999.66 
N 1462 1462 1462 1462 48 240   144 
Frequency day day day day month  month   month 
Public LLC Reform no  no  yes  no  yes  partly   none   
 
Incidence rate ratios, robust standard errors, p-values in parentheses, country fixed effects. *, ** and *** indicate p-values of 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent 
significance level, respectively. 
(I) The subsample consists of Spain, France and Germany. 
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The estimates confirm a substantial effect of the company law reforms on the 
popularity of domestic private LLCs in France (+59%), Germany (+65%) and Poland 
(+66%). The effect for Poland may well have been underestimated given that the 
public LLC was reformed simultaneously. In the case of Spain, the increase in daily 
incorporations is again relatively small (+28%), which may be attributed to the fact 
that the Spanish reform did not affect the minimum capital requirement. We fail to 
find a significant reform effect for Hungary. As in Poland, Hungary facilitated 
incorporations of both private and public LLCs at the same time.22 In addition, the 
public LLC for some reason is a poor control group for private LLCs as 
incorporations of the two company types used to be barely correlated before the 
reform (see Table 2.2 above). In Spain, France and Germany, the reforms were 
confined to the private LLC so that the public LLC – the control group – remained 
entirely unaffected. In these three jurisdictions, the average treatment effect amounts 
to 48 percent. Including Poland and Hungary, the average treatment effect rises only 
slightly to 49 percent. Monthly industry output as a proxy for the business cycle has 
neither an economic nor a statistical impact on LLC incorporations. 
 
2.5.3. Does corporate law reform promote entrepreneurship? 
 
A rise in private LLC incorporations must not be confused with a growth in 
entrepreneurship. It may be that domestic private LLCs have only substituted other 
legal forms, such as partnerships or foreign private LLCs. In this case, the increase in 
incorporations of domestic private LLCs could partly or fully be offset by a decrease 
in newly formed partnerships or UK private LLC. To examine whether company law 
reforms create a positive net effect for entrepreneurship, we need to consider the 
relevant substitutes. We therefore estimate difference-in-difference as before, but 
with the treatment group now consisting of (domestic) private LLCs, general and 
limited partnerships as well as UK private LLCs: 
 
Pr൫y୧ଵ,y୧ଶ … y୧T൯ ൌ  F ሺβଵTreat2୧ ൅ βଶPostReform୲ ൅ βଷPostReform୲ כ Treat2୧ ൅ 
 
                                            γଵIndustryOutput୲  ൅  ∑ d ൅ ε୧୲ሻ  
                                                             
22 Among other measures, the reform lowered the minimum capital requirement for the public 
LLC from HUF 20 million to HUF 5 million (i.e. from around € 69,690 to € 17,420). 
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where 
 
Treat2 = ൝  
 
0 if ݅ is a public LLC 
1 if ݅ is a domestic private LLC, partnership or UK private LLC 
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Table 2.7 Results of quasi-experiment – Promotion of entrepreneurship 
Spain  France  Hungary  Germany  Poland  General Sample  Subsample(I)   
PostReform 0.89 * 0.80 * 1.89 *** 0.76 *** 0.66 *** 0.93   0.84 
  (0.08)   (0.09)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.50)   (0.17) 
Treat2 8.80 *** 31.16 *** 27.19 *** 12.48 *** 7.42 *** 13.15 *** 13.78 *** 
  (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   
PostReform*Treat2 1.28 ** 1.59 ** 0.78 1.58 *** 1.56   1.38 * 1.45   
  (0.02)   (0.03)   (0.13) (0.00)   (0.15)   (0.06)   (0.11)   
IndustryOutput - - - - - 1.00 1.00 
  (0.52) (0.80) 
Log Pseudolikelihood -10018.41   -9096.94   -7286.93  -11745.98 -13581.31 -3665.87 -3665.87 
N 3655   3655  3655 3655   120  600 360  
Frequency day day day day month  month month 
Public LLC Reform no no  yes  no  yes  partly   none   
 
Incidence rate ratios, robust standard errors, p-values in parentheses, country fixed effects. *, ** and *** indicate p-values of 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent significance 
level, respectively. 
(I) The subsample consists of Spain, France and Germany. 
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Including partnerships and UK private LLCs in the treatment group changes the 
earlier findings for some of the jurisdictions under consideration. The treatment 
effect for Germany is still highly significant but slightly smaller (+58%) than in the 
original setting. The results for France and Spain remain significant at the 5%-level 
and exhibit the same economic magnitude as before (+59% and +28%, respectively). 
At least for these three countries, our results strongly support the conclusion that 
facilitating private LLC incorporations leads to a net growth in start-up activity. By 
contrast, the treatment effect for Poland not only decreases somewhat in magnitude 
but also loses statistical significance. We attribute the loss in statistical significance 
to the fact that the data from Poland is only available at a monthly frequency. In the 
case of Hungary, the result turns out even more negative than before. Again, it may 
be that – for whatever reason – the public LLC is a bad control group for the creation 
of small start-up firms in Hungary. In both Poland and Hungary, reforms 
simultaneously aimed at making public LLCs more attractive, which tends to dilute 
the effect we measure based on public LLCs as a control group. The average 
treatment effect for the general sample decreases in magnitude (+38%) and remains 
only weakly significant, while the effects in the Spanish, French and German 
subsample declines somewhat less (+45%) but ceases to be significant at 
conventional levels. Again, the cross-country estimates are based on monthly 
incorporation data because we do not have daily data for Poland. This may be a 
technical reason for the loss in significance in the two broader samples. 
 
2.6. Robustness: Germany 
 
In the previous subsection, we have included certain partnership forms and the UK 
private LLC in our analysis to account for substitution effects with other legal forms. 
However, our data do not cover all available legal forms of doing business. For 
instance, a single entrepreneur can start a firm as a sole proprietor.23 It stands to 
reason that a sole proprietor may have incentives to incorporate her business as a 
private LLC if incorporation costs are sufficiently low. We therefore investigate the 
robustness of our findings by including a certain class of sole proprietors, namely 
                                                             
23  Another example are civil law partnerships in some jurisdictions, which are not registered 
and hence do not show up in our data. 
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‘registered merchants’ in Germany. A ‘merchant’ under German law is any 
individual conducting a for-profit business activity that does not consist of a liberal 
profession, farming and forestry, or the management of the person’s own wealth. As 
such, a merchant has to be registered in the commercial register (Handelsregister). 
We were thus able to obtain data on ‘registered merchants’ (eingetragener 
Kaufmann, e.K.) from the German commercial register. In addition to considering 
more legal forms, we extend the timeframe of our German sample to two years 
(instead of one year) before and after the reform. Based on this broader data, we 
estimate a similar model as in the previous subsection but with 
 
Treat3 = ቄ  
 
Depending on the frequency of observations, we find our earlier results strongly 
confirmed. Taking registered merchants into account, the reform effect on German 
start-up firms remains almost unchanged (56% to 66 %). 
 
Table 2.8 Robustness Germany: Two years before and after law reform / treat-
ment group includes sole proprietor 
Germany  Germany  
PostReform 0.74 *** 0.72 *** 
  (0.00)   (0.00)   
Treat3 11.13 *** 14.30 *** 
  (0.00)   (0.00)   
PostReform*Treat3 1.56 *** 1.66 *** 
  (0.00)   (0.00)   
IndustryOutput 1.00 
(0.96) 
Log Pseudolikelihood -32933.07   -2491.49 
N 8668   392 
Frequency day   month 
 
Incidence rate ratios, robust standard errors, p-values in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate p-values 
of 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent significance level, respectively. 
 
As another robustness check Angrist and Pischke (2009) and Autor (2003) suggest to 
test for causality in the spirit of Granger (1969). We therefore specify a model 
0 if ݅ is a domestic public LLC 
1 if ݅ is a domestic private LLC, partnership, sole proprietor or UK private LLC 
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including lags and leads of the company law reform. If a decline in incorporations 
leads to the adoption of the new company law, lagged variables might provide 
evidence for reverse causality. To examine this, we extend our last specification for 
Germany by indicator variables for each of the three months before the reform, for 
the reform month itself and for the first and second month after the reform. A 
seventh dummy variable takes the value one in all months following the second post-
reform month. Figure 2.4 shows that the effect of the three dummies for the pre-
reform months are negative but not significant, with the third pre-reform month 
being close to an incidence rate ratio of one, as one would expect in the absence of 
reverse causality. Rather, the time pattern suggests that entrepreneurs anticipated the 
reform and waited to take advantage of lower incorporation costs. In contrast, the 
coefficients of all post-reform months are positive and highly significant. The fact 
that our dummy for the time from the third post-reform month onwards is positive 
and highly significant provides some evidence for the persistence of the effect. 
 
 
Figure 2.4 Results of quasi-experiment – Robustness Germany: Incidence rate 
ratios for pre-reform, reform and post-reform months 
 
2.7. Summary and conclusion 
 
Using a difference-in-difference approach, we study whether the company law 
reforms in Spain, France, Hungary, Germany and Poland have fostered the 
popularity of national legal forms. Generally speaking, the reforms appear to 
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encourage both LLC incorporations and entrepreneurial activity. Looking only at 
incorporations of domestic private LLCs, the legal changes have an effect in four out 
of five jurisdictions that is of statistical and economic significance, ranging from an 
increase by 28 percent to 66 percent. Only Hungary fails to produce a significant 
increase in incorporations. A likely reason is that the public LLC is a poor control 
group in this particular case;24 based on the mere number of daily private LLC 
incorporations, Hungary witnessed the highest percentage increase of all reform 
countries (see Table 5). Of the four jurisdictions where we are able to demonstrate a 
significant effect, the surge in incorporations is greatest in France, Germany and 
Poland where the statutory minimum capital requirement was lowered or abolished. 
As to the effect on entrepreneurial activity more generally, we find that the legal 
changes not only boosted incorporations of private LLCs but also raised the total 
number of new firms. This result holds even if one takes possible substitution effects 
with UK private LLCs, partnerships and (in the case of Germany) ‘registered 
merchants’ into account.  
 
These empirical results strongly support our theoretical predictions that reducing the 
costs of registering LLCs fosters incorporations as well as general start-up activity 
irrespective of legal form. Cutting regulatory costs of incorporating increases the 
expected value of doing business, shifting the supply curve to the right so that more 
individuals in the economy are willing to engage in entrepreneurship. There is, of 
course, an important caveat to our findings: While the reforms have evidently 
fostered the creation of new firms, we have little to say about their quality. It may be 
that lowering the regulatory costs of incorporations lures mostly incompetent or 
unproductive entrepreneurs. To examine whether regulatory restrictions serve a 
valuable screening role, one would have to track the success of the new post-reform 
start-up firms over time. However, what our evidence shows is that lower 
incorporation costs accomplish more than just inducing would-be entrepreneurs to 
switch to the private LLC in order to enjoy limited liability; they succeed in fostering 
overall start-up activity.  
                                                             
24  Apart from the puzzling fact that private and public LLC incorporations are virtually 
uncorrelated in Hungary (cf. Table 2.2), the public LLC has been subject to a reform 
treatment at the same time as the private LLC. 
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3. Incorporating under European Law: The Societas Europaea As a 
Vehicle for Legal Arbitrage∗ 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
When Council Regulation (EC) No 2157/2001 on the Statute for a European 
Company (Societas Europaea – SE) became effective on 8 October 2004, the first 
supranational type of company entered the European stage. After one year, only 16 
firms had ventured into the new territory. The European Company seemed to be the 
stillborn that many commentators had predicted. In the following years, however, the 
SE refuted the critics. With annual growth rates of around 100 percent, the number of 
European Companies had eventually increased beyond 200 by April 2008.25 If SE 
incorporations continue at the same pace, more than a thousand firms will have 
chosen this European corporate form by the year 2010. 
 
The SE’s growing success raises the question of what is driving SE incorporations. 
In this article, we argue that legal arbitrage – exploiting differences between legal 
rules of different jurisdictions – is the primary motive for managers and shareholders 
to opt for the SE. Although the SE Regulation fails to provide a fully-fledged 
company law regime and refers many matters to the laws of the Member States, there 
might still be enough scope for legal arbitrage to render the SE more attractive than 
domestic companies of at least some Member States.26 Since the European legislator 
created the SE to facilitate business activity in the European Union (EU) internal 
market, it seems straightforward (and even trivial) that the SE should offer certain 
                                                             
∗ A published version of this chapter appeared under the same title in the European Business 
Organization Law Review 10 (March 2009): 1-33. © 2009 by TMC Asser Press. All rights 
reserved. It was reprinted in the conference volume The Law and Economics of Corporate 
Governance edited by Alessio M. Pacces. © 2010 by Edward Elgar Publishing. We would 
like to thank the 26 interview participants without whom this project would not have been 
possible. Furthermore, we are indebted to John Armour, Matthias Dischinger, Andreas 
Haufler, Tobias Tröger, Joachim Winter, Klaus Wohlrabe and participants in the Public 
Economics Seminar at the University of Munich, the Conference on Changing Perspectives 
on Corporate Law and Economics at the Erasmus University Rotterdam and the Conference 
on New Developments in Law and Economics at the University of Innsbruck. 
25  See infra sections 3.4.1. and 3.5.1.1. 
26  By transferring the registered office to another Member State, the SE can also be used to 
shop for the most favourable gap-filling company law, see infra our hypothesis H3.2 in 
section 3.3. 
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advantages over national companies, particularly with a view to cross-border 
corporate mobility. Some commentators have even suggested that the opportunities 
for legal arbitrage extend far beyond the advantages envisaged by the European 
legislator. In their view, firms can use the SE corporate form to escape various 
restrictions of Member State law, even ones that do not relate to cross-border 
mobility (Enriques 2004a; Reichert 2008). By contrast, others have argued that the 
absence of specific tax rules for the SE as well as the complexity of the incorporation 
process work against potential cost savings and hence against legal arbitrage 
(McCahery and Vermeulen 2005; Bratton et al. 2009). Whether and in what regard 
the SE is indeed an attractive vehicle for legal arbitrage is an open and empirical 
question. 
 
In attempting to resolve this question, we cannot rely on a large dataset that would 
allow us to apply advanced econometric techniques. Therefore, we decided to follow 
a dual empirical strategy. This approach allows us to compare the results of two 
distinct methods and to evaluate the robustness of our findings. In a first step, we 
conducted a structured telephone survey among German SE users27 to ask them 
about their motives for choosing the European corporate form. In a second step, we 
broadened the scope of the analysis to the European Economic Area (EEA) by using 
a simple ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model. Both approaches are based 
on a unique dataset drawing on information from national company registers as well 
as the Official Journal of the European Union (OJEU). 
 
We find that the SE enjoys increasing popularity only in some jurisdictions. The 
evidence indicates that the domestic regulatory environment has a strong impact on 
SE formations. Legal arbitrage seems to be a primary motive for entrepreneurs to use 
the new supranational legal form. More specifically, we find strong evidence that 
mandatory worker co-determination is driving SE incorporations – firms seek to 
reduce the effect of such co-determination regimes. The option to transfer the 
registered office, the availability of the one-tier board structure and the opportunity 
to consummate a cross-border merger also seem to explain SE formations. 
                                                             
27  See infra section 3.4.2. 
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The article is structured as follows: section 3.2. gives a brief overview of the 
literature on corporate charter competition and legal arbitrage. In section 3.3., we 
suggest five hypotheses on the driving forces behind SE formations that guide our 
empirical analysis. Section 3.4. introduces the dataset and the methodology used. 
The empirical results are presented in section 3.5. Section 3.6. concludes. 
 
3.2. Literature 
 
Legal arbitrage can be defined as taking advantage of differences between legal 
regimes governing the same economic activities (or close substitutes). In the case of 
company law, legal arbitrage may occur especially when firms can choose to 
incorporate in different jurisdictions without having to relocate their business 
activities. Corporate law arbitrage is a demand-side precondition for charter 
competition among jurisdictions: if firms do not react to differences in company law, 
there is no point for jurisdictions in competing for incorporations.28 Legal arbitrage, 
therefore, bears on the longstanding academic debate on charter competition. As is 
well-known, Cary (1974) argued that corporate charter competition resulted in a 
‘race to the bottom’ and thus justified federal intervention. The opposite claim was 
made by Winter (1977), who asserted that competition between states would tend to 
produce optimal legal rules, rendering federal regulation dispensable and even 
harmful. The debate has since then not led to firm conclusions. Evaluating the 
literature after twenty years, Bratton (1994) depicts corporate charter competition as 
a race to ‘nowhere in particular’, benefiting some stakeholders but not others. It has 
also been claimed that the dominant position of Delaware is mainly due to network 
effects (Klausner 1995) and not the result of superior corporate law. The empirical 
evidence on the effects of charter competition in the United States is similarly 
inconclusive. To analyse the efficiency of competing corporate law regimes, event 
studies have been used to determine how reincorporations – typically to Delaware – 
affect firm value. The available evidence tends to confirm that reincorporations 
                                                             
28  Note that legal arbitrage is not sufficient for charter competition (see Enriques 2004a): 
despite arbitrage activity, jurisdictions can still choose not to compete, e.g. because they lack 
incentives to attract incorporators or due to interest group pressure. Moreover, while ‘legal 
arbitrage’ is sometimes employed in a pejorative sense, we use it as a purely descriptive 
term. 
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enhance shareholder value as measured by stock prices (Romano 1993),29 indicating 
that charter competition may lead to more efficient corporate law. However, the fact 
that Delaware offers relatively strong anti-takeover protection and that these 
provisions seem to be driving incorporations has shed doubt on these results 
(Bebchuk and Cohen 2003). 
 
Until recently, charter competition was mostly irrelevant in the EU/EEA. European 
company law has been characterised as a long-term non-compete agreement among 
Member States (McCahery and Vermeulen 2005) under the influence of intense 
interest group pressure (Carney 1997). Beginning in 1999, a line of cases decided by 
the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has fundamentally transformed the corporate 
law landscape. Under the new case law, firms can incorporate in any Member State 
even if their business activities are located elsewhere in the EEA. Also, while 
transferring the registered office of an existing company to a different jurisdiction 
used to be difficult or even impossible (Enriques 2004b), the enactment of Cross-
Border Merger Directive 2005/56/EC and its transposition into Member State law 
will greatly facilitate such reincorporations. The emergence of charter competition in 
Europe is discussed, among others, by Eidenmüller (2007) and Tröger (2005). 
Empirical work on legal arbitrage and charter competition in Europe is sparse. A 
thorough and highly influential analysis is due to Becht et al. (2008). They identify 
minimum capital requirements and the regulatory burden on start-ups as a major 
driver for choosing a foreign corporate law. Apart from this, the empirical literature 
is confined to the burdensome task of collecting descriptive statistical data (e.g. 
Niemeier 2007; Eidenmüller 2007). 
 
The advent of the SE has extended the menu of options for incorporators. It has been 
suggested that the SE is an attractive vehicle for legal arbitrage, enabling firms to 
shop for a more favourable corporate law as well as to save on corporate taxes by 
moving to a different tax jurisdiction (Enriques 2004a; Reichert 2008). Indeed, the 
SE corporate form facilitates cross-border mergers as well as a transfer of a 
company’s registered office; it allows public companies to switch to a one-tier board 
                                                             
29  Using a different methodology, Daines (2001) also provides evidence in favor of Delaware; 
against him Subramanian (2004).  
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system, to reduce the size of supervisory boards in large firms and to avoid worker 
co-determination or freeze the existing level of co-determination in medium-sized 
firms (Reichert 2008). So far, there is only anecdotal evidence on whether and to 
what extent firms have exploited these potential advantages of the SE. Some 
commentators are sceptical as to its legal arbitrage potential. Bratton et al. (2009) 
claim that the SE has opened the door, but not widely enough to serve as a vehicle 
for legal arbitrage. They argue that switching to the SE is too expensive und future 
benefits for firms are largely uncertain. 
 
The demand for the SE and whether it is driven by legal arbitrage (rather than, say, 
the SE’s European image) has not been subjected to rigorous empirical scrutiny. 
Again, most empirical contributions have focused on keeping track of the number 
and regional dispersion of incorporations (Bayer and Schmidt 2008; Eidenmüller et 
al. 2008). In this respect, the website of the European Trade Union Institute in 
collaboration with the Hans Böckler Foundation now provides an up-to-date 
overview of SE incorporations that can be accessed at a fee.30 Keller and Werner 
(2007, 2008) survey the design of worker co-determination adopted in individual 
SEs, thus providing case study evidence on one important aspect of legal arbitrage. A 
more comprehensive empirical analysis on the reasons for incorporations under 
European law and, more specifically, the use of the SE as a vehicle for legal 
arbitrage is still lacking. It is to this that we now turn. 
 
3.3. Hypotheses 
 
The SE is in many respects comparable to a national public company. The taxation, 
insolvency rules and even a great deal of the applicable corporate law are rather 
identical to an entity established under national law. Nevertheless, there are some 
crucial differences that make the SE a convenient vehicle for legal arbitrage. We will 
consider in turn the factors that seem likely to influence SE formations and formulate 
testable hypotheses. 
 
                                                             
30 See http://www.worker-participation.eu.  
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Setting up a company inevitably involves paying fees and carrying a certain 
bureaucratic burden. The SE is no exception. As with any firm, incorporation costs31 
should be expected to hamper SE formations.32 Depending on the method used and 
the size of the company, the costs of switching to the SE corporate form can be 
significant: Allianz SE and BASF SE have estimated their reincorporation costs at    
€ 95 million and € 5 million, respectively.33 From a legal arbitrage perspective, the 
most interesting question to ask is whether SE incorporation costs differ from those 
of competing national company forms. For instance, if an SE were less costly to 
incorporate than a company under Member State law this would constitute an 
additional opportunity for legal arbitrage. Differences in incorporation costs have 
been shown to be a major driver of demand in charter competition between national 
jurisdictions (Becht et al. 2008). If, on the other hand, the European Company faces 
relatively higher set-up costs, the advantages offered by the SE must be larger to 
overcome this additional hurdle. 
 
Founding a European Company requires registration in the company’s home state. At 
first blush, this would seem to preclude any difference in incorporation costs 
between the SE and the national companies of its home state.34 However, there are 
reasons to suspect that setting up an SE is more difficult and hence more costly 
because company registers and advisers are less familiar with it. Other things being 
equal, the European Company should flourish in jurisdictions that impose a relatively 
low excess burden on SE incorporations. We therefore hypothesise that the 
                                                             
31  We define ‘incorporation costs’ as the expenses, delay, risk and loss in flexibility incurred 
for setting up a company. A minimum capital requirement imposes incorporation costs in the 
sense that it restricts the company’s flexibility. Of course, the amount of the minimum capital 
as such does not constitute a cost as it can be invested by the company. 
32  See Djankov et al. (2002) providing evidence that a higher regulatory burden on firm entry 
results from rent-seeking by politicians and bureaucrats rather than from an attempt to 
remedy market failures. 
33  In the case of Allianz SE it should be noted that the conversion was consummated as part of 
a major cross-border merger, which would always entail considerable transaction costs.  
34  Of course, incorporation costs can be reduced by registering the SE in another (low-cost) 
Member State. However, this would require (re)locating the company’s head office in the 
state of incorporation, see SE Regulation, Article 7 and 64. Also, an existing company cannot 
be merged into an SE without the involvement (and hence the regulatory cost burden) of its 
home state, cf., SE Regulation, Article 25. If the company is converted into an SE under SE 
Regulation, Article 2(4) and 37, it cannot, at the same instance, transfer its registered office 
to another Member State, SE Regulation Art. 37(3). For all of these reasons, we only 
consider domestic SEs as an alternative to domestic national companies. 
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difference in incorporation costs between the SE and national companies has an 
influence on the number of SEs in a country.  
 
H1: The excess costs of incorporating an SE as compared to incorporating a 
national company have a negative impact on SE formations. 
 
Before incorporating as a European Company, management and employees are 
required to negotiate the terms of worker representation in the firm. Although 
employees can, under certain conditions, insist on preserving the level of board 
representation that prevailed before reincorporation as an SE, other less stringent or 
more flexible arrangements can be agreed upon (SE Employee Involvement 
Directive,35 Article 4(2), (3), Article. 7(2)). Even if pre-existing worker co-
determination remains untouched, the SE will not be subject to size thresholds for 
enhanced co-determination requirements under national law.36 For instance, if an SE 
is situated in Germany and grows beyond 2,000 employees, it does not come under 
the enhanced ‘equal co-determination’ regime (cf., German Co-Determination Act 
(Mitbestimmungsgesetz) §1(1)). Also, employees can only (if at all) insist on the 
same proportional representation on the board whereas board size and hence the 
number of employee representatives can be reduced (cf., SE Employee Involvement 
Directive, Annex Part 3 lit. b (‘proportion’)). The European charter can thus be used 
to loosen the grip of national co-determination laws. It seems plausible that 
shareholders and (perhaps) managers may seek to do just that (Charny 1991). 
Consequently, we expect them to use the SE as a vehicle to reduce the influence of 
national co-determination rules or even as an instrument to avoid them completely 
(where possible). Hence, the SE should be more popular in countries that have 
mandatory worker co-determination.37  
 
H2: Countries with mandatory worker co-determination rules exhibit more SE 
formations. 
 
                                                             
35  Council Directive 2001/86/EC supplementing the Statute for a European company with 
regard to the involvement of employees. 
36  This follows from Article 13(2) of the SE Employee Involvement Directive, which precludes 
the general Member State rules on employee representation at board level. 
37  Furthermore, companies using the legal form of the SE should tend to have less stringent co-
determination rules than comparable national corporations. 
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The European legislator designed the SE specifically to cater to the needs of cross-
border business activity in the internal market. It is therefore no surprise that the 
European Company facilitates corporate mobility within the EEA. Community law 
enables the SE to transfer its registered office to another Member State. National 
companies do not enjoy this freedom (Ringe 2007). This possibility, in and of itself, 
constitutes an advantage of the SE corporate form. Yet the ability to move freely 
throughout the internal market seems to be just a natural corollary of the SE being 
the product of Community legislation. It is more interesting to ask whether mobility 
between Member States offers additional opportunities for legal arbitrage between 
national jurisdictions. Perhaps most importantly, the corporate tax burden can differ 
significantly depending on where the company is located. Firms could use the SE 
corporate form to exploit differences in tax treatment by transferring the company’s 
seat to a more favourable jurisdiction. 
 
However, cross-border corporate mobility is not an exclusive privilege of the 
European Company. Due to the recent ECJ’s case law, national companies are no 
longer barred from conducting all or part of their business activities abroad provided 
that their home state permits such a move.38 As a company’s residence for tax 
purposes is usually determined by the place of its ‘real seat’ or effective management 
(instead of the registered office or applicable corporate law),39 moving to a 
favourable tax jurisdiction does not necessitate a transfer of the registered office. In 
addition, after the adoption of the Cross-Border Merger Directive in 2005 and its 
transposition into Member State law, national companies will be able to merge into 
an empty (special purpose) company of the target jurisdiction, thereby switching the 
applicable corporate law and – by consequence – transferring the registered office. 
 
While the SE’s advantage over national companies has waned, it is, or may have 
been for some time, the safest choice to ensure corporate mobility within the EEA. 
When a national company relocates only its head office to another Member State, it 
                                                             
38  The home state can prevent its companies from shifting their head office abroad, see ECJ, 
Case C-210/06 Cartesio Oktató és Szolgáltató bt [2008].  
39  Cf., Art. 4(3) of the OECD Model Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital 
(as it reads on 15 July 2005). 
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still faces uncertainty over not only its tax treatment but also other matters of, inter 
alia, company and insolvency law.40 Full-blown reincorporation has been made 
possible only recently; even now, the Cross-Border Merger Directive has not been 
implemented in all Member States. In view of these pitfalls and ambiguities, a tax-
related demand for company mobility may have driven (and may continue to drive) 
SE formations. As using the SE corporate form facilitates relocation in the future, we 
conjecture that jurisdictions with comparatively inauspicious tax conditions will 
exhibit more SE incorporations: 
 
H3.1: More SEs will be formed in jurisdictions with less favourable company 
taxation. 
 
Apart from company taxation, Member State jurisdictions also differ in other 
important aspects. Legal scholars have been particularly interested in how the SE can 
be used to engage in company law arbitrage (Bratton et al. 2009; Enriques 2004a). 
Although the European Company owes its existence to Community law, it is in great 
part governed by national company law rules because the SE Regulation often makes 
reference to the company law of the SE’s home state, i.e. the national jurisdiction of 
the company’s registered office.41 Shareholders and management can choose a 
jurisdiction to fill the gaps in the SE Regulation by transferring the registered office 
to the respective Member State. This might be a motive for choosing the SE in the 
first place. However, the choice for a particular gap-filling law cannot be made in 
isolation. As a tribute to the ‘real seat theory’, Article 7 of the SE Regulation 
requires the registered office to be in the same Member State as the company’s head 
office. While the same requirement applies, of course, to tax-induced relocations, 
incentives to exploit differences in company law might be weaker. While we tend to 
be agnostic, our working hypothesis is the following: 
 
H3.2: Firms incorporate in the SE form to shop for an attractive gap-filling 
company law. 
                                                             
40  For instance, German companies still run a considerable risk of forced dissolution when 
shifting their head offices abroad. The issue is being addressed by §4a GmbHG, §5a AktG as 
amended by the 2008 Act to Modernise Private Company Law and to Combat Abuses 
(Gesetz zur Modernisierung des GmbH-Rechts und zur Bekämpfung von Missbräuchen, 
MoMiG). On the European level, Art. 3(1) sentence 2 of Council Regulation (EC) No. 
1346/2000 on insolvency proceedings establishes a presumption that the centre of a 
(company) debtor’s main interests coincides with its registered office. 
41  Cf., the general reference in SE Regulation, Article 9(1)(c)(ii).  
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The SE Regulation itself offers individual companies a choice between a governance 
structure with one single board of directors (ineptly referred to as ‘administrative 
organ’ by the Regulation) or a separation between a management board 
(‘management organ’) and a supervisory board (‘supervisory organ’). By contrast, 
only few European jurisdictions give firms a choice between the one-tier and the 
two-tier board structure. Since the one-tier structure involves only a single corporate 
body, one would expect it to be less costly, at least with respect to direct costs. Start-
up companies and closely held firms can gain flexibility and save on board 
compensation while for them a separate supervisory board often does not accomplish 
much in terms of reducing agency costs. Hence, we hypothesise that the SE is 
especially attractive in countries that (with respect to public companies) provide 
solely for the two-tier system. 
 
H4: The sole availability of the two-tier board system in a jurisdiction has a 
positive impact on SE formations. 
 
Finally, before the Merger Directive was enacted in 2005, the SE Regulation offered 
the only safe way to accomplish a transnational merger. This was no doubt a motive 
for the establishment of Allianz SE (Hemeling 2008). It is less clear, however, 
whether it is still an important reason for using the SE today. The Cross-Border 
Merger Directive should provide national companies from different jurisdictions 
with a safe and tractable way to accomplish a merger in the future. Since the 
Directive has been implemented only recently (if at all), we expect that the SE was in 
fact used as a vehicle for cross-border mergers during our observation period. 
 
H5: Firms use the SE corporate form to accomplish transnational mergers. 
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3.4. Methodology and data 
 
To test our hypotheses we adopt a dual research strategy. While econometric analysis 
is the preferred method of many economists, it does not follow that it is, or should 
be, the only empirical approach (Swann 2006). Using two different methods enabled 
us to overcome the dearth of data as well as to check the robustness of our results.  
 
Firstly, we rely on a structured telephone survey with German SE users. We were 
thus able to obtain information on issues where no dataset is available. For instance, 
the survey provides information on the content of co-determination agreements and 
the way they were reached. Furthermore, we were able simply to ask for the reasons 
why the SE corporate form had been chosen. We are well aware, of course, that 
surveys may suffer from misreporting by interviewees despite our firm assurance of 
anonymity. The fact that many participants expressed that worker co-determination – 
arguably the most sensitive issue in the interview – was a major reason for choosing 
the SE makes us believe that misreporting is not a serious problem. We confined the 
survey to Germany because it is a very popular jurisdiction for SE incorporations and 
because we could guarantee high-quality interviews. 
 
Secondly, we investigate part of our hypotheses by means of a simple econometric 
model using a cross-section of the EEA countries. A major virtue of this approach is 
that we do not have to conduct field work in 30 different jurisdictions. We further 
benefited from the fact that the regression analysis allows us to make ceteris paribus 
statements so that we can estimate the influence of mandatory co-determination 
regimes on SE incorporations while controlling for the effect of tax rates and other 
variables that might affect these incorporations. 
 
3.4.1. Data from company registers 
 
Both empirical approaches required us to identify the existing SEs (as of June 2008). 
Notice of each SE incorporation is supposed to be published in the OJEU according 
to SE Regulation, Article 14, which seems to imply (but does not state explicitly) 
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that the national company register is responsible for forwarding the information to 
the EU Office for Official Publications. We doubted the quality of this data source 
because there are no legal consequences if an SE is not published in the OJEU. More 
specifically, an SE’s coming into existence does not turn on the required publication. 
We therefore decided to collect the relevant information directly from the national 
company registers. In some Member States, the national register was easily 
accessible through its website. In other cases, we had to contact the company register 
or the respective statistical office by e-mail or letter. Matching our dataset with the 
information from the OJEU confirmed our suspicion: we did not find any SEs in the 
OJEU that did not show up in the Member State records, but we were able to identify 
a large number of incorporated firms that had not made it into the OJEU. Table 3.1 
presents the number of incorporations which could be detected in the national 
company registers by June 2008 but did not show up in the OJEU. The OJEU has 
missed many SEs, particularly from the Czech Republic and Germany. 
 
Table 3.1 Number of additional SE registrations in the national company 
registers as compared to the OJEU in June 2008 
Register Additional registrations 
Czech Republic 43 
Germany 19 
Netherlands 4 
Austria 3 
Cyprus 2 
Slovakia 2 
Hungary 1 
Denmark 1 
Belgium 1 
United Kingdom 1 
 
We complemented the information gathered from company registers with responses 
from our survey, data from LexisNexis, and company websites. To the best of our 
knowledge, the resulting dataset was the most complete one on the European 
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Company that had been generated until then.42 Previous research either focused 
solely on the OJEU or drew just partly on expert knowledge and the national 
commercial registers (Bayer and Schmidt 2008). As the SE is growing more popular, 
it becomes increasingly difficult to keep track of incorporations in 30 different 
company registers. If the EU does not want to rely on a private data collection 
exercise like ours, it should require Member States to provide aggregated numbers 
on SE incorporations.43 
 
3.4.2. Telephone survey 
 
To learn about the driving forces behind SE formations, we carried out a structured 
telephone survey asking individuals who were involved in the incorporation decision 
of German SEs about, inter alia, the principal motives for adopting the new 
supranational legal form. Although a telephone survey is more time-consuming than 
sending out a written questionnaire, it allowed us to increase the participation rate 
significantly. In addition, we were immediately able to clarify ambiguous statements 
so that we could generate a maximum of usable answers. 26 individuals agreed to be 
interviewed. Since some of the respondents represent several firms, e.g. Allianz SE 
and Allianz Investment Management SE, we were able to cover 75 percent of all SEs 
incorporated in Germany, which we consider to be a highly representative sample.44 
For the remaining 25 percent no contact details were available or the contacted 
person indicated that he or she did not wish to participate. All of the interviewees 
occupied a high rank in their respective organisation. In many cases, we talked to the 
CEO or a person who was directly involved in the SE formation process, often the 
company’s legal counsel. When talking to providers of shelf companies,45 we asked 
for the clients’ motives for buying a SE. We were thus able to ascertain the intended 
uses of many shelf SEs which would turn into active SEs in the subsequent months. 
                                                             
42  An up-to-date overview of SEs is maintained by the European Trade Union Institute and the 
Hans Böckler Foundation, see http://www.worker-participation.eu. 
43  The recent Commission proposal for a Council Regulation on the Statute for a European 
Private Company provides for such a requirement, see COM (2008) 396 final, Art. 46(1).   
44  The sample represents 74 percent of active (i.e. non-shelf) SEs in Germany. 
45  We define a ‘shelf company’ as a company which is to be sold to a firm or entrepreneur and 
which does not yet carry out any business activity. Companies that are used as a vehicle for 
holding assets, such as investment companies, are considered ‘active’, not ‘shelf’ companies. 
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Interestingly, nearly all shelf companies had already been sold at the time of the 
interviews. 
 
All interviews were conducted during a narrow timeframe of three weeks in May and 
June 2008 to minimise the influence of periodic changes on the results. Each 
interview took approximately 20 minutes during which 14 questions were discussed. 
To get consistent responses, a structured questionnaire had been designed and was 
completed by the interviewer during each interview. The first block of the 
questionnaire asked general questions about the firm, the formation process of the SE 
and whether the one-tier or two-tier board structure had been adopted. Two questions 
followed on the current size of the board and whether it had been changed upon 
registration of the SE. The interviewees were further asked to provide information 
about the fraction of worker representatives currently serving as board members. In 
each interview, we inquired about the motives for choosing the SE corporate form. If 
the respondent did not name a particular reason, we asked explicitly whether the 
following seven issues had played a role: the specific image of the SE in the 
marketplace, choice between the one-tier and two-tier board model, simplification of 
the company structure, worker co-determination, sale of shelf companies, possibility 
to transfer the registered office and accomplishing a transnational merger. Most 
interviewees immediately offered their reasons for adopting the SE and did not 
change their response when we suggested other specific motives from our list. We 
also discussed some of the reasons in more detail: has the registered office already 
been transferred? Does the company plan to do so in the near future? How many 
employees work for the firm? Is there an agreement on worker co-determination at 
board level? If so, what was agreed upon? Finally, we discussed the risks associated 
with establishing an SE as well as potential improvements in the SE company law 
regime. 
 
3.4.3. Regression model 
 
In a second step, we combine the information from the company registers with other 
country-level data to run a simple regression model. Estimating a Probit or Logit 
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model would require detailed firm-level data, which were not available for a 
sufficient number of SEs. Although we observe the number of incorporations in a 
given year, most of the institutional explanatory variables have no variance over 
time, which rules out a panel data analysis. We therefore apply an OLS regression 
since the small-sample properties of this estimator are generally known and 
estimation problems such as omitted variables can be easily evaluated. This is 
important as our sample consists of only 22 EEA countries, for which we were able 
to obtain the relevant data. At the same time, using more sophisticated techniques 
would arguably not add much to our analysis. Some of our independent variables are 
institutionally predetermined and therefore exogenous. Specifically, mandatory 
worker co-determination and the board structure of national companies had mostly 
been instituted decades before the European Company appeared on the stage. As to 
other factors, such as corporate taxes or growth of the national economy, it is 
extremely implausible that they are influenced by the number of SEs, given that all 
over Europe SEs still count in the hundreds. The direction of causality should 
therefore be unambiguous. 
 
We have estimated the following equation: 
 
ln ൬
݊ݑܾ݉݁ݎ ݋݂ ܵܧݏ௜
ݐ݋ݐ݈ܽ ݊ݑܾ݉݁ݎ ݋݂ ݂݅ݎ݉ݏ௜
൰ ൌ  ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵ ݈݊ ݃݀݌0508௜ ൅ ߚଶ  ln ܿ݋ݎ݌ݐܽݔ௜ ൅ ߚଷ ݀݁ݐ݁ݎ௜  
                                                               ൅ ߚସ ݀ݑ݈ܽ݋݈݊ݕ௜ ൅ ߚହ ܾݑݏ݅݊݁ݏݏ௜  ൅ ݑ௜ 
 
As a dependent variable we use the number of SE incorporations divided by the total 
number of firms (rrse). The numerator of this variable contains the number of SEs 
registered in each country by June 2008. A total of 16 European Companies had 
already transferred their registered office to another Member State by then. They 
were counted for the jurisdiction in which they were registered originally because we 
are most interested in what drives the incorporation decision in the first place.46 We 
divided the number of SEs by the total number of firms in the respective (national) 
economy to control for differences affecting business activity generally. Such 
country-specific effects include the size of the national economy, institutional 
                                                             
46  This is in line with the reasoning behind our Hypothesis 3.1 that firms choose the SE 
corporate form with a view to moving to another Member State later on. 
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differences (for instance, tax law can make it attractive to hold assets in a company 
rather than individually), the amount of ‘entrepreneurial spirit’ or the regulatory 
burden on business activity. If, for reasons like these, a country has more firms, one 
would expect the number of SEs to be larger irrespective of legal arbitrage. The data 
on SE incorporations was gathered from the OJEU and the national company 
registers as described above (section 3.4.1.). The number of firms in the economy 
was obtained from the OECD Structural and Demographic Business Statistics 
(SDBS).47 To control for business cycle effects, we also use the variable gdp0508, 
which measures the average growth rate during the years 2005 to 2008 and is based 
on the real GDP growth rates from Eurostat.48 
 
The remaining explanatory variables are intended to examine our hypotheses H1, 
H2, H3.1 and H4 stated in section 3.3. H1 is particularly difficult to test as we cannot 
think of a direct way to observe the incorporation costs incurred specifically by SEs 
and hence the cost differential between setting up an SE as opposed to establishing a 
company under national law. Our hunch is, however, that ‘high-quality’ jurisdictions 
that offer low incorporation costs to their own companies should also be more adept 
in handling the new SE corporate form. Based on this conjecture, we assume that a 
country’s general incorporation costs, i.e. the costs of setting up a (national) 
company, can also serve as a proxy for the cost differential between the SE and a 
national company. Put differently, if a country makes it difficult to incorporate under 
its own national law, it should be even more difficult to bring local counsel, notaries, 
company registers etc., to deal with the unfamiliar and more complicated European 
Company.  
 
We measure incorporation costs using data from the World Bank’s ‘Doing Business’ 
Report (World Bank / International Finance Corporation 2008). Our first variable of 
                                                             
47  The OECD defines a firm (‘enterprise’) as ‘a legal entity possessing the right to conduct 
business on its own; for example to enter into contracts, own property, incur liabilities for 
debts, and establish bank accounts. It may consist of one or more local units or 
establishments corresponding to production units situated in a geographically separate place 
and in which one or more persons work for the enterprise to which they belong.’ 
48  As the first incorporations occurred already in the year 2004 and the year 2008 had not ended 
when this article was published, we tried different intervals without obtaining a significant 
impact on the results.  
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interest (business) represents a ranking based on the Report’s ease of doing business 
index. It reflects a cumulative measure of a country’s regulatory environment 
including the political and legal risks associated with business activities. We use 
business as a first proxy of incorporation costs. We test the robustness of our 
findings by investigating more detailed variables like the number of procedures 
(proce) and the time (time) it takes to start a business as a proxy for the bureaucratic 
burden a company has to deal with. We also consider the expenses of setting up a 
firm (cost) and the minimum capital requirement (mincap) as a percentage of income 
per capita that an entrepreneur must provide for a standardised company.49 The 
information for these variables was taken from the ‘Doing Business’ sub-category 
‘Starting a business’. 
 
To test the impact of mandatory worker co-determination rules (hypothesis H2), we 
include a dummy variable (codeter) in our model. The variable jumps to 1 if the 
respective country has mandatory rules on co-determination for privately owned (i.e. 
non-government) companies. The data was gathered from the European Trade Union 
Institute and the Hans Böckler Foundation (Kluge and Stollt 2006). Of course, a 
single dummy variable inevitably leaves out a lot of institutional detail. Hypothesis 
H3.1 is examined by including the national corporate tax rates (corptax) as provided 
by the European Commission (2006) and KPMG International (2008). With respect 
to H4, we add another dummy variable (dualonly) that jumps to 1 if the respective 
country allows only for the two-tier board system. The data again comes from the 
European Trade Union Institute (Kluge and Stollt 2006). Our variables are described 
in Table 3.2. Table 3.3 contains some descriptive statistics. 
  
                                                             
49  For the definition of the ‘standardised company’ see Djankov et al. (2002). The minimum 
capital requirement was included as one of several proxies for the regulatory burden. The SE 
uniformly requires a minimum capital of €120,000 (Art. 4(2), SE Regulation).   
58 
 
Table 3.2 Variables 
Variable Description 
rrse Number of SEs incorporations by June 2008 divided by the total 
number of firms in the economy. The data on SE incorporations was 
hand-collected from the national company registers in the EEA. The 
number of firms was taken from the OECD Structural and 
Demographic Business Statistics. 
gdp0508 Average real GDP growth rate for the years 2005 to 2008. The data 
comes from Eurostat. 
corptax Statutory corporate tax rates for the year 2006. The data was provided 
by the European Commission and KPMG International. 
deter Dummy variable reflecting rules on mandatory co-determination for 
privately owned companies (1 = mandatory co-determination 
required). The data source is the European Trade Union Institute and 
the Hans Böckler Foundation. 
dualonly Dummy variable reflecting whether the country allows for the one-tier 
board structure in public companies (1 = only two-tier board structure 
available). The source of the data is again the European Trade Union 
Institute and the Hans Böckler Foundation. 
business The rank of a country from 1 to 181 based on an index consisting of a 
simple average on each of 10 subindices covered in ‘Doing Business’. 
The data was taken from the World Bank / International Finance 
Corporation. 
proce Number of procedures needed to set up a firm. Procedures are defined 
as any interaction of the company founder with external parties (for 
example, government agencies, lawyers, auditors or notaries). 
Interactions between company founders or company officers and 
employees are not counted as procedures. Cf., 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/MethodologySurveys/Starting 
Business.aspx. 
time Median duration in calendar days that incorporation lawyers indicate 
is necessary to complete the required procedures. Cf., 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/MethodologySurveys/StartingBusiness. 
aspx. 
cost Fees for government agencies and legal or professional services if 
required by law to set up a firm. Fees are reported as a percentage of 
income per capita. Cf., http://www.doingbusiness.org/ 
MethodologySurveys/StartingBusiness.aspx. 
mincap The minimum capital requirement reflects the amount that a company 
founder needs to deposit in a bank or with a notary before registration 
and up to 3 months following incorporation. It is reported as a 
percentage of the country’s income per capita. Cf., 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/MethodologySurveys/Starting 
Business.aspx. 
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Table 3.3 Descriptive statistics of key variables 
  Mean  
Standard 
deviation Median Minimum Maximum 
Number of 
observations 
Number of 
SEs 
7.2 17.1 1.0 0.0 74.0 30 
Total 
number of 
firms 
668076 692017 448746 22597 2279299 14 
rrse (SEs / 
total firms) 
2.46e-06 6.20e-06 1.53e-06 1.00e-14 309.80e-06 26 
gdp0508 4.2  2.1 3.8 1.1 9.2 29 
corptax 25.6 8.1 27.0 10.0 39.0 28 
codeter 0.4 0.5 0.0 0.0 1.0 30 
dualonly 0.4 0.5 0.0 0.0 1.0 26 
business 32.4 22.5 26.0 5.0 100.0 27 
proce 6.8 2.8 6.0 5.0 15.0 27 
time  19.2 13.5 15.0 4.0 60.0 27 
cost 6.6 6.8 4.2 0.0 23.3 27 
mincap 37.2 39.9 31.1 0.0 196.8 27 
 
 
3.5. Empirical findings 
 
Before turning to the question of what caused incorporations, we present some 
descriptive statistics on our dataset on the European Companies now in existence. 
 
3.5.1. Descriptive statistics  
3.5.1.1. Time trend 
 
Figure 3.1 provides information on monthly and annual SE formations. In each of 
2005, 2006 and 2007, the number of incorporations roughly doubled: in 2005, we 
have been able to identify 21 incorporations. One year later, 40 European Companies 
were formed, and in 2007 the figure rose to 85. In the first months of 2008, 
incorporations reached again two-digit figures, indicating that the previous year’s 
value will be surpassed. If incorporations continue to grow at the same pace as in the 
last three years, there will be significantly more than one hundred incorporations in 
2008. 
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Figure 3.1 SE incorporations from October 2004 to June 2008 
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3.5.1.2. Regional distribution 
 
A look at the regional distribution of incorporations (Table 3.4) yields a surprising 
result. Apart from Germany, it is the Czech Republic that is home to the most SEs 
(Figure 3.2). In the course of one year (May 2007 – May 2008), as many European 
Companies were registered in the Czech Republic as in Germany during the three-
year period from October 2004 to October 2007. By the end of 2008, the Czech 
Republic had surpassed Germany by having incorporated more than 100 SEs. It is 
noteworthy that many Czech SEs are shelf companies which are being offered on 
multilingual websites.50 Nevertheless, there are also active European Companies 
registered in the Czech Republic. For instance, the Český Pivní Festival SE organises 
the beer festival in Prague and the NH Trans SE is a provider of specialised 
transportation services. 
  
                                                             
50  See http://www.eurospolecnosti.cz, http://www.czechcompanies.cz/en and http://www. 
smartcompanies.cz. 
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Table 3.4 Number of SE incorporations, existing SEs and existing SEs by 
population 
SE incorporations Existing SEs Existing SEs / Population 
Germany 74 Germany 70 Liechtenstein 58,0
Czech Republic 62 Czech Republic 61 Luxembourg 20,6
Netherlands 19 Netherlands 15 Cyprus 6,3
Austria 10 Austria 11 Czech Republic 5,9
Belgium 9 Luxembourg 10 Estonia 2,3
France 7 Belgium 8 Austria 1,3
Luxembourg 7 France 7 Latvia 1,3
Sweden 5 United Kingdom 5 Netherlands 0,9
Norway 5 Sweden 5 Germany 0,9
Cyprus 3 Cyprus 5 Belgium 0,8
Estonia 3 Estonia 3 Norway 0,6
Latvia 3 Latvia 3 Sweden 0,6
Slovakia 3 Norway 3 Slovakia 0,6
United Kingdom 2 Slovakia 3 Hungary 0,2
Liechtenstein 1 Liechtenstein 2 France 0,1
Hungary 1 Hungary 2 United Kingdom 0,1
Finland 1 
  
Denmark 1 
Total 216 Total 213   
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Figure 3.2 Existing SEs in Germany, the Czech Republic and the EEA 
 
As of June 2008, one out of two SEs had its registered office in either Germany or 
the Czech Republic. Apart from these two countries, only Austria and the 
Netherlands have double-digit populations of European Companies. Italy, Spain and 
Poland, along with 12 other Member States, did not have a single SE registered by 
this time. 
 
However, the total number of incorporations and of existing SEs shown in the first 
two columns of Table 3.4 may be misleading. Dividing the number of European 
Companies in a country by its population produces a different picture. With less than 
a single SE per 1 million inhabitants Germany drops to the middle of the European 
league; France and the UK fall to the bottom of the table. The top of the list is now 
occupied by small countries. Liechtenstein and Luxembourg stand out, followed by 
Cyprus and the Czech Republic. As small jurisdictions can gain relatively more from 
engaging in regulatory competition, their pre-eminence is already indicative of our 
central hypothesis that the European Company is employed as a vehicle for legal 
arbitrage. This first impression is reinforced by the fact that the lead group of 
Liechtenstein, Luxembourg and Cyprus has attracted 6 European Companies from 
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foreign jurisdictions through a transfer of the registered office (Table 3.5).51 Only the 
UK has been more successful in this regard than each of the small jurisdictions. In 
total, we observed 18 transfers by 16 firms, with some more SEs already planning to 
move their registered office. 
 
Table 3.5 Transfer of registered office of SEs 
Moving out  Moving in  
Germany 4 United Kingdom 4 
Netherlands 4 Luxembourg 3 
Norway 2 Netherlands 2 
Luxembourg 2 Cyprus 2 
Belgium 1 Cayman Islands 2 
Finland 1 Austria 1 
Czech Republic 1 Germany 1 
United Kingdom 1 Liechtenstein 1 
Denmark 1 Hungary 1 
Total 18 Total 18 
 
 
3.5.1.3. Firm size 
 
Our dataset has two measures of firm size: the number of employees and the 
subscribed capital. As the number of employees is only rarely published in the 
company register, we had to collect additional data from financial statements, 
company websites and LexisNexis. As a result, we have identified the number of 
employees for around one third of the total number of 216 SEs. We were able to 
classify nearly all of the remaining firms as either shelf or investment companies that 
do not have employees. 
 
Our data reveals that the SE is frequently used by small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SME). Based on the definition of the German Institut für 
                                                             
51  Two of the European Companies moved to Luxembourg only to reincorporate from there to 
the Cayman Islands, thus providing ‘smoking gun’ evidence of legal arbitrage. See on these 
cases Heuschmid and Schmidt (2007) and Schmidt (2005). 
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Mittelstandsforschung (Institute for SME Research), 13 out of 69 SEs with 
employees are of ‘small’ and 29 of ‘medium’ size;52 that is, almost two thirds of 
them are SMEs. Apparently, SMEs manage to set up a European Company even 
though the SE Regulation requires that at least one party from another Member State 
must be involved to incorporate in the SE form.53 We have learnt from the telephone 
survey that the cross-border requirement is often complied with by using a foreign 
special purpose vehicle, typically a private limited company (‘Ltd.’) from the UK. 
 
Only 6 SEs have more than 10,000 employees group-wide (Figure 3.3). Among them 
are 4 German firms, namely Allianz SE, BASF SE, Fresenius SE and Porsche 
Automobil Holding SE. The remaining two are Strabag Bauholding SE from Austria 
and the previously Finnish and now Luxembourg Elcoteq SE. 
 
 
Figure 3.3 SEs by employees 
                                                             
52  Small enterprises are defined as having up to 9 employees and less than €1 million annual 
turnover, while medium-sized enterprises have 10 to 499 employees and €1 to 50 million 
annual turnover. See Definition 01/01/2002 at http://www.ifm-bonn.org/index.php?id=89 
(last visited 15 October 2008). 
53  Cf., Art. 2 SE Regulation. An exception is provided for in Article 3(2), under which an 
existing European Company can set up subsidiary SEs. 
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A similar picture emerges when we consider subscribed capital (Figure 3.4). 111 out 
of 176 firms for which the relevant information was available have a subscribed 
capital of € 120,000, the minimum amount required by the SE Regulation. Only three 
SEs show a subscribed capital exceeding € 1 billion. These are (again) Allianz SE 
and BASF SE as well as the French insurance company Scor SE. 
 
Figure 3.4 SEs by subscribed capital in euros 
 
3.5.1.4. Industry 
 
We were able to categorise 122 SEs using the European NACE Revision 2 industry 
classification code (Table 3.6). Another 57 European Companies have been 
identified as shelf companies. For the remaining 34 SEs no information was 
obtainable. About one third of the SEs that we could classify belongs to the financial 
sector. Around half of them are investment funds or ‘trusts’ and similar financial 
entities. The remaining half is actively providing financial or insurance services. 
Again, the large share of the financial industry and investment funds in particular 
may be suggestive of legal arbitrage because the cost of relocating financial assets to 
a more favourable jurisdiction is especially low. The second largest group of SEs 
operates in manufacturing, which includes, among others, carmakers, component 
suppliers and chemical production. Finally, a significant number of non-financial 
service providers have incorporated under the SE Regulation.  
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Table 3.6 SE industry classification according to NACE Rev.2 
Industries (N=213)  
Section A:  Agriculture, forestry and fishing 1
Section B:  Mining and quarrying 1
Section C:  Manufacturing 22
Section D:  Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply 1
Section E:  Water supply; sewerage, waste management 1
Section F:  Construction 5
Section G:  Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles 5
Section H:  Transportation and storage 5
Section I:  Accommodation and food service activities 1
Section J:  Information and communication 12
Section K:  Financial and insurance activities 43
Section L:  Real estate activities 8
Section M:  Professional, scientific and technical activities 11
Section N:  Administrative and support service activities 1
Section O:  Public administration and defence; compulsory social security 0
Section P:  Education 1
Section Q:  Human health and social work activities 2
Section R:  Arts, entertainment and recreation 2
Section S:  Other service activities 0
Section T:  Activities of households as employers 0
Section U:  Activities of extraterritorial organisations and bodies 0
Shelf Companies 57
Unknown 34
Total 213
 
 
3.5.1.5. Board structure 
 
Slightly more firms have opted for the one-tier instead of the two-tier board structure 
(Figure 3.5). Some firms set up a sole ‘administrative organ’ in Member States that, 
for their national companies, require a distinct supervisory board. As predicted by 
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our hypothesis H4, these are mainly SMEs often having one dominant shareholder.54 
H4 is further supported by the fact that so far not a single SE has adopted a two-tier 
board structure in a one-tier jurisdiction.55 Finally, information collected from 
national company registers revealed that several two-tier firms reduced the number 
of directors on the supervisory board when incorporating as an SE. These were 
mostly large, publicly traded companies from Germany. 
 
 
Figure 3.5 Board system 
 
 
3.5.1.6. Incorporation methods 
 
The SE Regulation provides five different ways to set up a European Company (SE 
Regulation, Article 2 and 3): formation by merger, formation of a common 
subsidiary SE, conversion of an existing public company into an SE, formation of a 
                                                             
54  One fairly well-known example is Adi Drotleff who is both the CEO and controlling 
shareholder of the IT company Mensch und Maschine SE. 
55  Some European Companies in the United Kingdom have a supervisory board but only 
because they retained the two-tier structure after having moved to the United Kingdom. In no 
case did a European Company actively seek a two-tier board structure in a jurisdiction 
adhering exclusively to the one-tier structure. 
100
86
One-Tier Two-Tier
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holding SE and formation of a direct SE subsidiary, also known as secondary 
formation. The latter two methods appear not to be very popular while the former 
three have been widely used (Figure 3.6). In at least 40 cases, SEs have been formed 
as shelf companies and sold to end users. As we have learnt from our interviews, one 
method of producing shelf companies is to employ a foreign company as an 
‘incorporation vehicle’ to comply with the cross-border requirement (section 3.5.1.3. 
above). Therefore, some of the 37 mergers and of the 40 formations of common 
subsidiary SEs likely did not serve a business purpose except that of accomplishing 
an SE incorporation. 
 
 
Figure 3.6 Type of SE formation 
 
 
3.5.2. Survey results 
 
According to our hypothesis H1, the differential in incorporation costs between the 
SE and national companies should have a negative impact on SE formations. The 
responses to our survey confirm this hypothesis. Many of our German interview 
partners mentioned that company registers, tax authorities and other government 
agencies are largely unfamiliar with the SE, making incorporation and operating the 
firm fairly difficult in some cases. Some respondents considered registration in the 
company register as a major risk factor associated with the incorporation decision. 
4
5
37
39
40
0 10 20 30 40 50
Secondary Formation
Holding 
Merger
Conversion 
Subsidiary
70 
 
These statements underscore our intuition that there are specific costs of forming and 
operating a European Company and that the regulatory burden matters to SE users. 
 
Hypotheses H2, H3.1, H3.2, H4 and H5 are at the heart of our research interest in the 
SE as a vehicle for legal arbitrage. The survey responses regarding the motives for 
choosing the SE corporate form (Table 3.7) bear on all of these hypotheses. As to 
H2, our respondents named co-determination as a factor for 29 out of 49 SEs. 
Additional support for H2 comes from the fact that negotiations on employee 
involvement in the SE produced some very creative outcomes (see also Keller and 
Werner 2007): in some firms, employees acceded to a smaller ‘Representative 
Body’56 and a precise definition of its competences while the company promised a 
higher frequency of meetings with management and offered employee 
representatives improved access to worksites abroad. At least one firm abolished co-
determination completely in exchange for a ‘social fund’ on behalf of its 
employees.57 At the same time, negotiations on worker co-determination were also 
mentioned as imposing a major risk of delay on the incorporation process. In sum, 
however, survey responses confirm that avoiding or reducing worker co-
determination plays an important role for many SE incorporators. 
 
Table 3.7 Survey results: motives behind German SE formations 
Motive  Positive response (N = 49) 
Image of the SE 36 
Board structure 30 
Co-determination 29 
Corporate mobility 26 
Corporate structure  7 
Planned merger 6 
 
                                                             
56  As compared to the size prescribed by the default rule of SE Employee Involvement 
Directive, Annex, Part 1, lit. e,. the Representative Body is the SE equivalent of the European 
Works Council established by Council Directive 94/45/EC, cf., SE Employee Involvement 
Directive, Art. 13(1). 
57  For details see Rehberg (2008). 
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Respondents representing 26 SEs brought up corporate mobility as another reason to 
opt for the European Company. This result seems to support both hypothesis H3.1 
and H3.2. Yet, when our interview partners indicated plans to transfer the company’s 
registered office, most of them identified tax-related advantages as the key motive. 
By contrast, none of our respondents cited an intention to seek a different gap-filling 
company law for the SE. On the contrary, many respondents would prefer a uniform 
SE company law so as to avoid legal frictions in the event of a relocation. Therefore, 
our survey evidence supports the tax law arbitrage hypothesis (H3.1) but not the 
notion that firms use the SE to shop for a more favourable company law (H3.2).58 
 
Another strong motive to opt for the SE corporate form is, according to responses for 
30 German SEs, the desire to choose between the one-tier and the two-tier board 
structure. Taken together with our observation that SEs tend to opt out of, rather than 
into, the two-tier structure (section 3.5.1.5. above), this backs our hypothesis H4: SE 
incorporations are driven in part by the requirement in some Member States of a dual 
management/supervisory board for public companies. 
 
In our survey sample of German SEs, the opportunity to consummate a cross-border 
merger under the SE Regulation (H5) seems to have played a role in only 6 SE 
incorporations. While this looks like a small number, it should not be read as 
evidence against H5: after all, the merger motive apparently mattered in more than 
10 percent of our observations. Given how important legal certainty is in a merger, it 
may well have been the decisive reason in the relatively few cases for which the 
merger motive was mentioned. 
 
The central results of the survey are that incorporations were mainly driven by the 
availability of the one-tier board system, the freezing of mandatory worker co-
determination and the reduction of supervisory board members as well as the desire 
to transfer the registered office to another jurisdiction. For more than half of the 
firms, each of these reasons was a major argument for choosing the SE. In addition, 
three fourths of the participating German SEs considered the European image of the 
                                                             
58  Since the unobserved fraction of German SEs consists most likely of investment or shelf 
companies, we would rather expect to underestimate the importance of tax motives. 
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SE as an important motive to select the new legal form. However, this is not a legal 
arbitrage motive in a strict sense. 
 
To sum up, the survey results provide support for hypotheses H1, H2, H3.1, H4 and 
H5 but not for H3.2. In the next paragraph we investigate whether these results hold 
more broadly in the EEA. 
 
3.5.3. Regression results 
 
Keeping in mind the small size of our sample, we obtain surprisingly sound and 
robust results from the regression analysis (Table 3.9). All coefficients have the 
expected signs and some are statistically significant.59 Our hypothesis H1 on the 
excess cost burden for SE incorporations receives support in different specifications 
of our model: the general ease of doing business rank (business), the number of 
procedural steps (proce) and the time (time) to set up a business each turn out 
significant at the 1 percent level; expenses (cost) and minimum capital requirements 
(mincap) are significant at the 5 or 10 percent level, respectively.60 
 
As regards H2, we begin the analysis by comparing the sample means of SE 
incorporations in jurisdictions with and without a worker co-determination regime 
(Table 3.8). On average, 14 SEs have been incorporated in countries with mandatory 
co-determination whereas around 2 SEs exist in the other Member States. Using a 
simple t-test, we find that the two samples are different from each other with a 
                                                             
59  We took the natural logarithms of the dependent variable rrse (number of SEs divided by 
total number of firms) and the two explanatory variables (gdp0508 and corptax), which are 
measured at the interval level, as this improved the distribution of these variables and helped 
us to deal with outliers. Since the sample size is already rather small and we are dealing with 
almost the entire population, we decided to take the data as it is and did not drop the two 
outliers Germany and the Czech Republic. If a country does not have a single SE, we cannot 
take the natural logarithm of zero. Instead, we insert a very small number (10-14). Choosing a 
number closer to the range of positive values of rrse (e.g. 10-8) does not affect the statistical 
significance of our results whereas an even smaller number would have worsened the 
distribution of the data. Because all country values of rrse are close to zero, their natural 
logarithm is negative. For this reason, the constant is not positive and should not receive an 
economic interpretation. 
60  When interpreting these results, one should keep in mind that we scale our dependent 
variable (the number of SEs) by the total number of firms. This control should already 
capture the impact of a country’s incorporation costs on firms generally.  
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significance level of 5 percent. The coefficients on the co-determination dummy in 
the regression model are significant at the 1 percent level. The economic effect of the 
co-determination regime is not only statistically significant but also large in 
magnitude. Looking at regression number 3, which fits the data quite well, we find 
that mandatory co-determination increases the number of SE incorporations by 1,150 
percent or around 12 times. Holding all other factors constant, if the UK switched to 
a mandatory co-determination regime we would expect 24 SE incorporations there 
instead of 2. In sum, our results confirm H2 quite well. Evidently, co-determination 
is driving SE formations not only in Germany but in the EEA more generally. 
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Table 3.8 Test of difference in means between co-determination and no co-
determination 
Country SE incorporations Country SE incorporations 
Austria 10 Belgium 9 
Czech Republic 62 Bulgaria 0 
Denmark 1 Cyprus 3 
Finland 1 Estonia 3 
Germany 74 France 7 
Hungary 1 Greece 0 
Luxembourg 7 Ireland 0 
Netherlands 19 Island  0 
Norway 5 Italy 0 
Romania 0 Latvia 3 
Slovakia 3 Liechtenstein 1 
Slovenia 0 Lithuania 0 
Sweden 5 Malta 0 
  Poland 0 
  Portugal 0 
  Spain 0 
  United Kingdom 2 
Co-determination average         14.46 No co-determination average     1.65 
   
Sample average                       7.20 
Test of means between subsamples (t-Statistics) 
Co-determination                        12.81** 
 
** Significant at the 5 percent level 
 
The results on corporate tax rates are mixed, with half of the coefficients turning out 
significant. This is somewhat at odds with the responses from our survey where 
taxation appeared as the main reason for an anticipated transfer of the registered 
office. One could imagine that the statutory tax rate is not a very good measure of the 
actual tax advantages sought by firms that incorporate as SEs with a view to 
relocating at some time in the future. Alternatively, the mere option to move to 
another tax jurisdiction, while being on the minds of managers and shareholders, 
may not be a strong motive for choosing the SE corporate form. 
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The results for the board structure are not as expected. We hypothesised that the 
European Company should be more popular in countries where domestic company 
law required public companies to have two boards of directors (H4). However, the 
coefficient on the dummy variable dualonly is insignificant in all specifications. As 
the correlation between dualonly and codeter is only 0.14, multicollinearity seems 
not to be the reason why our regression analysis fails to support H4. 
 
The coefficient on economic growth is insignificant most of the time. This is not 
entirely surprising as our dependent variable captures the relative share of SEs in the 
overall population of firms. It is hard to think of a reason why economic growth 
should lead to a disproportionately large number of SE incorporations. 
 
Looking for missing variables, we added legal origin, total GDP (at purchasing 
power parity) and three different measures of public sentiment towards the EU from 
Eurobarometer.61 None of them yielded significant coefficients or had a major effect 
on our results. We left these variables out as including all of them would have 
reduced the degrees of freedom. We also conducted a RESET specification test, 
which consists of adding the explanatory variables in quadratic and cubic form. The 
test indicated that we have not misspecified the model. As with every regression 
model, we cannot rule out that a crucial variable is missing from the model. 
However, the results from the telephone survey make us reasonably confident that 
this is not the case. 
  
                                                             
61  The idea behind the Eurobarometer variables is that the European image of the SE should be 
more attractive when public opinion is generally in favour of European integration.  
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Table 3.9 Regression results: driving forces behind SE formations in the EEA(I) 
baseline proce time cost mincap 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
lngdp0508 3.634  4.380  10.693 *** 0.851  0.236  
(4.430)  (3.392)  (3.967)  (4.594)  (4.178)  
lncorptax 14.876 * 16.946 *** 19.013 *** 12.321  8.006  
(7.973)  (4.704)  (5.597)  (7.895)  (6.153)  
deter 10.278 *** 10.555 *** 11.500 *** 10.660 *** 12.928 *** 
(3.950)  (3.152)  (2.643) * (3.819)  (3.479)  
dualonly 2.240  2.175  0.670  2.974 2.231  
(2.989)  (2.595)  (2.173)  (3.329) (3.877)  
business -0.195 ***     
(0.067)   
proce  -1.661 ***   
 (0.460)   
time  -0.522 ***   
 (0.093)   
cost  -0.571 **   
 (0.231)   
mincap  -0.062 * 
 (0.035)  
cons - 71.705 *** -74.240 *** - 89.457 *** -63.008 ** -50.691 ** 
(27.641) (19.577) (20.441) (28.708) (22.268) 
N 22 22 22 22 22  
Adj. R² 0.545  0.566  0.769  0.519  0.419  
F 24.513  23.963  37.378  21.094  12.519  
 
 (I) We use robust standard errors to account for residual heteroscedasticity. *** indicate the 1 percent,   
    ** the 5 percent and * the 10 percent level of significance 
 
3.6. Summary and conclusion 
 
When the Societas Europaea was made available as a new legal form for European 
firms, it was quite unclear whether and to what extent it would be accepted by the 
market. Many had argued that its legal complexity would reduce the attractiveness of 
this new company type. It appears that the critics are proven wrong. Based on a 
unique dataset that was collected from the Member States’ national commercial 
registers, we observed a total of 216 SE incorporations by June 2008. 80 SEs had 
been incorporated without being published in the Official Journal of the European 
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Union. The compounded annual growth rate of SEs between 2005 and 2007 was 
around 100 percent. If the demand for SEs continues to grow at the same rate, we can 
expect around 300 SEs by the end of 2008 and more than a thousand SEs in 2010. 
Hence, the SE has become more and more popular as a corporate form, and the EU 
must be viewed as an emerging competitor in the market for corporate charters. 
 
In this article we have studied legal arbitrage as a motive for choosing the SE. We 
specified a set of hypotheses that reflect certain specific legal arbitrage motives, and 
we examined these hypotheses by employing a dual empirical strategy. We 
conducted a structured telephone survey among the German users of the SE and 
tested some of the hypotheses in a simple OLS regression model. Overall, we find 
that legal arbitrage plays a significant role in choosing the SE. More specifically, we 
find strong evidence for legal arbitrage with regard to mandatory co-determination. 
The SE is popular especially in countries with mandatory co-determination at board 
level, and firms seek to reduce this effect or even avoid mandatory co-determination 
altogether by choosing the SE corporate form. We also find that the use of the SE 
seems to be motivated at least in part by enhanced corporate mobility with a view to 
corporate tax savings. By contrast, company law arbitrage – shopping for an 
attractive company law to fill the gaps of the SE Regulation – is not confirmed by 
our empirical analysis as a motive for choosing the SE. Our survey evidence from 
Germany also suggests that the SE may be preferred to a domestic public company 
because of the choice it offers between a one-tier and a two-tier board. Finally, 
incorporation costs seem to have hampered SE growth. 
 
The most striking finding clearly is that the SE has become a vehicle to reduce the 
effects of mandatory co-determination at board level or to avoid such co-
determination altogether. What the founding fathers (and mothers) of the SE had in 
mind was enhancing cross-border mobility and creating a uniform company law for 
cross-border business activities in the internal market. However, such a new 
company type could not be devised without creating certain differences in relation to 
national companies. As it turns out, the resulting legal arbitrage opportunities do not 
go unexploited. This is true especially with respect to mandatory co-determination at 
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board level, which is often profoundly unpopular with shareholders and (perhaps 
sometimes less so) managers. Member State legislatures have reasons to be 
concerned if they want to shield their statutory rules against legal arbitrage. At the 
same time, they may also use it as a source of inspiration. Legal arbitrage 
demonstrates a demand for legal rules that differ from existing law. Our evidence 
suggests that national jurisdictions should consider possible changes, such as 
abolishing or reducing co-determination at board level or allowing for bargained 
solutions. Also, there seems to be a need for a one-tier board structure even in the 
large, public company form. Faced with legal arbitrage, Member States can and 
should reassess their legal infrastructure for public companies. 
 
We should like to conclude with an outlook on a (possible) European private 
company (Societas Privata Europaea – SPE). The European Commission has recently 
published a proposal for an SPE Regulation.62 If the EU manages to agree on an SPE 
statute, our results suggest that we will see a lot more legal arbitrage going on than 
under the SE Regulation. There are many reasons for this prognosis. First, the SPE 
will have no or only a very low minimum capital requirement. This implies that the 
SPE will be relevant for a lot more firms. Further, the absence of a minimum capital 
requirement or a low minimum capital requirement in itself will be a great driver for 
using the SPE in countries that have a high minimum capital requirement for closed 
corporations. Second, the SPE statute will probably restrict incorporation costs. It 
seems likely that the incorporation documents will be controlled either through 
notarial certification or by a competent public authority, but not both. Third, it also 
seems likely that the SPE – different from the SE – will be allowed to have its 
registered office and its actual head office in different Member States. Hence, 
engaging in legal arbitrage by choosing a registered office in a particular Member 
State will be relatively cheaper – it will not be necessary to relocate the actual head 
office as well.  
                                                             
62  The recent Commission proposal for a Council Regulation on the Statute for a European 
Private Company provides for such a requirement, see COM (2008) 396 final, Art. 46(1). 
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4. How Does the Market React to the Societas Europaea?∗ 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
When it came to company law, European firms used not to have much choice. In 
most Member States of the European Union (EU) as well as the European Economic 
Area (EEA), a legal rule known as the ‘real seat doctrine’ restricted companies from 
incorporating in a jurisdiction other than that where their corporate headquarters 
were located. The situation began to change fundamentally when in 1999 the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruled that applying the real seat doctrine to 
companies from other EU Member States violated the freedom of establishment 
under the TFEU.63 The new case law effectively permitted company founders to 
choose a company law of their liking. It did not, however, provide the same freedom 
of choice to existing companies and their shareholders. There was no simple 
mechanism for ‘reincorporating’ a firm, that is, for transforming a company 
established in one jurisdiction into a company governed by the law of another 
jurisdiction.64 Particularly for public companies with a large and dispersed 
shareholder base, it was virtually impossible to switch to another, more favourable 
company law. For them, the first choice to become available was between the 
national law of their respective home state and a new corporate form created by the 
EU: the European Company (Societas Europaea – SE). The European Company 
                                                             
* This chapter is a thoroughly revised version of an earlier ECGI working paper circulated 
under the title ‘The Societas Europaea: Good News for European Firms’ (Eidenmüller et al. 
2009c). A published version of this chapter appeared under the title ‘How Does the Market 
React to the Societas Europaea?’ in the European Business Organization Law Review 11 
(March 2010): 35-50. © 2010 by TMC Asser Press. All rights reserved. It was reprinted in 
the conference volume Company Law and Economic Protectionism: New Challenges to 
European Integration edited by Ulf Bernitz and Wolf-Georg Ringe. © 2010 by Oxford 
University Press. We are indebted to Florian Heiss, Klaus Wohlrabe and the participants in 
the Empirical Economics Research Workshop at the University of Munich. We also thank 
Jodie Kirshner, participants in Oxford University’s conference on ‘Company Law and 
Economic Protectionism’ and an anonymous referee for their thoughtful comments. 
63  See ECJ, Case C-212/97 Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen [1999] ECR I-1459; 
Case C-208/00 Überseering BV v. Nordic Construction Company Baumanagement GmbH 
[2002] ECR I-9919; Case C-167/01 Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam 
v. Inspire Art Ltd. [2003] ECR I-10155. 
64  Meanwhile, reincorporations among the EEA Member States should be possible by means of 
a cross-border merger into a shell company of the target jurisdiction under the Cross-Border 
Merger Directive 2005/56/EC. Member States were required to transpose the Directive into 
national law by 15 December 2007. 
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owes its existence not to the national laws of the Member States but to EU law itself. 
Council Regulation (EC) No 2157/2001 on the Statute for a European Company (SE 
Regulation) entered into force on 8 October 2004. As soon as Member States had 
adopted the required transposition measures, public companies organised under the 
laws of an EEA member state were able to reincorporate as an SE,65 thereby 
choosing to be governed by the SE Regulation.66 
 
 
 
                                                             
65  Reincorporation can be accomplished by way of a merger between two or more public 
companies from different Member States (SE Regulation Art. 2(1)) or, more directly, by 
converting a public company into an SE; the latter method presupposes that the company has 
a subsidiary that has been governed by the law of another Member State for at least two years 
(SE Regulation Art. 2(4)).  
66  It should be noted, however, that the SE company law differs only in part from that of the 
company’s home state because the SE Regulation frequently makes reference to the national 
law of the Member State where the registered office is located, see SE Regulation Art. 
9(1)(c)(i) and (ii). 
82 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1 SE incorporations from October 2004 to April 2009 
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Since 2004, the new corporate form has been increasingly used by European firms 
(see Figure 4.1). While the number of SEs is still in the hundreds, it has so far shown 
exponential growth. Commentators have asserted potential advantages that the SE 
might offer to firms and their shareholders (e.g. Enriques 2004a; Reichert 2008). In 
prior work, we have studied the validity of some of these claims by examining the 
motives of SE founders (Eidenmüller et al. 2009a). Yet we know only little about 
whether and to what extent the alleged benefits of the SE corporate form actually 
materialise. In this regard, stock prices offer a valuable opportunity. If markets are at 
least reasonably efficient, the stock price should reflect the quality of the corporate 
governance structure insofar as it has an effect on the position of shareholders in the 
firm. 
 
Event studies are a proven research tool to exploit this source of information. They 
have been used extensively to evaluate reincorporation decisions in the United States 
where firms have enjoyed free choice among the state company laws for much more 
than a century. With the emergence of the SE, the event study methodology can now 
be applied to charter competition in Europe. To the best of our knowledge, the 
working paper version of this article has been the first to do this (Eidenmüller et al. 
2009c). Meanwhile, we have discovered eight more publicly traded firms that 
decided to reincorporate as an SE.67 Our results now build on 38 publicly traded 
firms, regarding which the intention to reincorporate under the SE Regulation was 
publicised before 1 February 2009. Based on this new sample, our original finding of 
positive abnormal returns following the reincorporation decision still holds but no 
longer comes out at conventional levels of significance. Besides documenting the 
present state of knowledge, the article comments on the methodological difficulties 
of an event study five years after the SE’s introduction and offers an outlook for 
future research. 
 
In the remainder of the paper, we briefly consider the relevant literature (section 4.2.) 
before presenting our data (section 4.3.) and the event study methodology relied on 
(section 4.4.). Section 4.5. contains the main results regarding the abnormal returns 
                                                             
67  We have learned of four new firms from the (almost concurrent) study by Lamp (2009). 
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on or around the reincorporation decision. In section 4.6., we discuss why we are no 
longer able to find significant results in our new sample. Section 4.7. concludes.  
 
4.2. Literature 
 
We are concerned with the economic consequences of company law choice, 
particularly with regard to shareholders in public companies. Our research interest 
has important policy implications: which company law a firm elects may depend on 
substantive differences in legal rules between jurisdictions. Whoever is in control of 
the decision will opt for the jurisdiction that best serves his/her own interests. 
Therefore, it is not a trivial question whether firms should be free to choose the 
company law under which they are organised. If reincorporating in another 
jurisdiction tends to harm certain stakeholders, the EU legislator may consider 
restricting firms’ choices. For instance, additional requirements could be imposed to 
prevent harmful reincorporations, such as exit rights for dissenting shareholders and 
creditors.68 Learning about the consequences of company law choice can also inform 
policy making at the national level. If Member States want to attract firms, or 
discourage firms from switching to another jurisdiction, they too should be interested 
in the effects of different legal rules on the various constituencies. 
 
The US has a long history of free company law choice. For more than a century, at 
least some states have actively engaged in what has come to be known as ‘charter 
competition’, i.e. competition among state jurisdictions to attract incorporations. 
Most of the time and until today, the tiny state of Delaware has dominated the market 
for incorporations. Its success has long been viewed with suspicion. The rival 
positions have originally been associated with Cary (1974), who argued that states 
engaged in a ‘race to the bottom’, and Winter (1977), who took the opposite view 
that competition improved the quality of company law. It is important to note that the 
discussion in the US focuses on the agency problem between managers and 
                                                             
68  At present, the SE Regulation does not provide any such safeguards. If an SE is formed by 
way of a cross-border merger, Art. 24 leaves it to the Member States to protect minority 
shareholders and creditors of the merging companies. Cross-Border Merger Directive Art. 
4(1)(b), (2), grants the Member States similar authority. To define its proper scope, the ECJ 
should consider the impact of reincorporations on the respective group.  
85 
 
shareholders in public companies. Accordingly, the quality of Delaware’s law – 
being the epitome of charter competition – was judged primarily by its impact on 
diversified shareholders. This common understanding and a growing confidence in 
market efficiency suggested a way to put the conflicting propositions to an empirical 
test: if reincorporating in Delaware increased (decreased) stock market valuation, this 
would imply that charter competition benefitted (hurt) shareholders. 
 
Hyman (1979) was the first to take this cue and to conduct a (somewhat rough) 
analysis of stock returns of firms announcing their intention to reincorporate in 
Delaware. A survey by Bhagat and Romano (2007) counts a total of eight event 
studies on reincorporations in Delaware alone, with none of them finding 
significantly negative returns on the announcement date and four documenting 
positive returns that are statistically significant. More recently, the event study 
methodology has been complemented by another approach seeking to detect how the 
market evaluates Delaware law.69 Daines (2001) and Subramanian (2004) examine 
whether Delaware companies generally enjoy a higher relative market valuation 
measured in terms of Tobin’s Q70 after controlling for a number of other factors. 
Again, the evidence seems to be slightly in favour of Delaware, with Daines finding 
a significantly higher valuation and the Subramanian analysis, using a refined 
methodology and a different sample, yielding no significant results. 
 
As we pointed out in the introduction, choice of company law is a novel phenomenon 
in Europe. What little empirical research there is has mostly focused on the evolving 
use of foreign company law by start-ups since 1999 (Becht et al. 2008, 2009). For 
existing companies, the opportunity to opt out of the national company law under 
which they were established is an even more recent phenomenon. So far, 
reincorporating as an SE under European Community law has been the only relevant 
alternative to the national company law of the firm’s home jurisdiction.71 We 
documented in prior work that the SE has gained some popularity among European 
                                                             
69 For a critical assessment of the event studies on Delaware law, see Bebchuk et al. (2002). 
70  Tobin’s Q is defined as the ratio of the market value and the replacement cost of the firm’s 
(net) assets. 
71  This will change gradually after the Cross-Border Merger Directive has been implemented in 
all Member States.  
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firms (Eidenmüller et al. 2008, 2009a). In addition, we provided evidence on the 
reasons for choosing the SE form rather than incorporating under national company 
law (Eidenmüller et al. 2009a). While the German Helaba bank early on presented 
data on abnormal returns surrounding the decision to reincorporate as an SE (Rausch 
2007), our study (Eidenmüller et al. 2009c) and the almost concurrent one by Lamp 
(2009) are the first to analyse the stock price reaction based on a meaningful sample. 
 
4.3. Data 
 
Our objective is to detect abnormal stock returns surrounding the decision of a listed 
firm to reincorporate as a European Company. The first critical step is to identify the 
‘event day’, i.e. the point in time when the reincorporation decision was made public. 
We collected data on three events: the first public statement, by the firm itself or by a 
third party, on the firm’s decision to reincorporate, the shareholder meeting 
authorising the reincorporation, and finally, the registration of the SE in the company 
register. We relied on Thomson Knowledge and LexisNexis as primary sources to 
identify the event dates. For all firms, the intention to reincorporate was publicly 
announced by the firm, included in the invitation to the shareholder meeting or 
otherwise mentioned in media reports before the respective shareholder meeting took 
place. We chose the earliest publication as the relevant event day in all cases because 
it was then that the market first learned of the reincorporation plan. We obtained 
information on firms regarding which the intention to reincorporate became known 
to the public by 1 February 2009,72 even if these firms have not, or had not, yet been 
registered as SEs. For firms listed on German stock exchanges, we double-checked 
the dates against the inside information disclosure statements as recorded by the 
semi-official provider Deutsche Gesellschaft für Ad-hoc-Publizität (DGAP). Finally, 
we requested information from and clarified discrepancies with the investor relations 
departments of the respective firms.  
 
                                                             
72  Since February 2009, at least two more firms (Nordex and Tipp24) announced to 
reincorporate as SE. Other candidates that might soon announce to reincorporate under the 
SE Regulation are M-Tech, Infineon and EADS. 
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As a result, we have generated a dataset of 42 publicly traded stock companies which 
announced to reincorporate under the SE Regulation. Four firms were transformed 
into an SE just before or shortly after going public.73 After dropping these 4 cases, 
our ultimate sample consists of 38 firms. We rely on daily stock prices and indices 
from Thomson Reuters Datastream. The information on the method of incorporation, 
a possible transfer of the registered office, the (new) board structure, the number of 
employees and the industry branch of the firm were hand-collected from annual 
reports, special reports on the transfer of the registered office and the website of the 
European Trade Union Institute.74 
 
For six observations, the intention to reincorporate was publicised on a weekend.75 
As securities were not traded over the weekend, we would not be able to calculate 
abnormal returns for the actual event and hence defined the event day as the 
following Monday. Furthermore, if we had knowledge that the information was 
revealed after the stock market had closed, we specified the following day as the true 
event day.76 
                                                             
73  The four firms are Artemis Global Capital, Equipotential, Wacker Neuson and ENRO 
Energie. 
74  See http://www.worker-participation.eu. 
75  The six firms are Allianz, Conwert Immobilien Invest, HIT International Trading, MAN, 
Mensch und Maschine and Porsche Automobil Holding. 
76  This was the case for DVB Bank and Fotex Holding. 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.1  Public companies regarding which an intention to reincorporate as an SE was publicised by 1 February 2009 
Name of company and state 
of registration 
Reg. office 
transferred 
from 
First public 
information of 
reincorp. 
plan(I) 
Shareholder 
meeting on 
reincorp. 
Date of 
registration 
as an SE 
Board 
structure 
before 
reincorp.  
Board 
structure 
change 
Industry(II) Number 
of 
employees
Method of 
reincorp. 
Nordea, SE - 19/06/2003 - - one-tier - K 32,000 - 
Elcoteq, LU FI 08/10/2004 27/09/2005 01/10/2005 one-tier - C 24,222 Conversion 
Strabag Bauholding, AT - 12/10/2004 12/10/2004 12/10/2004 two-tier - F 61,125 Conversion 
Graphisoft, HU LU 11/04/2005 10/05/2005 27/07/2005 one-tier - J 253 Conversion 
Allianz, DE - 11/09/2005 08/02/2006 13/10/2006 two-tier - K 177,000 Merger 
Mensch und Maschine, DE - 29/10/2005 30/05/2006 07/12/2006 two-tier + J 388 Conversion 
Scor, FR - 04/07/2006 24/05/2007 25/06/2007 one-tier - K 1,840 Conversion 
Fresenius, DE - 11/10/2006 04/12/2006 13/07/2007 two-tier - Q 114,000 Conversion 
Surteco, DE - 12/10/2006 31/08/2007 19/11/2007 two-tier - C 2,109 Conversion 
HIT Int. Trading, DE - 05/11/2006 24/09/2007 - two-tier + G 5 Conversion 
Prosafe, CY NO 17/11/2006 22/12/2006 02/02/2007 one-tier - D 1,030 Conversion 
BASF, DE - 27/02/2007 26/04/2007 14/01/2008 two-tier - C 95,000 Conversion 
Odfjell, NO - 14/03/2007 03/05/2007 23/07/2007 one-tier - H 3,500 Conversion 
Porsche Auto. Holding, DE - 24/03/2007 26/06/2007 13/11/2007 two-tier - C 11,500 Conversion 
Eurofins Scientific, FR - 28/03/2007 02/05/2007 25/06/2007 one-tier - M 4,069 Conversion 
Wiener Privatbank, AT - 24/04/2007 31/05/2007 23/08/2008 two-tier + K 204 Conversion 
Norddeutsche Affinerie, DE - 24/06/2007 - - two-tier - C 4,700 - 
I.M. Skaugen, NO - 17/09/2007 18/10/2007 20/12/2007 one-tier - H 1,500 Merger 
        
table continues on the next page 
 
 
 
(I)  We report here the actual date of the first publication even if it was publicised after the market close or on a weekend or holiday.  
(II) NACE Rev. 2 Statistical classification of economic activities in the European Community 
 
B = Mining and quarrying G = Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles  L = Real estate activities  
C = Manufacturing  H = Transportation and storage  M = Professional, scientific and technical activities  
D = Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply  J  = Information and communication  Q = Human health and social work activities  
F = Construction  K = Financial and insurance activities  R = Arts, entertainment and recreation 
 
        
Klöckner & Co, DE - 20/09/2007 20/06/2008 08/08/2008 two-tier - C 10,581 Conversion 
Conwert Immo. Invest, AT - 22/09/2007 25/10/2007 14/12/2007 two-tier + L 436 Conversion 
Interseroh, DE - 26/09/2007 25/06/2008 24/09/2008 two-tier - D 1,729 Conversion 
Catalis, NL - 03/10/2007 03/01/2008 25/01/2008 one-tier - J 444 Conversion 
SGL Carbon, DE - 12/03/2008 25/04/2008 27/01/2009 two-tier - C 5,862 Conversion 
Linde, DE - 17/03/2008 - - two-tier - D 51,908 - 
GfK, DE - 31/03/2008 21/05/2008 04/02/2009 two-tier - M 10,000 Conversion 
DVB Bank, DE - 09/04/2008 11/06/2008 01/10/2008 two-tier - K 437 Merger 
IMW Immo. Invest, DE - 11/04/2008 - - two-tier + L 88 Merger 
Songa Offshore, NO - 23/04/2008 26/05/2008 12/12/2008 one-tier - B 296 Merger 
Betbull Holding, AT UK 23/04/2008 17/11/2008 31/10/2008 one-tier - R 109 Conversion 
Q-Cells, DE - 14/05/2008 26/06/2008 23/10/2008 two-tier - C 2,300 Merger 
Solon, DE - 15/05/2008 24/06/2008 02/12/2008 two-tier - C 850 Merger 
Fotex Holding, LU HU 02/07/2008 04/08/2008 31/12/2008 one-tier - K 593 Conversion 
Dexia, BE - 03/07/2008 - - one-tier - K 35,200 - 
MAN, DE - 07/07/2008 03/04/2009 19/05/2009 two-tier - C 51,000 Conversion 
SCA Hygiene Products, DE - 18/11/2008 - - two-tier - C 8,000 Conversion 
Colexon Energy, DE - 27/11/2008 - - two-tier - C 93 Merger 
Nav. Equity Solutions, NL - 17/12/2008 12/02/2009 17/03/2009 two-tier - M 124 Conversion 
Sword Group, FR - 29/12/2008 30/01/2009 - one-tier - J 2,018 - 
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4.4. Methodology 
 
In this section, we briefly outline our methodology for assessing the market 
response to the reincorporation decision.77 We take the following three steps: first, 
we predict the returns for each day of the event window that we would expect if no 
event had occurred. Second, we subtract the expected returns from the actual 
returns to obtain abnormal returns. In our third and final step, we test whether the 
abnormal returns are statistically different from zero. 
 
There are different ways to calculate predicted returns (Brown and Warner 1980; 
MacKinlay 1997). The most widely used are the market model and the constant 
mean return model. The latter assumes that the mean return of a given security is 
constant over time and hence uses the security’s mean return over a certain period 
of time as predicted return for the event window. By contrast, the market model 
presupposes a steady linear relationship between the returns of an individual 
security and the returns of the market. In so doing, the market model tends to 
reduce the variance in abnormal returns because it can capture the portion of the 
individual security’s return that is related to the variation of the market return. We 
want to take advantage of this property and therefore adopt the market model. Since 
the predictive power of the market model depends primarily on how well the 
market index matches the market component in the returns of the security as 
measured by the R², we rely on different indices covering the various European 
stock markets and market segments. For instance, we choose from the DAX, 
MDAX, SDAX and TecDAX for the subsample of German companies. If a firm is 
part of one of these indices, as is the case for Allianz and BASF with respect to the 
DAX, we use this index. In the remaining cases, we choose the index that best 
approximates the firm’s size and industry. We estimate the predicted return 
parameters in a window from 230 to 30 days before the event date. To establish 
whether abnormal returns are significantly different from zero we apply a t-test 
                                                             
77  For a more detailed account, see Eidenmüller et al. (2009c). 
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(Brown and Warner 1985) and – as a robustness check – a non-parametric 
Wilcoxon rank-sum test (Wilcoxon 1945).78 
 
 
4.5. Empirical findings 
 
Information is sometimes not disclosed to the market at one distinct point in time. It 
may leak out before and disseminate after the event day. Also, we are often not able 
to observe when exactly the decision to reincorporate became known to the public 
for the first time. For instance, rumours spread some days before the official press 
release, or there may not even be a specific announcement by the firm that is clearly 
communicated to the market. To increase the chance of capturing the abnormal 
returns associated with a piece of information, it has become standard practice to 
consider event windows of more than one day around the event date and calculate 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) over those timeframes. 
 
We find both positive and negative abnormal returns for individual firms in our 
sample. The results for the event date (0), the day before (-1) and after (+1) the 
event date as well as for the time window from day -1 through day +1 are reported 
in the Appendix. Table 4.2 contains the average abnormal returns in our sample. 
The event date 0 yields a modest average abnormal return of .2 percent, which falls 
far short of any significance level. The picture brightens somewhat when we 
cumulate average returns over broader timeframes. Cumulative average abnormal 
returns (CAARs) rise to .9 percent as we extend the event window from the event 
date 0 up to day +5. While these CAARs still fail to reach even the 10 percent level 
of significance, the p-values decrease. This is the remnant of the result in an earlier 
version of this study, in which we did find significant positive CAARs for all time 
windows beginning on day 0 and ending at days 0 to 8. In the subsequent section 
we will examine why we fail to confirm this earlier finding with our larger sample. 
As Figure 4.2 depicts, the average stock market valuation of the firms in our sample 
                                                             
78  For non-parametric tests in the event study context, see MacKinlay (1997). 
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increased around the event date. Given the behaviour of our test statistics on and 
after the event date, we still believe that ‘something is going on’.79 
 
In contrast to our results, the concurrent study by Lamp (2009) claims to find 
significantly positive CAARs. However, this conclusion rests only on the 
timeframes from -20 to +1 and -2 to 0. Other intermediate event windows in 
Lamp’s analysis yield insignificant or significantly negative CAARs, which is in 
line with the results reported in Table 4.2. While news of the reincorporation 
decision may leak out before the information is published, we believe that at least 
some effect should occur on or after the event date. Unfortunately, Lamp does not 
report results for any post-event windows, making a direct comparison infeasible. 
 
Figure 4.2 Cumulative average abnormal returns 
  
                                                             
79  A difference-in-means test of the CAARs 30 days before and after the event day comes out 
at the 5 percent level. This may be seen as a hint that the market valuation increases on or 
around the event day. 
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Table 4.2 Cumulative average abnormal returns(I) 
 CAARt t-test Wilcoxon rank-sum test 
window  t-value p-value z-value p-value 
-1 to +1 0.006 1.09 28.1  0.43 66.9 
-2 to +2 0.005 0.77 44.4 0.24 81.1 
-3 to +3 0.005 0.60 55.5 0.33  74.4 
-4 to +4 0.009 1.02 31.5  1.04  30.0 
-5 to +5 0.010 0.91 37.0 1.34  18.0 
-5 to -1 0.000 0.03 99.7 0.53 79.7 
-4 to -1 0.002 0.27 78.5 0.44 65.8 
-3 to -1 0.000 -0.07 94.7 0.27 78.9 
-2 to -1 -0.001 -0.24 81.0 -1.17 24.3 
0 0.002 0.62 54.0 0.07 94.8 
0 to 1 0.004 0.96 34.3 0.31 75.5 
0 to 2 0.006 1.23 22.6 0.54 58.7 
0 to 3 0.005 1.04 30.5 0.78 43.8 
0 to 4 0.007 1.37 17.8 1.20 23.2 
0 to 5 0.009 1.43 16.2 1.28 19.9 
 
(I) We use robust standard errors to account for possible heteroskedasticity. 
 
4.6. Assessing the present findings 
 
In the prior version of our analysis, we found significantly positive CAARs ranging 
from 1.2 – 3.0 percent in a sample of 30 firms (Eidenmüller et al. 2009c). Why did 
we lose statistical significance when we moved to a larger sample consisting of 38 
firms? One possible explanation, of course, is that reincorporation does not affect 
market valuation and that our previous results were spurious. For instance, it may 
be that in our old sample other news was often disclosed simultaneously with the 
decision to reincorporate. Although we cannot rule out this possibility, we do not 
believe that it was behind our old findings. As long as event days do not cluster, 
other news revealed on the event day can be positive as well as negative. Its effect 
should cancel out. To distort the results, concurrent information would have had to 
pull systematically in one direction. 
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In any event, adding eight firms to the sample (and correcting eight event days) 
made our CAARs drop to 0.4 – 0.9 percent. While 38 observations can be a 
sufficiently large sample to conduct an event study, the power of the tests decreases 
rapidly as the magnitude of abnormal returns falls. For a sample size of 40, a Monte 
Carlo simulation by MacKinley (1997) reveals that the power of a t-test decreases 
from 100 to 35 percent if abnormal returns fall from 2 percent to .5 percent, 
assuming that the standard deviation is 0.02. Thus, CAARs of 1.2 – 3.0 percent in 
our old sample of thirty firms gave the t-tests statistical power that is noticeably 
reduced for CAARs of 0.4 – 0.9 percent in a somewhat larger sample of 38 firms 
(MacKinley 1997). The probability of committing a type II error – failing to reject a 
null hypothesis when it should have been rejected – rises considerably. It follows 
that our new result should not be read as evidence against the hypothesis that firms’ 
decision to reincorporate as an SE leads to positive abnormal returns on average. 
Given the lack of statistical power, the loss of significance only implies that there is 
no valid evidence in favour of a positive stock market reaction. 
 
The key question consequently is why CAARs in our larger sample are much 
smaller than in our original study. We attribute this to the greater problems in 
identifying the correct event day for reincorporations of less prominent firms. It is 
often quite uncertain when news of the reincorporation decision first hit the market. 
Even with an announcement by the firm, it was sometimes hard to determine the 
release date. In a number of cases, the earliest event date we could obtain was some 
type of media coverage, including reports from internet sources. We cannot be sure 
that we have actually spotted the first occurrence of the information. All of these 
difficulties increased as we discovered additional firms because they were typically 
smaller and less well-known than the ones in our old sample. Missing the correct 
event day, and hence any abnormal returns associated with the decision to 
reincorporate, is more of a risk for the new firms in our sample. 
 
Another, related point is that the market reaction is likely to differ depending on 
how the information on the possible reincorporation is revealed. A posting on a 
market information website may amount to little more than a market rumour. Even 
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a newspaper article can be misleading, as in the case of Siemens AG, where in 
April 2007 the weekly magazine ‘Euro am Sonntag’ reported plans for a 
reincorporation, which later turned out to be the result of a misunderstanding during 
an interview with a company representative. Because reports from third parties 
involve a greater degree of uncertainty, one would expect such information to be 
discounted by investors as compared to statements from the firms themselves. But 
even when firms announced their decision to reincorporate as an SE, the 
communication was often far from clear-cut. Some announcements were only made 
orally during press conferences, others through a mere post on the company 
website, still others consisted of no more than an agenda item on the invitation to 
the shareholder meeting. In all these cases it may have taken a couple of days or 
even weeks for the information to spread. Its price impact on the event day should 
therefore be much weaker than its total effect over time. Again, the new firms that 
were added later are likely to suffer more from this problem because we had already 
combed news providers like Reuters and DGAP for our old sample. Our old dataset, 
therefore, covered most firms with a well-defined announcement that was 
publicised on a specific date. 
 
4.7. Concluding remarks 
 
Our analysis of the market reactions to the decision to reincorporate under 
European law has led to a sobering result: in contrast to the findings in a precursor 
to this article, the positive abnormal returns on and after the event day cease to be 
statistically significant in our new and extended sample. The available data as of 1 
February 2009 do not yet allow a reliable conclusion as to whether the new 
European Company appeals not only to firms and their managers (which we know) 
but also to diversified shareholders of public companies. The loss of significance in 
our results can be attributed to the lower quality of the data for those firms that we 
learned of only after our working paper was published. Our original results may 
thus have been diluted by new bad data. Alternatively, they may have simply been 
wrong in the first place. At present, there is no way of distinguishing which of these 
two possibilities applies. We will have to wait until more publicly traded firms opt 
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into the new legal form and, accordingly, provide us with a larger sample and more 
statistical power. 
 
If significantly positive abnormal returns can be re-established, this would carry a 
general policy lesson: a broader range of company law choice for European firms 
may open up new opportunities and help to unlock hidden value. One implication 
would be that the EU should keep experimenting with enhancing company law 
choice as well as offering additional company types, such as the European Private 
Company that is presently being contemplated.80 A larger sample would also enable 
us to investigate the important follow-up question of what drives the market’s 
appreciation – if any – of the SE. We have some evidence that avoiding or 
mitigating the effects of mandatory worker co-determination laws plays an 
important role in the choice of the SE corporate form (Eidenmüller et al 2009a). 
However, firms for which this motive may have been relevant do not exhibit higher 
CAARs than others; rather, the converse is true.81 If SE incorporations keep their 
pace, we will be able to study this and other important issues in a not-too-distant 
future. 
  
                                                             
80  See the recent Commission proposal for a Council Regulation on the Statute for a European 
Private Company, COM (2008) 396 final. 
81  This point is elaborated for our old sample in Eidenmüller at al. (2009c). 
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Appendix 
 
Table 4.3 Firm-level abnormal returns 
Day (t) -1 0 1 -1 to 1 
Firm  
Allianz -.0054 -.0292*** .0034 -.0312 
Bauholding Strabag  -.0170 -.0039 .0108 -.0101 
BASF .0077 -.0028 -.0000 .0049 
Betbull .0004 -.0149 -.0014 .0016 
Catalis -.0158 -.0149 -.0188 -.0495***
Colexon Energy .0246 .0762* -.0376 .0632 
Conwert Immo. Invest .0456*** -.0347*** -.0088 .0021 
DVB Bank -.0035 .0147 .0147 .0007 
Elcoteq .0139 -.0079 .0017 .0077 
Dexia .0088 .0264 .0016 .0368 
Eurofins Scientific .0057 .0021 -.0130 -.0052 
Fotex Holding .0325** -.0320** .0293* .0298 
Fresenius -.0153 .0039 -.0106 -.0221 
GfK .0477** .0076 .0173 .0726* 
Graphisoft .0022 .0027 .0131 .0179 
HIT International Trading .0026 .0010 .0027 .0063***
I.M. Skaugen -.0181 .0061 -.0015 -.0135 
IMW Immobilien -.0030 -.0032 -.0031 -.0093***
Interseroh .0086 -.0205 .0160 .0041 
Klöckner & Co .0152 -.0073 .0180 .0258 
Linde .0049 .0299** .0185 .0533** 
MAN -.0058 -.0013 -.0087 -.0158** 
Mensch und Maschine -.0026 -.0008 .0011 -.0023 
Nav. Equity Solutions -.0056 -.0017 -.0079 -.0151***
Norddeutsche Affinerie -.0086 -.0174 -.0159 -.0419***
Nordea -.0048 -.0032 -.0002 -.0082* 
Odfjell .0010 -.0134 .0056 .0022 
Porsche Auto. Holding .0129 .0162 .0723*** .1015* 
Prosafe -.0254 -.0053 .0192 -.0115 
     
table continues on the next page 
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Q-Cells -.0132 .0447** .0055 .0370 
SCA Hygiene Products .0042 -.0141 -.0374* -.0473 
Scor .0025 .0226 .0374** .0625** 
SGL Carbon -.0212 .0171 .0155 .0113 
Solon -.0289 .0059 -.0087 -.0316 
Songa Offshore .0035 -.0023 -.0023 -.0010 
Surteco -.0008 -.0019 -.0001 -.0028* 
Sword Group -.0006 .0170 -.0288 -.0123 
Wiener Privatbank .0000 -.0008 .0001 -.0006 
 
*** indicate the 1 percent, ** the 5 percent and * the 10 percent level of significance. 
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5. Where Do Firms Issue Debt? An Empirical Analysis of Issuer Location 
and Regulatory Competition in Europe∗ 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
If offered a choice, firms will opt for the legal framework that best suits their 
business needs and the transaction at hand. It has been documented for a broad 
range of settings that firms choose a law of their liking and thus engage in legal 
arbitrage (see Fleischer 2010 for a definition). The most famous example is 
corporate law. In the US, firms have always been able to incorporate in any state, 
thereby effectively choosing the corporate law under which they are organised. 
Because supplying corporate law to firms may be attractive for states, jurisdictions 
in the US have engaged in what has come to be known as ‘charter competition.’ 
Much more recently, a number of rulings by the European Court of Justice have set 
off a similar contest among European jurisdictions (Becht et al. 2008). 
 
Firms’ choice of law and regulatory competition between jurisdictions is not 
confined to corporate law. Other examples include forum shopping with respect to 
insolvency proceedings or the cross listings of public companies. We consider a 
somewhat less prominent but highly relevant area of business law: the legal rules 
governing corporate bonds. Recent legislation indicates that European jurisdictions 
actively compete in this area. Germany, for example, has just modernised its Bond 
                                                             
∗  This chapter appeared under the same title in the ECGI working paper series in finance. A 
German version will be published in the conference volume Ökonomische Analyse des 
Europarechts edited by Peter Behrens, Thomas Eger and Hans-Bernd Schäfer. © 2011 by 
Mohr Siebeck. All rights reserved. We thank the LMU-ifo Economic and Business Data 
Center (EBDC) for providing us with the data from the SDC Platinum. We also gratefully 
acknowledge the withholding tax data provided by the Centre for European Economic 
Research (Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung, ZEW). We are indebted to a 
number of experts who provided us with valuable institutional details of the European debt 
securities markets: René Bösch and Daniel Daeniker (Homburger law firm, Zurich), Tom 
Boedts and Jean-Marc Gollier (Eubelius law firm, Brussels), Xavier Foz (Roca Junyent law 
firm, Barcelona) and Marco Palmieri (University of Bologna). In addition, we are grateful 
for valuable comments on this paper from Matthias Dischinger, Andreas Haufler, Florian 
Heiss, Pravin Trivedi, Joachim Winter, Klaus Wohlrabe and the participants in the Law and 
Economics Workshop at UC Berkeley, the Law and Finance Workshop at the University of 
Oxford, the Field Day Applied Economics - Mark II and the Public Economics Seminar at 
the University of Munich as well as the Law and Economics Workshop at the University of 
Bonn. We also thank participants in the 7th Annual Conference of the German Association 
for Law and Economics and the 4th French-German Talks in Law and Economics in Trier 
as well as the XII. Travemünder Symposium zur ökonomischen Analyse des Rechts. 
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Debenture Act (SchVG) to make it more competitive.82 To the best of our 
knowledge, we are the first to study the extent of legal arbitrage and regulatory 
competition in corporate debt issues in Europe. Our work examines the motives 
behind firms’ choices. Knowing why firms prefer certain jurisdictions and avoid 
others can provide valuable guidance to lawmakers seeking to improve their own 
legal framework. Such insights are also important if one wishes to evaluate the 
effects of regulatory competition both generally and in the corporate bond market. 
Firms’ ability to select from a menu of jurisdictions is not a given but the result of 
conflict-of-laws rules. These ‘rules of the game’ can be changed if, for instance, the 
European Union concludes that the quality of corporate bond law deteriorates as a 
result of regulatory competition. 
 
Investigating legal arbitrage and regulatory competition in the European corporate 
bond market can also contribute to the ‘law and finance’ literature. The main 
proposition of this school of thought is that ‘law matters’, i.e. that legal rules 
advance financial and economic development. Numerous studies have documented 
a link between economic outcomes (such as the relative size of securities markets, 
ownership concentration or the amount of credit in the economy) and legal rules 
and institutions. A difficulty, however, lies in determining the direction of 
causality:83 The coincidence of legal rules and indicators of financial development 
can mean that ‘good’ law causes superior economic performance. But it could also 
be the other way round, with the law responding to an increased demand for legal 
protection due to a growth in specific activities. Identifying causality, therefore, is a 
major challenge facing the law and finance movement. In this regard, legal 
arbitrage can be an indirect piece of evidence: If market players shop for particular 
legal rules, it follows that differences in law matter for economic activity. For 
instance, stronger creditor rights may coincide with a greater volume of credit in the 
economy. If firms facing a choice between different jurisdictions actively seek 
                                                             
82  See the somewhat confused statement of the former German justice minister, Brigitte 
Zypries: ‘It is not the case that German issuers are not choosing German law at all. But we 
have found that many of them prefer foreign law.’ (‘Es ist nicht so, dass deutsche 
Emittenten deutsches Recht überhaupt nicht mehr wählen. Aber wir haben festgestellt, dass 
viele von ihnen ausländisches Recht bevorzugen.’), Interview with Börsen-Zeitung, May 
13, 2008. 
83  See La Porta et al. (2008) for extant evidence on the direction of causality.  
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those with more robust creditor protection, then there is a case that creditor rights 
are the cause, and financial development the effect. 
 
In the realm of public debt, legal arbitrage can occur at two different levels. First, 
debt securities are themselves governed by the terms of the indenture and hence by 
contract law. Second, there are various legal rules that attach to the issuer of the 
securities and that are equally important to investors and the firm. In this 
contribution, we examine legal arbitrage with respect to the second set of rules. 
Firms can effectively choose the applicable law by deciding where to locate the 
issuer of the debt securities – either by using an existing subsidiary or by 
establishing a new one in the jurisdiction of choice. To examine this decision, we 
employ a gravity model, nowadays a workhorse in international economics. 
Although it has been applied mostly to international trade, there is a more recent 
literature adapting this model to financial flows (Eaton and Tamura 1994; De Ménil 
1999; Portes et al. 2001; Portes and Rey 2005) and M&A activities (Ashcroft et al. 
1994; Di Giovanni 2005; Delannay and Méon 2006; Hyun and Kim 2010). To our 
knowledge, this is the first analysis implementing a gravity model in a law and 
finance context. 
 
The basic idea of gravity models is to focus not on individual countries but on the 
flows in country-pair relations. Our dependent variable, accordingly, is the number 
of cross-border debt security issues between a ‘country of origin’ and a ‘host 
country’ in a given year. We study issuer choice in the European corporate debt 
market based on a dataset of 870 bilateral country relations for the period 1980 to 
2008. We find that, in absolute terms, Germany has by far the highest outflow of 
debt issues, while the Netherlands, the UK, Luxemburg and Ireland see the most 
inflows (in that order). The data clearly support the prediction that inflows are 
influenced positively by a low withholding tax rate. Corporate tax rates also play a 
role: If the multinational firm’s ultimate parent faces a high corporate tax burden, it 
is more likely to have foreign subsidiaries issue debt securities. We see this as 
evidence of profit shifting. At the same time, however, higher corporate tax rates 
appear to attract debt security issues by subsidiaries of multinational firms, 
103 
 
particularly asset backed securities. We explain this somewhat contradictory finding 
with a strategy to use locally issued debt securities as a tax shield (‘tax shield 
hypothesis’). Finally, we find only indicative evidence that the level of creditor 
protection is important for the location of debt security issues. Creditor rights under 
bankruptcy law do not seem to matter, but the effectiveness of contract enforcement 
positively influences the number of cross-border bond issues attracted by a 
particular jurisdiction. 
 
In section 5.2. we describe the legal environment for corporate debt security issues 
and formulate hypothesis on the influence of creditor protection rules and tax law 
on issuer choice and location. Section 5.3. presents the methodology and data, 
section 5.4. the gravity model results. Section 5.5. concludes. 
 
5.2. The legal environment for corporate debt security issues 
 
One can think of a variety of reasons why a firm would have a foreign subsidiary 
issue debt securities. We are interested whether ‘law matters’ for this decision, that 
is, whether by choosing a foreign venue firms engage in legal arbitrage and, 
accordingly, whether jurisdictions can attract more cross-border issues by changing 
their legal rules. Based on theoretical considerations, there are two main aspects of 
the legal environment that can influence a firm’s decision to locate its debt security 
issue in a particular jurisdiction. First, tax considerations can play a role in choosing 
where to issue debt securities. Therefore, tax law is a dimension in which we try to 
spot legal arbitrage (subsection 5.2.2.). Second, jurisdictions can differ in the degree 
of protection afforded to the holders of debt securities. If there is significant 
variation in this regard, one would expect firms to take it into account (subsection 
5.2.3.). Before identifying relevant differences in these two areas of the law, we 
should clarify what we mean by a ‘foreign’ subsidiary or, correspondingly, by the 
‘location’ of an issuer (subsection 5.2.1.). 
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5.2.1. ‘Location’ of issuer and parent 
 
There is a great variety of legal criteria – depending on legal context – to determine 
an entity’s ‘location.’ The place of incorporation and the statutory seat are strictly 
formal criteria. Many others consider the actual business activities, such as the 
‘headquarters,’ ‘centre of main interests,’ the ‘real seat,’ or the ‘centre of 
management.’ These latter substantive criteria should be very closely aligned. In 
our data and hence in our analysis, ‘issuer location’ is defined as the country of 
incorporation. Accordingly, a ‘foreign issuer’ is an entity incorporated in a 
jurisdiction different from the corporate parent. From an empirical point of view, 
the country of incorporation should correlate strongly with the more substantive 
‘location’ concepts. Before 1999, many European Economic Area (EEA) member 
states followed the ‘real seat’ doctrine and required a legal entity to incorporate in 
the jurisdiction in which it had taken its ‘real seat,’ i.e. its central management or 
principal place of business. While the European Court of Justice in its ground-
breaking Centros (1999), Inspire Art (2002) and Überseering (2003) judgments has 
effectively dismissed the real seat doctrine and some firms have subsequently 
incorporated out-of-state (Becht et al. 2008; Eidenmüller 2007), there are still 
significant barriers (Becht et al. 2009), and ‘reincorporations’ of existing entities 
have become workable only recently.84 Accordingly, it seems safe to assume that 
most European firms, especially the large ones, are still incorporated in the country 
of their main business activities. For the timeframe of our investigation ending in 
2008, the incorporation state should largely coincide with the location of the main 
business activities and the other substantive criteria. 
  
                                                             
84  A reincorporation is typically effected by means of a cross-border merger. Member states of 
the EU had to transpose the Directive 2005/56/EC on cross-border mergers of limited 
liability companies by December 2007. 
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5.2.2. Tax law 
 
The location of the issuer has important tax implications.85 One potential type of tax 
law arbitrage involved in issuer location choice relates to the taxation of interest 
paid to bondholders. Interest is part of the taxable income in the investor’s home 
country. From the point of view of the issuer, interest payments are expenses that 
reduce corporate income and hence the corporate tax burden. Many states, however, 
levy an additional tax on interest payments from the issuer. The tax is meant to be a 
tax on income received by investors, but it is collected as a ‘withholding tax’ ‘at the 
source.’ Issuer location thus determines whether and at what rate the debt security is 
subject to withholding tax. Typically, the investor’s home country will grant a tax 
credit to equalise the effect of the withholding tax. Yet claiming the credit creates 
an additional burden and can entail costly delays. More importantly, a tax credit 
does not eliminate the withholding tax for tax-exempt investors such as, notably, 
US employee pension plans and educational endowments. If investors are affected 
by the withholding tax, they will refrain from buying the debt security or demand to 
be compensated through higher interest rates; in either event, the firm’s cost of 
capital rises. We thus hypothesise that jurisdictions with low withholding taxes or 
no withholding tax at all attract more issuer subsidiaries. 
 
In addition, issuer location choice can be influenced by differences in corporate 
income tax. In this respect, there are two plausible theories that lead to opposite 
predictions. The first can be referred to as the ‘profit shifting hypothesis.’ As a 
general rule, an incorporated entity’s profits are subject to corporate income tax in 
its country of residence. By shifting profits to another entity in a different 
jurisdiction, firms exploit variation in corporate income taxation and, particularly, 
in the applicable tax rate.86 There is a growing literature on corporate tax strategies 
designed to channel income towards entities in low tax jurisdictions. Tax laws seek 
                                                             
85  Tax laws and conventions use different location (‘residence’) criteria, cf. Art. 4(1) of the 
OECD Model Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital. For the reasons 
just stated, we assume that the issuer’s tax residence is in the incorporation state.  
86  Apart from tax rates, profit shifting can be motivated by specific tax benefits. A prominent 
example were Belgian ‘coordination centers’ of multinational firms, which (until 2010) 
enjoyed a significantly lower tax burden, see EU Council (1999) for details.  
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to prevent profit shifting by requiring transactions between affiliate entities to be 
conducted ‘at arm’s length’, i.e. at prices that unrelated parties would demand and 
pay in the open market. Yet firms appear to be violating the arm’s length principle: 
Dischinger (2008) and Huizinga and Laeven (2008), among others, provide 
evidence on a link between reported profits of affiliate entities and corporate tax 
rate differentials. As an example of the tax planning devices used by multinationals, 
Dischinger and Riedel (2008) and Karkinsky and Riedel (2009) demonstrate that 
firms locate their intellectual property in countries with lower corporate tax rates. 
They explain this finding with the opportunity to transfer profits into low tax 
jurisdictions by charging higher royalty prices than the arm’s length principle 
permits. 
 
Having a subsidiary in a low tax jurisdiction issue debt securities could follow an 
analogous strategy: If all or part of the debt is raised to finance not (only) the 
business of the issuer-subsidiary itself but (also) the operations of the parent or of 
subsidiaries in other jurisdictions, the issuer serves as an internal bank for the 
group. Charging a higher interest rate for intra-group loans than it has to pay to 
investors, the issuer realises a spread at the expense of its intra-group borrowers. In 
consequence, the issuer shows a higher profit whereas profits of the parent and/or 
the other subsidiaries are diminished. Profits are siphoned from high tax to low tax 
jurisdictions.87 With regard to the decision to issue debt securities abroad, the profit 
shifting hypothesis thus predicts that parents from high-tax jurisdictions issue debt 
securities through subsidiaries in low tax jurisdictions.88 For our empirical analysis, 
                                                             
87  In principle, profits could also be shifted from the subsidiary (high tax jurisdiction) to the 
parent (low tax jurisdiction). To accomplish this, the subsidiary would have to charge lower 
interest rates than it has to pay to investors. Tax authorities in the subsidiary’s jurisdiction 
would face little difficulty detecting and neutralizing such a scheme by treating the net loss 
as a disguised dividend. By contrast, it is harder for tax authorities to determine that a 
foreign affiliate is charging more for a loan than its own cost of capital because they would 
need to observe the financing terms of the foreign entity, which is not subject to their 
jurisdiction.  
88  A second argument supports this prediction: Raising debt through the subsidiary can also 
finance the subsidiary’s own operations. In this regard, the subsidiary’s debt issue 
substitutes for an intra-group loan from the parent. Such downstream loans are a way to 
shift profits from the subsidiary by charging an interest rate above the parent’s own cost of 
capital. But if the subsidiary faces a lower tax rate than the parent, there is no reason to shift 
profits to the parent. Hence, one would expect to see fewer downstream loans and, all else 
equal, more debt being issued by the subsidiary itself. 
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the profit shifting hypothesis suggests that lower corporate tax rates have a positive 
effect on cross-border debt security issues in a given jurisdiction. 
 
The profit shifting hypothesis builds on the idea that multinational firms use interest 
rate spreads between external debt and intra-group loans to direct corporate income 
to low tax jurisdictions; lenders within the group ‘overcharge’ other affiliates to 
siphon off profits. By contrast, the competing ‘tax shield hypothesis’ focuses on a 
general tax characteristic of debt as opposed to equity. There is a major tax 
advantage of debt over equity in that interest expenses are deductible whereas 
dividends are not; payments to debtholders reduce the firm’s tax burden, payments 
to equityholders do not (Modigliani and Miller 1963). Debt financing thus creates a 
tax shield for the firm’s cash flows insofar as they are owed to creditors.89 The tax-
induced incentive to substitute equity with debt rises with the corporate tax rate. 
Based on this line of reasoning, firms have a foreign subsidiary issue debt securities 
in order to protect the subsidiary’s cash flows against corporate tax. Erecting the tax 
shield at the foreign subsidiary instead of the parent is better the higher the 
subsidiary’s corporate tax rate both in absolute terms and relative to the parent’s. 
The tax shield effect thus runs in the opposite direction of the profit shifting 
hypothesis stated above. It predicts more debt securities being issued by 
subsidiaries in (absolute and relative) high tax jurisdictions. Accordingly, lower tax 
rates should have a negative impact on cross-border issues in a given country. 
 
Dischinger et al. (2010) provide an instructive overview of the extant evidence on 
the tax shield effect within multinational groups. For a sample of 14,332 European 
subsidiaries of multinational firms, they demonstrate that both a higher corporate 
tax rate for the subsidiary and a larger difference in statutory corporate tax rates 
between parent and subsidiary significantly increase the subsidiary’s indebtedness. 
Using micro data on foreign subsidiaries of US firms, Desai et al. (2004) show that 
leverage increases with corporate tax rates. Huizinga et al. (2008) calculate explicit 
                                                             
89  In principle, the different tax treatment of debt and equity at the level of the corporation can 
balanced at the level of the shareholder/debtholder. For instance, shareholders can be 
granted a credit or a preferential rate on dividends to compensate them for the tax burden on 
equity at the level of the corporation. As a matter of fact, there is generally no such (full) 
compensation in cross-border taxation.  
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measures of the marginal tax rate on equity and the tax incentive to shift debt to a 
subsidiary. They find both variables to have a significant positive effect on the 
leverage of foreign subsidiaries in a large panel of European firms. In sum, the 
available evidence supports the tax shield hypothesis. Whether the profit shifting 
effect exists (with regard to issuing debt securities) and whether it neutralises or 
even dominates the tax shield effect for debt securities is a matter we seek to 
determine empirically. 
 
5.2.3. Creditor protection rules 
 
In the first instance, bondholders look to the contractual terms of their debt security 
for protection against opportunist behaviour by the debtor, particularly the incentive 
to increase default risk (Jensen and Meckling 1976). The bond indenture will 
typically stipulate safeguards such as financial covenants or a trustee acting on 
behalf of bondholders. Contract law determines the validity of these contractual 
provisions and can impose additional rules. The applicable contract law may thus 
be a primary concern for bondholders. However, the contract law governing the 
securities does not depend on the issuer’s domicile. Private international law 
permits a choice of law, and debentures usually contain a choice-of-law clause.90 
An issuer in jurisdiction A can easily choose the contract law of jurisdiction B to 
govern its debt securities. Therefore, we do not expect contract law to matter for the 
location of issuers. 
 
Apart from contractual safeguards, investors can rely on statutory or judge-made 
rules against debtor opportunism. Such rules will be found in corporation law and 
bankruptcy law.91 They include capitalisation requirements, restrictions on the 
                                                             
90  The majority of jurisdictions in our sample were subject to the Rome Convention on the 
Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (which by the end of 2009 has been replaced by 
the ‘Rome I’ Regulation (EC) No. 593/2008). Art. 3 of the Convention (and equally of the 
Regulation) contains the basic rule of free choice of law. Art. 1(2)(c) of the Convention 
(Art. 1(2)(d) of the Regulation) exempts from its scope only obligations arising from the 
‘negotiable character’ of an instrument.  
91  Securities law (capital market law) can also benefit creditors, particularly by imposing 
disclosure duties on issuers. Such requirements usually apply if debt securities are listed at 
a stock exchange or offered to the public. For the rules determining the applicable securities 
laws in Europe see Enriques and Tröger (2008). 
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transfer of assets to shareholders and third parties, fiduciary duties of directors and 
corporate officers, liability rules and rules on (a change in) corporate control. 
Corporation law varies with the issuer’s ‘location’ in our data. Much the same is 
true for bankruptcy law. Under Art. 3(1) of the European Insolvency Regulation 
(EC) No 1346/2000, the ‘centre of a debtor’s main interests’ determines jurisdiction 
for (main) insolvency proceedings. Without proof to the contrary, the Regulation 
presumes that a corporate entity has its ‘centre of main interests’ at the place of its 
‘registered office,’ that is, in the state of incorporation. The Regulation entered into 
force in EU member states on May 31, 2002. However, its rule on bankruptcy 
jurisdiction reflected the prevailing view by European jurisdictions even before its 
enactment. In sum, creditor protection rules embodied in corporate law and 
bankruptcy law are governed by the jurisdiction in which the issuer is located. 
 
In principle, a multinational firm chooses a foreign creditor protection law by 
issuing debt securities through an entity located in the desired jurisdiction. Better 
creditor protection rules should tend to reduce the agency costs of debt and hence 
the firm’s cost of capital. Choosing a creditor-friendly jurisdiction to issue debt 
securities can thus help the firm to save interest expenses or avoid more restrictive 
bond covenants. In line with this conjecture, the ‘law and finance’ literature starting 
with La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) has used an index of creditor rights to show that 
debt financing rises with the degree of creditor protection. In the most 
comprehensive sample so far, consisting of 129 countries, Djankov et al. (2007) 
find a significantly positive relation in a cross-country OLS regression between the 
creditor rights index and credit extended to firms and individuals (scaled by the 
country’s GDP or population). Haselmann et al. (2009) corroborate this evidence 
using microdata on bank loans and changes in creditor rights laws in Eastern 
European transitions economies.92 Mansi et al. (2009) and Qi and Wald (2008) 
document that, within the US, firms from states with more stringent restrictions on 
payouts to shareholders enjoy lower bond spreads and have to agree to fewer debt 
covenants in their bond indentures. 
 
                                                             
92  The results of Haselmann et al. (2009) are driven by legal rules on collateral, which are not 
included in the widely used creditor rights index of Djankov et al. (2007). 
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Drawing on these insights, it seems natural to hypothesise that jurisdictions with 
stronger creditor rights attract more cross-border debt security issues. However, 
legal arbitrage regarding creditor protection law is more difficult to accomplish. 
Corporation and bankruptcy laws of a given jurisdiction govern only domestic 
entities and their assets. While a multinational firm with its ultimate parent in 
country A can set up a subsidiary in country B to issue debt securities, the 
(supposedly superior) corporation and bankruptcy laws of B apply only to the 
subsidiary and its assets. In practice, the parent will often extend a guarantee to the 
issuer’s creditors. As a consequence, if a default occurs, the guarantee has to be 
enforced against the parent, which is subject to the corporation and bankruptcy laws 
of country A. Employing a foreign issuer does not change creditor protection rules 
with regard to the assets of the parent (or any other group entity extending a 
guarantee) located in another jurisdiction (Figure 5.1). Therefore, if a multinational 
firm wishes to choose a different jurisdiction for its creditor protection law, it has to 
transfer the underlying assets to the entity in the preferred jurisdiction. Creditor 
rights depend not so much on where the debt securities are issued but on where the 
assets backing the securities are held. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1 Legal arbitrage with regard to creditor protection rules if assets are 
held by the parent 
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A general conclusion is that legal arbitrage regarding creditor protection rules can 
be very costly. It is not enough to set up a foreign subsidiary (if it does not exist 
already) and to use it as issuer of the debt securities. In addition, the firm would 
have to transfer the assets underlying the debt security to the foreign subsidiary, 
which will often be infeasible or too expensive, not least because capital gains are 
realised and become subject to corporate income tax. It thus seems that the cost of 
legal arbitrage would typically exceed any benefits from superior creditor 
protection rules. 
 
Yet in one special case, legal arbitrage is more likely to be feasible: The firm does 
not have to shift assets insofar as a subsidiary itself is holding assets, as in the case 
of an operating subsidiary. In such a setting, the firm can choose to issue debt 
securities through the subsidiary to take advantage of its better creditor protection 
rules. The alternative would consist of selling debt claims against the parent. The 
parent’s creditors have indirect recourse against the subsidiary through the parent’s 
shareholdings. Of course, there is a crucial difference: Regarding the subsidiary’s 
assets, creditors of the subsidiary have priority over the parent and its creditors.93 
Nonetheless, debt issues by the parent can serve as substitutes, albeit imperfect 
ones, for debt issues by the subsidiary (Figure 5.2). 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2 Legal arbitrage with regard to creditor protection rules if assets are 
held by operating subsidiary 
                                                             
93  Conversely, the subsidiary’s creditors cannot enforce their claims against the parent’s assets 
(provided that no specific guarantees or security interests have been granted). 
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All else equal, we expect differences in creditor protection rules to have an impact 
on the proportion of debt securities issued by a parent and its subsidiary, 
respectively.94 In a recent contribution, Banerjee and Noe (2010) analyse the 
corresponding trade-off in terms of minimising the agency costs of debt. They 
predict that jurisdictions with stronger creditor rights (i.e. a stronger bargaining 
position for creditors in debt renegotiations) capture a larger share in the total debt 
being issued by a multinational firm. Consistent with this prediction, Desai et al. 
(2004) find that foreign subsidiaries of US-based multinational firms incur higher 
leverage and pay less interest in countries with stronger creditor rights (as measured 
by the index of La Porta et al. 1998). In addition, the greater indebtedness is driven 
by more external borrowing while there is less credit extended by the parent. 
Likewise, Huizinga et al. (2008) also find creditor rights (taken from Djankov et al. 
2007) to be a good predictor for subsidiary leverage with respect to a very large 
panel of European multinational firms ranging from 1994 to 2003. 
 
5.3. Methodology and data 
5.3.1. Econometric approach 
 
To identify country-specific differences in law that motivate legal arbitrage, we 
analyse debt issues where the corporate parent and the debt issuer are located in 
different jurisdictions (‘cross-border debt security issues’). We are interested in the 
number of cross-border debt security issues in a country pair consisting of a 
‘country of origin’ (where the corporate parent is located) and a ‘host country’ 
(location of the subsidiary) in a given year. We thus seek to identify the legal 
factors influencing the debt security issues a host jurisdiction attracts in a particular 
country-pair relation. Using country-pair relations has the obvious advantage of 
revealing more information than a standard country panel because we observe the 
origin and target of cross-border issues at the same time. 
 
A general difficulty with count data is how to deal with zero cross-border issues. 
Discarding them would be a poor solution because the countries without any cross-
                                                             
94  For the US, Kolasinski (2009) reports that issues of debt securities by subsidiaries 
amounted to 13 % of all public debt issued by non-financial firms.  
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border issues may result from a different data generating process (Baltagi 2008). 
For instance, certain states might have chosen to abstain from offering even a 
minimum legal infrastructure for debt securities and hence do not attract any 
foreign debt issues. In this case, the zero observations would not be representative 
of the overall sample. By dropping them, we would introduce a selection bias. An 
econometric solution to this problem would be to apply a two-step estimation 
technique as suggested by Helpman et al. (2008). However, in the present context 
we cannot think of a plausible exclusion restriction for the identification of the 
second stage equation. We therefore rely on the alternative approach suggested by 
Westerlund and Wilhelmsson (forthcoming): We abolish the traditional log-
linearised gravity model and use the data in its original non-linear form instead. 
Using maximum likelihood (ML) methods, we can naturally estimate the zero 
observations and handle the count characteristics of the data more appropriately. As 
Westerlund and Wilhelmsson (forthcoming) have shown based on Monte Carlo 
simulations, the Poisson ML estimator can deal with a large number of zeros while 
suffering from considerably less bias than the traditional log-linear OLS estimates. 
We thus start out from a Poisson regression model as initially suggested by 
Hausman et al. (1984). We then assess how well the Poisson estimator actually 
predicts the data at hand. For the baseline specification below we find the Poisson 
estimator to correctly predict any counts above 5 while it does rather poorly in 
forecasting the zero observations (69 instead of 91 percent zeros are correctly 
predicted). This result may be due to the fact that the Poisson model suffers from 
overdispersion. Comparing the Poisson estimator to the negative binomial (NB) 
estimator, we find the latter to predict the data almost perfectly for all values (all of 
the 91 percent zero observations are correctly predicted). We therefore reject the 
Poisson estimator in favour of the NB estimator. 
 
A second econometric concern is endogeneity. Panel data has the advantage that it 
permits general types of country specific heterogeneity. To limit the likelihood of 
omitted variable bias, we have estimated all models postulating time invariant 
country-pair effects. This specification solves the problem of omitted variable bias 
much better than including a handful of control variables that may influence cross-
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border debt issues (Baldwin and Taglioni 2006). The model thus takes unobservable 
time invariant variables like a history of legal stability or the quality of legal 
institutions into account, without having to specify them explicitly in the equation. 
Due to the fact that the conditional fixed effects NB estimator as suggested by 
Hausman et al. (1984) is a ‘pseudo’ panel estimator, the model permits the 
simultaneous identification of explicit time invariant country pair effects like the 
distances between two jurisdictions. 
 
We specify the following baseline equation considering the theoretical concepts 
stated above: 
 
Pr ሺy୧୨ଵ, y୧୨ଶ, …  y୧୨Tሻ ൌ  F൫۵ܚ܉ܞܑܜܡ୧୨୲ ൅  ܀ܑܛܓ୧୲ ൅ ۺ܉ܟ୧୲ ൅ EMU୧୲൯  
 
where y is the number of cross-border debt issues attracted by the host country i 
from the country of origin j in year t. F(.) denotes the NB distribution function as in 
Baltagi (2008). Gravity is a vector of distance, contiguous, language, 
imports/exports and bond market size. Likewise, Risk and Law are vectors of 
government yield and inflation as well as withholding tax, corporate tax, creditor 
rights, legal origin and contract enforcement respectively (for details see Table 
5.1). 
 
The distribution in our data has many support points, but action concentrates on a 
few values only. Therefore, we additionally consider an ordered probit model in 
which we collapse the number of events into a small number of groups and rank 
them on an ordinal scale. Another robustness check (potentially improving the 
specification) might be a dynamic model. From a theoretical perspective, one might 
conjecture that certain pair relations get more intense over time due to learning 
effects or path dependence. However, since dynamic estimators require us to make 
additional assumptions while at the same time being more sensitive to omitted 
variables, we decided not to specify such a model. We take some comfort in that the 
data does not seem to exhibit much stationarity (see Figure 5.3). For instance, the 
number of debt issues by German multinational firms through subsidiaries in the 
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Netherlands peaked in the year 1996 and decreased steadily thereafter. Note that the 
total number of cross-border debt security issues in all country pairs increased over 
time. 
 
 
Figure 5.3 Cross-border debt security issues over time by pair relation 
 
 
5.3.2. Data and summary statistics 
 
Our analysis is based on a sample of corporate debt securities issued by subsidiaries 
of multinational corporate groups. The data on debt issues was extracted from the 
Thomson Financial ‘SDC Platinum’ database. 95 To qualify for inclusion, both the 
ultimate parent and the subsidiary issuing the securities have to be located in 
countries that by 2009 were member states of the EU or the EFTA. As we do not 
observe a single issuer or corporate parent from Malta, we are left with 870 bilateral 
relations for the period 1980 to 2008 which amounts to 25,230 observations (30 
countries of origin × 29 host countries × 29 years). 
                                                             
95  As ‘SDC Platinum’ is supposed to be exhaustive, the absence of cross-border bond issues 
should be interpreted as an absence of activities rather than a lack of data. Hence, we coded 
the absence of cross-border bond issues by replacing missing values with zeros. 
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In our overall sample, we consider a broad array of debt securities, which consist 
mostly of straight bonds, floating rate notes, medium term notes, and asset backed 
securities; the latter category includes among others collateralised debt obligations 
and the German ‘Pfandbriefe’ (covered bonds).96 As a robustness check and to 
study some of our hypotheses in more depth, we construct two sub-samples – one 
with straight bonds and the other with asset backed securities. While investors in 
asset backed securities typically do not have recourse to other assets of the firm, 
parents and other entities of the group often provide guarantees for straight bonds 
issued by subsidiaries. Straight bonds are thus more likely to be backed not just by 
the issuer but also by entities in other jurisdictions. In total, we observe 11,718 
cross-border issues of debt securities (4,719 straight bonds, 1,275 asset backed 
securities97). 
 
We merge the data on cross-border debt issues with several macroeconomic, 
financial and legal variables. In the international trade literature, geographic 
distances are interpreted as a proxy for transaction costs. Despite the intangible 
nature of financial transactions and communication technologies, transaction costs 
associated with geographic distance may still play a role. For busy investment 
bankers, legal advisors and financial managers, flying from Warsaw to Lisbon takes 
nearly twice as long as flying to London. We therefore include the distance (in 
1,000 kilometres) between capitals and a dummy variable indicating whether the 
country pair is geographically contiguous. Furthermore, we include another dummy 
variable which indicates whether the two countries share an official language 
although we expect that the financial industry nowadays generally speaks English. 
The data on geography and language was taken from the Centre d’Etudes 
Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales (CEPII) database.98 We further use 
the average export (in billion US $) of each individual country pair obtained from 
                                                             
96  For an overview of the various types of asset backed securities see Bank for International 
Settlements (2009).  
97  Note that the subsamples leave out various types of debt securities, which explains why 
they do not add up to the full sample. 
98  Available at http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm. 
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the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS) as a 
measure of countries’ economic connectedness.99 
 
Additional macroeconomic variables come from the Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS) as well as the IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO) database. 
The former source provides information on the size of the international bond market 
(in billion US $) in the respective economy. Total bond market size is a measure for 
economies of scale and scope. A larger market tends to exhibit more liquidity and 
hence lower costs of capital. Larger markets may also be more developed and offer 
more advanced financial service providers. The WEO database offers information 
on classic macroeconomic variables like the country’s inflation rate and 
government bond yield. Both variables are considered as measures for country 
specific risk. 
 
As suggested by the tax law considerations in section 5.2.2., the first variable of 
interest is the withholding tax rate which would be deducted from interest paid to 
investors. We predict that a higher withholding tax makes a jurisdiction less 
attractive as a host for cross-border debt issues. The data come from the Zentrum 
für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (Centre for European Economic Research). 
The second variable of interest is corporate income tax rates. To test the profit 
shifting and tax shield hypotheses, we use panel data from the OECD tax database 
measuring the basic central government statutory (flat or top marginal) corporate 
income tax rate (including surtax if applicable).100 The panel was supplemented in 
part by information from the KPMG Corporate and Indirect Tax Rate Surveys.101 
 
The third set of variables of interest comes from the law and finance literature and 
is specified to test the hypothesis that creditor protection rules matter for issuer 
                                                             
99  There is an old tradition in the estimation of gravity models of using import data only (as 
nations spend more time on measuring imports than exports to avoid tariff fraud). Since 
1993, trade data is generated from the VAT statistics, so that exports provide a more 
accurate measure than imports.  
100  The data is available at http://www.oecd.org/document/60/0,3343,en_2649_34533_ 
1942460_1_1_1_ 37427,00.html#cci.  
101  We extended the initial OECD panel for Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Iceland, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Romania and Slovenia.  
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location choice (see section 5.2.3. above). La Porta et al. (1998) have created a 
creditor rights index which has been used in dozens of previous studies. Djankov et 
al. (2007) provide panel data ranging from 1978 to 2003.102 The index is designed 
to measure the rights of lenders in a particular jurisdiction on a scale from 0 to 4 
(with 4 indicating the highest degree of creditor protection). The index is 
incremented by 1 for each of the following bankruptcy law provisions: (i) There are 
restrictions for debtors to file for reorganisation, such as creditor consent; (ii) 
secured creditors can seize the collateral if the reorganisation petition is approved, 
i.e. there is no automatic stay; (iii) secured creditors enjoy priority over other 
creditors, such as workers or the government; (iv) the debtor does not retain 
administration of its assets during reorganisation. While we are somewhat sceptical 
of how well the creditor rights index actually measures creditor protection in 
bankruptcy law, it is the best proxy we have. Because the creditor rights variable in 
our study has a panel structure, it is less likely to suffer from miscoding or a 
confounding variable problem. We further use information on the number of days it 
takes to resolve a payment dispute through courts. The data for our contract 
enforcement days variable come from Djankov et al. (2003) and provide a measure 
for the efficiency of the judicial system. Finally, we include the legal origin of each 
country from Zweigert and Kötz (1998). To the main advocates of the law and 
finance movement, legal origin determines the ‘style of social control of economic 
life’ (La Porta et al. 2008). According to this view, the common law tends to be 
more concerned with free market contracting and, therefore, provides stronger 
safeguards for investors and creditors. Hence, legal origin could be a proxy for 
more robust creditor protection. 
                                                             
102  As the data is only available until the year 2003 but does not exhibit much variance over 
time, we extend the latest observation in all cases until the year 2008. 
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Table 5.1 Variable descriptions 
  
Variable Description 
Gravity  
distance Identifies the bilateral distance (in 1,000 kilometers) 
between the capitals of the two countries. Source: Centre 
d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales 
(CEPII). 
contiguous Equals 1 if the two countries are contiguous and 0 otherwise. 
Source: CEPII. 
language Equals 1 if the two countries share a common official
language and 0 otherwise. Source: CEPII. 
imports/exports Is the host country’s average of imports from and exports to
the country of origin (in billion US $) for each year from 
1980 to 2008. Source: IMF Direction of Trade Database. 
international bond 
market 
International debt securities by nationality of issuer (in
billions of US dollars) for each year from 1980 to 2008. 
Source: BIS Quarterly Review Statistical Appendix Table 
15B: International bonds and notes: Amounts outstanding all
issuers. 
Risk  
government bond 
yield 
Average government bond yield to maturity (in percent per
annum) for each year from 1996 to 2007. Source: IMF
International Financial Statistics Yearbook. 
inflation Average consumer prices (Index, 2000=100, annual percent
change) for each year from 1980 to 2008. Source: IMF
World Economic Outlook Database. 
Law  
withholding tax rate Withholding tax rates on cross-border interest payments for 
each year from 1998 to 2008. Source: Zentrum für
Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW). 
corporate tax rate Tax rate for the basic central government statutory (flat or
top marginal) corporate income tax (including surtax if
applicable) for each year from 1981 to 2008 Source: OECD 
tax database: Taxation of corporate and capital income Table
II.1 and KPMG Corporate and Indirect Tax Rate Survey. 
creditor rights index An index aggregating creditor rights, following La Porta et
al. (1998). The index ranges from 0 (weak creditor rights) to 
4 (strong creditor rights) and is constructed as of January for
each year from 1978 to 2003. Source: Djankov et al. (2007).
legal origin Identifies the legal origin of each jurisdiction. Four legal
origins are considered: (1) English, (2) French, (3) German, 
(4) Scandinavian. Source: Zweigert and Kötz (1998). 
 
table continues on the next page 
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contract enforcement Number of days to resolve a payment dispute through courts.
The data are based on the methodology in Djankov et al.
(2003), but the variable contains the (logarithmised) number 
of calendar days to enforce a contract of unpaid debt worth
50 percent of the country’s GDP per capita. The variable is
constructed as of January 2003. Source: Djankov et al. 
(2003). 
EMU Equals 1 if the host country is a member of the Economic
and Monetary Union and 0 otherwise for each year from
1980 to 2008.  
 
In very many of the country pairs (9 out of 10), no cross-border debt security issue 
took place. The remaining observations largely cluster around 1 to 10 issues (see 
Figure 5.4), with an absolute maximum of 148 issues from German multinational 
firms hosted in the Netherlands in 1996 (see Table 5.2). 
 
 
Figure 5.4 Density of cross-border debt security issues in country pairs   
(values 1 to 30)  
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Table 5.2 Country pairs with most frequent cross-border debt security issues  
Origin Host nation # cross-border issues  Year 
Germany Netherlands 148 1996 
Germany Ireland 130 2005 
Germany Netherlands 121 1995 
Switzerland United Kingdom 111 1994 
Germany Netherlands 109 1997 
 
Interestingly, cross-border issue flows are often rather one-sided. 6,842 of the cross-
border debt issues in our sample in a given country pair and year (say, from country 
A to country B in 1995) are not matched by a corresponding debt issue in the 
opposite direction (from country B to country A). They can be characterised as net 
inflows (to country B). This is a first hint that cross-border issues concentrate in 
certain host jurisdictions. In fact, 98 percent of net inflows are attracted by the 
Netherlands, Luxembourg, the United Kingdom and Ireland (listed from the most to 
the least important host jurisdiction). Figure 5.5 depicts the (gross) inflows and 
outflows for the European jurisdictions in our sample. 
 
Figure 5.5 Total inflows and outflows of cross-border debt issues 1980 – 2008 
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This picture is confirmed by the findings reported in Table 5.3. The values in the 
matrix represent the debt securities issued in a given country (columns) as a 
percentage of all debt security issues by multinational firms located in a particular 
country of origin (rows).103 The rows show the different magnetism of European 
jurisdictions. The diagonal shows that most of the debt issues are located in the 
country of origin, indicating that debt security issues exhibit a strong home bias. 
The two exceptions are Belgium and Greece, where the majority of the debt 
security issues is located abroad. 
 
Table 5.3 Debt security issues in a particular country (columns) as a 
percentage of all debt securities issues by multinational firms in a 
country of origin (rows) 1980 – 2008 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
103  I.e. the country where the group’s ultimate parent is located.  
AUT BEL BGR CHE CYP CZE DEU DNK ESP EST FIN FRA GBR GRC HUN >0
AUT 0.96 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 >5
BEL 0.00 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 >10
BGR 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 >20
CHE 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.76 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 >40
CYP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
CZE 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
DEU 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.78 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
DNK 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.99 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ESP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.82 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
EST 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
FIN 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.99 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
FRA 0.00 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.89 0.00 0.00 0.00
GBR 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.94 0.57 0.00
GRC 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.42 0.00
HUN 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.97
IRL 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
ISL 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ITA 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
LIE 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
LTU 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
LUX 0.01 0.15 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00
LVA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
NLD 0.02 0.18 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.26 0.09 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.03
NOR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
POL 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
PRT 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ROM 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
SVK 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
SVN 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
SWE 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Total # 1,734 2,958 21 3,386 29 42 19,317 1,720 3,506 17 2,208 8,610 15,758 460 39
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country of origin
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Table 5.4 provides summary statistics on the total number of debt securities, 
straight bonds and asset backed securities issued in a jurisdiction over the years 
1980 through 2008. It also reports the number of debt security issues attracted from 
abroad (inflows) and the number of issues in foreign jurisdictions from 
multinational firms located in the respective country (outflows), each as a 
percentage of the total number of debt security issues in the country. Because they 
are scaled to total issues, inflows can per definition never exceed 100 percent but 
outflows can and do in some cases because they do not count in the denominator. 
For instance, the number of debt securities by Belgian firms through foreign 
subsidiaries is 1.75 times larger than the total number of issues in the domestic 
market. In Luxembourg, by contrast, outflows represent less than 1 percent 
although inflows from EU/EFTA member states amount to 34 percent of the 
domestic market. Except for Sweden, the Scandinavian debt markets are relatively 
closed with a small share of in- and outflows relative to the domestic market. In 
IRL ISL ITA LIE LTU LUX LVA NLD NOR POL PRT ROM SVK SVN SWE >0
AUT 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 >5
BEL 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 >10
BGR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 >20
CHE 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 >40
CYP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
CZE 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.00
DEU 0.09 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04
DNK 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
ESP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
EST 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
FIN 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
FRA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
GBR 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
GRC 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
HUN 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
IRL 0.87 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ISL 0.00 0.93 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ITA 0.00 0.00 0.87 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
LIE 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
LTU 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
LUX 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.99 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
LVA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
NLD 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.91 0.00 0.18 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03
NOR 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.99 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
POL 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.75 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
PRT 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.92 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ROM 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
SVK 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.94 0.00 0.00
SVN 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
SWE 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.88
Total # 3,318 320 4,247 19 6 3,257 2 5,516 1,806 56 1,397 8 18 3 2,680 22,653
country of origin
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absolute terms, Germany has by far the highest outflow of debt issues, while the 
Netherlands see the most inflows. Table 5.4 also contains our three principal 
explanatory variables corporate tax rate, withholding tax rate and creditor rights, 
each averaged over all years under consideration. 
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Table 5.4 Summary statistics of total number of debt security issues, (gross) inflows and outflows as a percentage of total number 
of debt issues, and average values of explanatory variables 
Location of issuer Total debt 
issues 
Total 
straight 
bond issues 
Total abs 
issues 
Debt  
inflows % 
Debt 
outflows %
Corporate 
tax rate Ø
Withholding 
tax rate Ø
Creditor 
rights Ø 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Austria 1,797 698 188 6.7 3.1 38.0 0.0 3.1 
Belgium 1,136 470 123 16.5 174.6 40.3 11.0 2.0 
Bulgaria 24 10 1 8.3 0.0 12.5 12.5 1.2 
Cyprus 31 20 - 6.5 0.0 15.8 11.4 - 
Czech Republic 36 19 4 22.2 38.9 32.7 10.9 3.0 
Denmark 1,757 549 233 3.5 1.4 36.3 0.0 2.8 
Estonia 25 9 3 32.0 0.0 22.5 14.2 - 
Finland 2,225 625 292 1.8 1.0 38.5 0.0 2.1 
France 8,549 3,613 908 9.6 10.6 40.1 10.9 0.0 
Germany 16,352 5,127 3,646 7.3 25.0 51.8 0.0 3.0 
Greece 214 123 6 10.3 122.9 39.4 27.5 1.0 
Hungary 48 29 4 20.8 2.1 24.9 9.8 1.0 
Iceland 297 172 8 0.0 7.7 25.7 - - 
Ireland 4,144 2,470 152 30.6 10.7 33.7 13.7 1.4 
table continues on the next page 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Italy 3,904 1,965 271 5.8 14.5 42.5 17.5 2.0 
Latvia 3 1 1 33.3 0.0 19.1 10.0 3.0 
Liechtenstein 20 8 4 0.0 0.0 - - - 
Lithuania 6 3 1 0.0 0.0 15.0 12.7 1.2 
Luxembourg 4,955 2,029 487 33.7 0.7 31.7 0.0 - 
Netherlands 8,744 3,880 821 40.6 5.5 36.7 0.0 3.0 
Norway 1,815 645 217 2.0 1.5 37.0 0.0 2.0 
Poland 54 20 4 22.2 24.1 36.4 10.9 1.0 
Portugal 1,420 365 267 9.2 8.0 39.8 16.4 1.0 
Romania 10 6 - 20.0 0.0 20.5 12.5 1.7 
Slovak Republic 18 5 3 5.6 5.6 30.5 17.2 2.0 
Slovenia 3 2 - 0.0 0.0 24.5 0.9 3.0 
Spain 2,913 1,436 204 1.4 21.9 34.5 14.2 2.0 
Sweden 2,380 839 348 0.8 13.4 38.6 0.0 1.7 
Switzerland 2,653 742 557 3.2 30.1 27.8 6.7 1.0 
United Kingdom 17,161 7,628 1,724 12.8 5.3 34.7 12.7 3.8 
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Table 5.5 reports the correlations between the number and the volume of debt 
securities, straight bonds and asset backed securities, for all country pairs. All of 
these variables exhibit strong correlations. In particular, a plausible alternative for 
our dependent variable – the volume (in billion US $) of cross-border debt security 
issues – is highly correlated with the number of issues. Since we are interested in 
firms’ choice, and the unreported estimates of a Tobit gravity model based on the 
volume of debt security issues generate results rather similar to the conditional NB 
panel model, we restrict our analysis to count data estimates only. 
 
Table 5.6 contains a correlation matrix of cross-border debt security issues in country 
pairs with the main explanatory and control variables. As expected, the withholding 
and corporate tax rates in the host country are negatively correlated with inflows. 
Vice versa, the number of cross-border debt issues is positively correlated with the 
corporate tax rate in the ultimate parent’s jurisdiction, which is in line with the profit 
shifting hypothesis. The latter correlation is not only highly significant but also large 
in magnitude. Moreover, the number of debt issues is positively correlated with the 
host country’s creditor rights index. The correlation matrix shows, however, that 
most explanatory variables are highly correlated with one another (very frequently at 
the 1-percent level). Therefore, one cannot identify the effect of market size, tax 
advantages and creditor rights on inflows of debt issues based on simple correlations, 
making multivariate and in particular panel data methods clearly preferable. 
 
Table 5.5 Correlation matrix: Number and volume of cross-border issues in 
country pair for full sample and subsamples 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(1) debt securities # 1.00           
(2) debt securities $ 0.82 1.00         
(3) straight bond issues # 0.88 0.71 1.00       
(4) straight bond issues $ 0.77 0.78 0.87 1.00     
(5) asset backed sec. # 0.64 0.54 0.27 0.21 1.00   
(6) asset backed sec. $ 0.58 0.60 0.24 0.23 0.88 1.00
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.6 Correlation matrix: Cross-border issues in country pairs (inflows to host country from country of origin) and explanatory variables 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
(1)  debt securities # inflows 1.00                             
(2)  distance -0.07 1.00                           
(3)  contiguous  0.06 -0.49 1.00                         
(4)  common language 0.04 -0.45 0.65 1.00                       
(5)  exports / imports 0.23 -0.39 0.48 0.22 1.00                     
(6)  EMU membership 0.04 -0.02 0.15 0.13 0.16 1.00                   
(7)  international bond market 0.17 -0.04 -0.02 0.00 0.44 -0.01 1.00                 
(8)  government bond yield -0.07 0.06 -0.06 -0.12 -0.20 -0.26 -0.25 1.00               
(9)  inflation rate 0.03 0.11 -0.11 -0.12 -0.19 0.27 -0.21 0.28 1.00             
(10) corporate tax host -0.07 -0.11 0.20 0.10 0.30 0.06 0.27 0.09 -0.37 1.00           
(11) withholding tax host -0.15 0.14 -0.03 -0.06 -0.17 -0.13 -0.29 0.32 0.13 -0.10 1.00         
(12) corporate tax origin 0.21 -0.02 0.17 0.00 0.29 0.03 -0.25 0.21 0.09 0.06 0.27 1.00       
(13) legal origin -0.19 -0.12 0.26 0.14 0.10 0.08 -0.02 -0.12 -0.14 0.35 -0.49 -0.16 1.00     
(14) creditor rights index 0.10 0.01 -0.25 -0.11 0.05 -0.42 0.36 0.10 -0.21 0.18 -0.21 -0.14 -0.14 1.00   
(15) contract enforcement -0.10 0.17 -0.01 -0.07 -0.09 -0.22 0.04 0.22 0.05 -0.19 0.49 0.01 -0.11 0.05 1.00 
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5.4. Results 
5.4.1. Gravity model 
5.4.1.1. Debt securities 
 
In Table 5.7 we present the results of the gravity model estimations. They originate 
from the baseline model set out in section 5.3.1. In what follows, we report incidence 
rate ratios as they can conveniently be interpreted as multiplicative effect or semi-
elasticity. This implies that all estimates below one have to be interpreted as a 
negative effect, while estimates greater than one reveal a positive relationship. We 
focus on the fixed country-pair effects estimator, because it deals with omitted 
variables more adequately than the simple pooled model. Conducting a Hausman test 
leads us to dismiss the random effects model as being inconsistent for the overall 
sample and the subsamples (analysed in subsection 5.4.1.2 below). 
 
As regards the classic gravity variables, we find throughout all specifications a 
negative effect for distance (between the capitals of the host country and the country 
of origin). 1,000 kilometers of additional distance reduce cross-border issues by 40 –
55 percent, but the effect does not come out significant in our preferred fixed-effects 
specification. A common geographic border also fails to be statistically significant. 
Unlike in the international trade literature, we do not find support for our conjecture 
that geographic proximity – as a proxy for transaction cost – explains where firms 
locate debt issues. Even more surprisingly, a common official language also does not 
stimulate inflows, which suggests that English as the lingua franca of international 
finance overcomes any language barriers. Even though the EMU membership and 
bond market size variable show the expected sign, these variables are not significant 
as well. As regards the two measures of country specific risk, we find somewhat 
mixed results, with lower government bond yields and higher inflation increasing the 
attractiveness of the host state. The former result, indicating that shaky public 
finances discourage corporate debt issues is weakly significant, while the latter is 
not. 
 
130 
 
Considering legal factors driving the choice of issuer location in multinational firms, 
we hypothesised that a lower withholding tax rate would increase inflows of debt 
issues to a jurisdiction. We find impressive support for this prediction. Our 
withholding tax rate variable is strongly significant for the conditional NB estimates 
(and unreported Poisson as well as Tobit estimates) and shows the expected sign, 
with a 1 percentage point increase in the withholding tax rate reducing cross-border 
debt issues by 2.6 percent. With regard to corporate taxes, our results generally 
confirm neither the tax shield nor the profit shifting hypothesis, as the corporate tax 
rate variable comes out insignificant for the overall sample. 
 
Regarding the legal factors we expect to influence issuers’ choice, we find only legal 
origin to have a significant and robust impact throughout all specifications. In 
unreported estimations using three separate dummy variables, French, German and 
Scandinavian relative to English legal origin all show an incidence rate ratio below 
1, which is significant at the 1-percent level. It might be that there is a drift towards 
better creditor protection under the common law. However, we do not have much 
confidence in this conclusion: There are only three jurisdictions of English legal 
origin in our sample. These are also the countries with English as an official 
language, which could explain their attractiveness; or the legal origin variable may 
just have randomly selected two countries with very large inflows (the UK and 
Ireland). The effect of contract enforcement days is as one would expect: The more 
efficient the court system (as measured by the time to resolve a dispute), the more 
debt issues a jurisdiction attracts. This effect is, however, only weakly significant (at 
the 10-percent level) for the preferred fixed effects model. Our third variable of 
interest is creditor rights. In none of the panel models we find a significant impact of 
creditor rights on multinational firms’ choice where to issue debt securities. 
Generally speaking, the creditor rights index has been a mixed success in empirical 
research. It failed to yield significant results as soon as legal origin was included 
even in La Porta et al. (1997), the paper that started the law and finance movement 
and first introduced the creditor rights index.104 At the same time, there are too many 
potential legal or economic factors behind the legal origin variable to draw reliable 
                                                             
104  See also the other references in subsection 5.2.3. above. 
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conclusions. In sum, our analysis lends only very weak support to the hypothesis that 
differences in creditor protection rules generally explain multinational firms’ choices 
where to issue debt securities. The relevant factor for the location choice is taxes. 
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Table 5.7 Negative binomial gravity model(I) 
      pooled  panel 
      (1)    (2)   (3)   
distance     0.549 ***  0.601   0.450 *** 
      (0.097)    (0.218)   (0.072)   
contiguous      0.975    1.801   2.091   
      (0.287)    (1.328)   (0.608)   
language     1.797    0.889   0.921   
      (0.751)    (0.718)   (0.273)   
imports / exports   1.110 ***  1.007   1.008   
      (0.013)    (0.379)   (0.004)   
EMU     1.453    1.118   1.329 * 
      (0.218)    (0.203)   (0.176)   
bond market size * 10-3   0.994    0.837   0.895   
      (0.234)    (0.150)   (0.101)   
government yield   1.027    0.845 * 0.863 * 
      (0.113)    (0.075)   (0.064)   
inflation      0.841 ***  1.073   0.994   
      (0.056)    (0.057)   (0.045)   
corporate tax host   0.997    1.009   1.021 * 
      (0.020)    (0.010)   (0.009)   
withholding tax host   0.941 ***  0.974 ** 0.971 ** 
      (0.015)    (0.012)   (0.007)   
legal origin   0.224 ***  0.495 *** 0.373 *** 
      (0.042)    (0.072)   (0.040)   
creditor rights   1.202 *  0.956   0.970   
      (0.124)    (0.137)   (0.067)   
contract enforcement   0.751 **  0.820 * 0.779   
      (0.092)   (0.148)  (0.076)  
  Pair effects   -   FE  RE   
  Hausman   -    -   inconsistent   
Standard errors   robust   bootstrap  bootstrap   
  Observations   5652   1115  5652   
  Groups    -   120  725   
Log-likelihood -3007.15  -1593.71 -2376.25   
 
(I) Due to the pairwise exclusion of cases, the sample reduces to the period 1998–2007.  
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5.4.1.2. Subsamples: Straight bonds and asset backed securities 
 
To ensure that we are not missing important effects that are specific to certain types 
of debt securities, we analyse two subsamples consisting of only straight bonds and 
of only asset backed securities. Beside a general concern for robustness, we expect 
these two subsamples to differ regarding the importance of safeguards on behalf of 
creditors: Straight bonds typically have longer maturities so that creditors should be 
particularly concerned about protecting themselves against opportunism. By contrast, 
asset backed securities are typically ‘bankruptcy remote’: The entitlements of 
securityholders and the special purpose entity holding the assets are structured so as 
to prevent the entity from becoming insolvent (Standard & Poor’s 2008). Creditor 
protection should therefore play a more pronounced role in the straight bond 
subsample. 
 
In general, our findings appear to be quite robust in the straight bonds subsample, 
with withholding tax rates and legal origin showing the same sign and high statistical 
significance as in the larger debt securities sample. Furthermore, within the straight 
bonds sample we find that multinational corporate groups locate the bond issues 
preferably in jurisdictions with low government bond yields, which can be 
interpreted as aversion to country-specific risk. As in the baseline sample, we find 
inflation to attract cross-border issues of straight bonds. High inflation may point to a 
greater exchange rate risk, leading firms to finance the subsidiary’s operations in 
local currency. With regard to the asset backed securities subsample, the effect of 
government bond yields and inflation turns the other way. Country-specific risk may 
affect going concern firm value more than the value of individual assets, which could 
render asset based financing relatively less expensive than debt backed by the firm’s 
business operation. The opposite signs of government bond yield and inflation in the 
two subsamples might explain why the variables do not turn out significant in the 
larger sample. Surprisingly, in the asset backed securities subsample the withholding 
tax effect disappears in our preferred fixed-effects specification, which is hard to 
explain. The host country corporate tax rate remains insignificant. 
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Table 5.8 Negative binomial gravity model: Subsamples of straight bonds and 
asset backed securities 
Straight bonds 
      pooled   panel 
      (1)     (2)   (3)   
distance     0.593 *** 0.589 0.408 
      (0.103)    (0.216)  (0.148) 
contiguous      0.941   1.085 1.382 
      (0.283)    (0.759)  (0.679) 
language     1.415   0.774 0.766 
      (0.551)    (0.555)  (0.401) 
imports / exports   1.101 *** 1.012 1.014 * 
      (0.012)    (0.008)  (0.008) 
EMU     1.339   1.280 1.596 ** 
      (0.382)    (0.237)  (0.315) 
bond market size * 10-3   1.347   0.925 1.047 
      (0.324)    (0.237)  (0.181) 
government yield   0.813 * 0.603 *** 0.656 *** 
      (0.057)    (0.060)  (0.061) 
inflation      0.859 ** 1.170 ** 1.061 
      (0.057)    (0.079)  (0.076) 
corporate tax host   0.957   0.994 1.006 
      (0.025)    (0.015)  (0.011) 
withholding tax host   0.951 *** 0.966 *** 0.964 *** 
      (0.018)    (0.012)  (0.011) 
legal origin   0.275 *** 0.593 ** 0.402 *** 
      (0.058)    (0.126)  (0.082) 
creditor rights   1.216 * 1.002 1.025 
      (0.129)    (0.127)  (0.117) 
contract enforcement   0.756 ** 0.923 0.847 
      (0.104)   (0.201)  (0.173) 
  Pair effects   - FE RE 
  Hausman   - - - 
Standard errors   robust bootstrap bootstrap 
  Observations   5652 915 5652 
  Groups    - 98 725 
Log-likelihood -2160.34 -1108.85 -1736.15 
table continues on the next page 
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Asset backed securities 
      pooled   panel 
      (4)     (5)   (6)   
distance     0.454 *** 0.525 0.404 *** 
      (0.084)   (1.172)  (0.113)  
contiguous      0.709 1.555 3.014 ** 
      (0.293)   (7.128)  (1.575)  
language     1.429 0.394 1.135 
      (0.580)   (2.816)  (0.866)  
imports / exports   1.077 0.989 1.006 
      (0.011)   (0.025)  (0.027)  
EMU     1.341 0.638 1.226 
      (0.447)   (0.307)  (0.435)  
bond market size * 10-3   0.099 *** 0.425 0.124 ** 
      (0.041)   (0.275)  (0.132)  
government yield   2.036 *** 7.027 *** 2.703 *** 
      (0.249)   (2.027)  (0.536)  
inflation      0.950 0.695 ** 0.598 *** 
      (0.176)   (0.119)  (0.105)  
corporate tax host   1.182 *** 1.057 1.136 *** 
      (0.045)   (0.048)  (0.037)  
withholding tax host   0.910 *** 1.038 0.945 * 
      (0.016)   (0.053)  (0.030)  
legal origin   0.083 *** 1.536 0.142 *** 
      (0.042)   (2.958)  (0.081)  
creditor rights   1.051 0.966 1.259 
      (0.118)   (0.716)  (0.222)  
contract enforcement   0.995 1.117 0.716 
      (0.159) (1.810)  (0.186)  
  Pair effects   - FE RE 
  Hausman   - - inconsistent 
Standard errors   robust bootstrap bootstrap 
  Observations   5652 540 5652 
  Groups    - 54 725 
Log-likelihood -631.79 -245.76 -553.18
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5.4.1.3. Push and pull factors 
 
By construction, our sample contains only cross-border debt issues. This enables us 
to analyse what multinational firms look for when they pick a foreign jurisdiction, 
once they have decided to go abroad. However, since our unit of observation are 
cross-border debt security issues in country pairs, we also know the location of the 
firm’s ultimate parent. Obviously, the number of cross-border debt security issues in 
a given country pair should not only depend on the conditions in the host country but 
also of those in the country of origin. The latter can be thought of as ‘pushing’ firms 
abroad whereas host country variables determine which of the available jurisdictions 
‘pulls’ most issues. For this reason, we include the variables of interest from country 
of origin into our analysis. 
 
Including ‘push’ factors should help to specify the model better and thus to estimate 
the coefficients more precisely. As to host country ‘pull’ variables, the estimates 
confirm withholding tax rate and legal origin as relevant predictors for a host 
country’s attractiveness. The extended model lends more empirical support to 
contract enforcement than our original specification. In addition, EMU membership 
now turns out highly significant for debt securities in general and straight bonds in 
particular. For the straight bond sample, we find membership in the EMU to more 
than double the debt issues being attracted. Finally, we now find a significant 
positive effect of corporate tax rate in the host country. This result conforms to the 
tax shield hypothesis. It is mainly driven by asset backed securities, which is also 
consistent with the tax shield hypothesis: Securitisation amounts to refinancing the 
assets through debt securities. The assets’ cashflows no longer generate profits for 
the subsidiary but instead have to be used to pay the securityholders.105 Asset backed 
securities are another way of establishing a tax shield. 
 
Looking at the country of origin, we find corporate tax rate to be significantly and 
positively related to cross-border issues. The effect is even larger than that of the host 
country corporate tax rate. High corporate taxes in the country of origin push firms 
                                                             
105  See Han et al. (2010) for a model of corporate tax incentives to securitise bank loans. 
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to issue debt securities abroad. In and of itself, this finding is consistent with the 
profit shifting hypothesis. At first blush, however, it is hard to reconcile with high 
corporate taxes being a ‘pull’ factor. It seems that firms decide to go abroad to 
escape high corporate taxes, but then again seek high-tax jurisdictions. The former 
result conforms to the profit shifting hypothesis while the latter is predicted by the 
tax shield hypothesis. Yet the two hypotheses may well coexist. Profit shifting and 
erecting a tax shield can be motives for different multinational firms and different 
subsets of cross-border debt security issues. 
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Table 5.9 Negative binomial gravity model: Host and origin country effects 
      pooled       panel       
      
all debt 
securities     
all debt 
securities  
straight 
bonds  
asset 
backed 
securities   
      (1)     (2)   (3)   (4)   
distance     0.220 *** 0.408 *** 0.346 0.628
      (0.038)   (0.073)  (0.075)  (0.249)  
contiguous      2.376 ** 2.060 ** 1.366 3.207 ** 
      (0.916)   (0.634)  (0.491)  (1.849)  
language     1.227 0.886 0.790 0.489
      (0.464)   (0.281)  (0.290)  (0.305)  
imports / exports   0.991 1.003 1.000 1.024
      (0.008)   (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.016)  
host country (subsidiary) 
EMU     2.584 *** 1.581 *** 2.024 *** 1.275
      (0.560)   (0.268)  (0.446)  (0.391)  
bond market size * 10-3   3.228 *** 1.105 1.314 * 0.407 * 
      (0.748)   (0.154)  (0.208)  (0.188)  
government yield   0.970 0.865 0.792 1.896 ***
      (0.108)   (0.102)  (0.117)  (0.370)  
inflation      0.866 ** 1.032 * 1.051 0.757 ** 
      (0.054)   (0.049)  (0.061)  (0.095)  
corporate tax   0.996 1.026 ** 1.016 1.073 ***
      (0.017)   (0.011)  (0.013)  (0.027)  
withholding tax   0.932 *** 0.969 *** 0.969 *** 0.929 ***
      (0.013)   (0.008)  (0.010)  (0.024)  
legal origin     0.220 *** 0.344 *** 0.387 *** 0.149 ***
      (0.032)   (0.040)  (0.054)  (0.049)  
creditor rights   1.155 * 0.979 1.060 1.297
      (0.095)   (0.078)  (0.108)  (0.213)  
contract enforcement   0.896 0.808 ** 0.893 0.720
      (0.100) (0.083) (0.112) (0.178)
 
table continues on the next page 
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      (1)   (2)  (3)  (4)  
country of origin (corporate parent)
EMU     0.580 ** 1.130 1.239 1.239
      (0.146)   (0.207)  (0.302)  (0.375)  
bond market size * 10-3   1.745 *** 1.031 1.302 ** 0.177 ***
      (0.302)   (0.124)  (0.183)  (0.084)  
government yield   1.329 0.866 0.731 ** 1.626 * 
      (0.247)   (0.110)  (0.115)  (0.417)  
inflation      1.076 0.992 0.974 0.669 ** 
      (0.143)   (0.066)  (0.078)  (0.116)  
corporate tax   1.114 *** 1.052 ** 1.029 ** 1.079 ***
      (0.018)   (0.012)  (0.014)  (0.027)  
withholding tax   1.017 1.006 1.012 0.995
      (0.012)   (0.446)  (0.010)  (0.023)  
legal origin     0.646 *** 0.932 1.083 0.525 ** 
      (0.088)   (0.125)  (0.175)  (0.170)  
creditor rights   0.763 *** 1.033 1.116 1.100
      (0.075)   (0.082)  (0.108)  (0.194)  
contract enforcement   0.875 1.031 0.915 0.807
      (0.293) (0.343) (0.379) (0.591)
Pair effects   - RE RE RE
Standard errors   robust - - -
Observations   2660 2660 2660 2660
Groups - 360 360 360
Log-likelihood -2299.22 -1963.40 -1444.49 -421.87
 
  
140 
 
5.4.2. An alternative ordered probit model 
 
As an additional robustness check, we group country pairs in four groups depending 
on the number of cross-border debt security issues: The first contains the country 
pairs with no cross-border issues, the second to fourth those with a moderate (1–10), 
large (11–50) and very large number (51–150) of cross-border debt issues. The idea 
is that there could be distinct data generating processes. For instance, some 
jurisdictions may have ceased to provide any infrastructure for debt securities at all; 
others have the required legal and financial institutions but take no interest in luring 
debt issues from abroad; a few countries are pursuing a conscious competitive 
strategy of promoting its legal and financial services industry. To see whether our 
results hold up against such a story, we estimate an ordered probit model based on 
the four groups mentioned above. Our results on tax and creditor protection variables 
are largely confirmed. While a lower withholding tax attracts cross-border debt 
security issues generally and with respect to straight bonds in particular, asset backed 
securities are affected by corporate taxes. The legal origin of a particular country 
affects all samples alike. 
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Table 5.10 Ordered probit model 
      pooled      panel       
      
all debt 
securities    
all debt 
securities  
straight 
bonds   
asset 
backed 
securities   
      (1)    (2)   (3)   (4)   
distance     -0.413 ***  -0.564 *** -0.820 *** -0.371 * 
      (0.052)    (0.115)   (0.135)   (0.197)   
contiguous      0.025 *  0.957 *** 0.356 * 1.000 ** 
      (0.089)    (0.193)   (0.200)   (0.427)   
language     0.296 ***  0.974 *** 0.752 *** 0.017   
      (0.094)    (0.212)   (0.249)   (0.432)   
imports / exports   0.038 ***  0.027 *** 0.037 *** 0.019 ** 
      (0.003)    (0.004)   (0.004)   (0.007)   
EMU     0.059    0.165   0.431 *** -0.142   
      (0.078)    (0.121)   (0.144)   (0.172)   
bond market size * 10-3   -0.200 ***  -0.045   -0.043   -1.059 ***
      (0.073)    (0.099)   (0.109)   (0.224)   
government yield   0.053    -0.044   -0.192 ** 0.445 ***
      (0.035)    (0.063)   (0.076)   (0.106)   
inflation      -0.085 ***  -0.030   -0.008   -0.183 ** 
      (0.026)    (0.043)   (0.051)   (0.078)   
corporate tax host   -0.006    0.020 ** 0.001   0.061 ***
      (0.005)    (0.008)   (0.010)   (0.013)   
withholding tax host   -0.018 ***  -0.017 ** -0.026 *** -0.021   
      (0.005)    (0.007)   (0.008)   (0.013)   
legal origin     -0.631 ***  -0.720 *** -0.836 *** -0.986 ***
      (0.053)    (0.093)   (0.102)   (0.185)   
creditor rights   0.063 **  0.053   -0.021   0.156   
      (0.029)    (0.062)   (0.065)   (0.109)   
contract enforcement   -0.162 ***  -0.119   -0.186 ** -0.306 ** 
      (0.040)    (0.094)   (0.092)   (0.156)   
Pair effects   -   RE  RE   RE   
Standard errors   robust   -  -   -   
Observations   5652   5652  5652   5652   
Log-likelihood -1493.82 -1111.87  -849.2 -372.77   
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5.5. Summary and conclusion 
 
Regulatory competition between jurisdictions has become a central feature of the 
European legal landscape. As in the US, such competition occurs, for example, in the 
area of company law. But it surely is not confined to this field. In this article, we 
have been looking at issuer location and regulatory competition in the European 
Corporate Debt Market. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to study the 
extent of competition for corporate debt issues in Europe empirically. We find that, 
in absolute terms, Germany has by far the highest outflow of debt issues, while the 
Netherlands, the UK, Luxemburg and Ireland see the most inflows (in that order). 
We use a panel gravity model to investigate the motives for choosing an issuer 
incorporated in another jurisdiction. 
 
The data clearly support the prediction that inflows are influenced positively by a 
low withholding tax rate. A 1 percentage point increase in the withholding tax rate 
reduces cross-border debt issues by 2.6 percent. Corporate tax rates also play a role, 
but here the picture is less clear. Considering the perspective of both the host country 
and the country of origin, we find some support for the hypothesis that firms use out-
of-state issues as a tax shield by issuing more debt locally in high-tax jurisdictions 
(‘tax shield hypothesis’). This effect shows up with respect to asset backed securities. 
There is also some evidence for the hypothesis that multinational firms from high-tax 
jurisdictions issue debt securities abroad to create profit shifting opportunities 
(‘profit shifting hypothesis’). Further, in none of the panel models do we find a 
significant impact of creditor rights in bankruptcy on multinational firms’ choice 
where to issue debt securities. The only weakly significant effect that we observe is 
that of the efficiency of a host country’s court system as measured by the time it 
takes to resolve a dispute. 
 
The implications of these findings appear to be straightforward: Countries that wish 
to attract bond issues should lower or abolish withholding taxes. From a European 
regulatory perspective, this result provides empirical evidence on an important field 
of tax competition. As tax law arbitrage is costly, our findings strengthen the case for 
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abolishing withholding taxes in Europe. A somewhat sobering result for European 
jurisdictions might be that even if they radically improve on their legal rules as 
applicable to debt securities, especially with respect to creditor protection, they 
should not anticipate to capture a larger market share in the European public debt 
market. ‘Success’ in European regulatory competition crucially depends on 
identifying the drivers of firms’ choices. Whereas in company law, incorporation 
speed and capital requirements play the decisive role (Becht et al. 2008), issuer 
choice in the European corporate bond market is driven by (withholding) tax rates – 
not creditor rights. 
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6. Choice of Law in Debt Securities: A Case Study of French, German and 
Italian Issues 1998 – 2008 
 
6.1. Introduction 
 
That firms adopt a law of their liking has been documented for a broad range of 
settings. The choice of a particular law is not a random event and therefore often 
referred to as ‘regulatory arbitrage’ or ‘legal arbitrage’. Fleischer (2010) defines this 
activity as a ‘planning technique’, which allows the management to “take advantage 
of a gap between the economics of a deal and its regulatory treatment, restructuring 
the deal to reduce or avoid regulatory costs without unduly altering the underlying 
economics of the deal.” The most prominent example of regulatory arbitrage is 
corporate law. For more than a century, US firms have been free to incorporate in 
any state, thereby effectively choosing the corporate law under which they are 
organised. In a similar vein, a large number of start-ups from Germany and other 
continental European countries decided to incorporate in a foreign jurisdiction, after 
the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in his landmark rulings Centros (1999), 
Überseering (2002) and Inspire Art (2003) held that the ‘real seat doctrine’ violated 
the freedom of establishment laid down in the TFEU.106 Finally, when in October 
2004 the European Company (Societas Europaea – SE) entered the scene, it offered 
existing European firms for the first time a choice between the law of their home 
state and the law of the supranational SE. 
 
Regulatory arbitrage is, however, not confined to corporate law and the holders of 
equity, which can influence the management decisions by means of ‘exit and voice’ 
(Hirschman 1970).107 In a more subtle way, debt holders may also facilitate such 
practices. Ball et al. (2010) found firms which chose to cross-list their shares on a US 
stock exchange to lower their offering bond yield by about 48 basis points. They 
                                                             
106  See ECJ, Case C-212/97 Centros Ltd. v Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen [1999] ECR I-1459; 
Case C-208/00 Überseering BV v Nordic Construction Company Baumanagement GmbH 
[2002] ECR I-9919; Case C-167/01 Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v 
Inspire Art Ltd. [2003] ECR I-10155. 
107  If the salary of the management depends on stock prices and regulatory arbitrage increase 
firm value, the stock market may provide another channel to incentivise the management to 
engage in regulatory arbitrage.  
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attribute the reduction in initial yield payments to ‘legal bonding’ with respect to 
discloser requirements. Debt holders thus indirectly force corporate managers to 
engage in regulatory arbitrage, by punishing those firms with higher financing costs 
failing to commit themselves to a more stringent disclosure regime. Similarly, 
Eidenmüller et al. (2010b) found European firms to issue their debt securities by 
foreign subsidiaries, as a venue abroad can save investors withholding tax payments 
debt holders otherwise pass on to the debt issuer by requesting higher interest rates. 
 
While it is well established that firms do in fact engage in regulatory arbitrage, there 
is little knowledge about the intensity with which this corporate decision-making 
process is carried out. It has been argued that managers adopt certain legal rules (e.g. 
securities regulations, corporate charters, bankruptcy laws or arbitration rules) as it 
may help them to save regulatory, financing or litigation costs (Easterbrook and 
Fischel 1991; Becht et al. 2008; Ball et al. 2010; Eidenmüller et al. 2009a; 
Eidenmüller et al. 2010b). It is doubtful though, that the management of a firm 
engages in regulatory arbitrage on a daily basis. After all, the decision-making 
process within a firm is preceded by search costs for a superior regulation, which can 
be substantial and may rarely materialise. Furthermore, due to the complexity of 
many business activities, the actions of managers of large companies are often 
routine (Hart 1995). As a result, firms’ choice of law often perpetuates itself and 
becomes subject to what is known as path dependence. 
 
Historically, the concept of path dependence has been developed to show how 
inefficient technologies persist despite the emergence of more efficient ones (David 
1985; Arthur 1989). The reasons for a so-called technological lock-in range from 
high switching costs, the uncertainty about other alternatives to the interrelatedness 
of a particular choice with other decisions. More recently, the concept of path 
dependence was also applied to the persistence of inefficient institutions (North 
1990) and legal rules (Klausner 1995). Heine and Kerber (2002) draw on path 
dependence to explain the sluggishness of corporate charter competition in Europe. 
The following analysis is the first empirical study relating path dependence to the 
legal rules governing corporate debt. 
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Knowing whether the legal rules governing corporate debt securities are path 
dependent carries important policy implications. Potentially welfare-enhancing 
policies like the recent reform of the German Debenture Act 
(Schuldverschreibungsgesetz, SchVG) have no or only a very sluggish impact if path 
dependence in the choice of law is strong. Moreover, it should be mentioned that 
regardless of whether regulatory competition is a ‘race to the bottom’ or ‘race to the 
top’, path dependence slows any racing car down. In case the second presumption 
about regulatory competition is right, then path dependence is an impediment to a 
more efficient regulatory environment providing a prima facie case for 
harmonisation. 
 
The analysis in this article proceeds in two steps: First, it seeks to identify the initial 
drivers of regulatory arbitrage in corporate debt issues. Unlike the macro analysis by 
Eidenmüller et al. (2010b), this article sets out to spot regulatory arbitrage on the 
micro level (debt security issues and firms). In a second step, it seeks to determine 
the degree to which regulatory arbitrage is path dependent. Section 6.2. starts by 
outlining the factors influencing the choice of law and path dependence from a 
theoretical perspective. Thereafter, the data and methodology are presented in section 
6.3. Section 6.4. provides the empirical findings and section 6.5. concludes. 
 
6.2. Choice of law and path dependence in corporate debt issues 
 
If firms resile from issuing additional equity or eating up their financial reserves to 
finance future operations, they have to rely on external sources of finance. External 
financing in turn distinguishes between the issue of debt securities and taking out a 
bank loan.108 Whether firms prefer the one over the other depends foremost on the 
costs of the alternative financing sources. Interest rates differentials are only one 
factor influencing the financing costs and hence a firm’s decision whether to tap the 
capital market or not. In a world with global and highly integrated capital markets, 
where firms are able to address banks and investors in multiple countries, interest 
                                                             
108  Financial institutions face a similar choice with regard to their refinancing activities. They 
can increase the funds from depositors, obtain finance from other banks, or tap the capital 
market. 
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rate differentials may no longer play the most important role. By contrast, due to the 
globalisation of many business activities, firms encounter more and more 
possibilities to lower their financing costs by engaging in regulatory arbitrage.109 
While banks mostly dictate the terms and conditions of a loan, the precise design of a 
debt security depends on the regulatory environment the firm adopts. Some 
regulatory factors affecting a debt issue include the prospectus requirements and 
liabilities, corporate taxation, taxation of investors by means of withholding taxes, 
the bankruptcy regime and accounting practices, to name just a few. 
 
That institutional and regulatory differences are highly relevant in corporate finance 
indicates the financial structure of European and US companies. Tapping the capital 
market has traditionally been less popular among European firms. In the year 2003, 
non-financial companies in the US have issued debt securities worth 22.6 percent of 
GDP as compared to only 7.2 percent in the Euro area (European Central Bank 
2005). This difference can at least partly be traced back to dissimilarities in the 
banking regulation. The Glass-Steagall Act in the US has traditionally prohibited 
corporate finance via credit and the simultaneous holding of securities in the very 
same company. For this reason, corporate finance in the US has essentially been 
carried out on the capital market (Heine and Kerber 2002). In Germany universal 
banking system provides that banks can extend credit to a firm while investing in the 
same company, which allows financial institutions to gain control in the supervisory 
board. Such a tight relation helps banks to reduce agency costs and provides 
incentives for prolonged interactions between banks and the industry. 
 
The issue of a corporate debt security touches on various areas of the law. First of all, 
a debt security constitutes a contractual relationship between the issuer and investors, 
which is governed by the contract law of a jurisdiction. Second, in case the firm 
undergoes financial distress, the contract might also specify an international 
jurisdiction of courts, which is independent from the applicable contract law and 
specifies the forum where proceedings may take place. Third, if the security is 
offered to the public or listed at the stock market, a prospectus must be published and 
                                                             
109  Dischinger et al. (2010) provide evidence for regulatory arbitrage by means of ‘debt shifting’. 
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other requirements fulfilled under the securities regulation of a particular 
jurisdiction. Finally, different laws – in particular tax laws and bankruptcy laws – 
dependent on the location of the issuing entity may actively be chosen by the 
corporate parent. The analysis in this paper focuses on two choice of law stages in a 
debt security issue. Figure 6.1 provides an overview: 
 
 
Figure 6.1 Choice of law stages in a corporate debt issue 
 
First, the firm has to decide upon the jurisdiction and corporate entity issuing the 
debt security. The issuer can either be the ultimate parent, an operating subsidiary, or 
a special purpose entity, which is referred to as an ‘investment vehicle.’ If the issuer 
is a subsidiary or investment vehicle, it can either be located in the same jurisdiction 
as the ultimate parent or abroad. The decision to use a subsidiary or investment 
vehicle and where to locate it can be a means of choosing an advantageous tax or 
bankruptcy law.110 At the same time, there may be reasons for choosing a particular 
issuer that are unrelated to the applicable law. For example, the firm may want to tap 
a local capital market or the corporate group financing policies may allow an 
operating subsidiary to fund its own business activities by issuing debt. 
 
                                                             
110  See the study of Eidenmüller et al. (2010b) for a detailed theoretical analysis of regulatory 
arbitrage regarding tax and bankruptcy law. 
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At the second stage, after the firm has selected the issuer and jurisdiction, the firm 
chooses a contract law to govern the debt security. The debenture may stipulate the 
domestic law of the issuer jurisdiction, but it can also be the law of any other 
jurisdiction. It should be mentioned that there is a variety of possible non-legal 
motives for choosing a (different) contract law, such as the intention to access a 
particular debt market to issue debt denominated in a foreign currency (e.g. to 
finance foreign investments). The currency of the debt issue may play a decisive role 
for the choice of the applicable contract law as for instance the German central bank 
had required these two decisions to be consistent until the year 1992 (Gruson and 
Harrer 1996). Of course, the choice of the applicable contract law can also be driven 
by the substance of the law as well as the quality of legal services and the courts. 
 
When the management has made a choice regarding the applicable law, it may 
institute this decision in corporate guidelines or implicit procedural rules. Making an 
informed decision on every occasion a debt security is issued may not pay off, as 
setting up a new investment vehicle involves the costs of (re-)incorporation, 
transferring assets and legal advice. In case the debt issue is small, the costs of 
regulatory arbitrage quickly become exorbitant. Moreover, certain advantages of 
regulatory arbitrage – as for instance in tax law – only materialise if an operating 
corporate subsidiary has been set up. The firm will stick to this corporate entity in 
subsequent debt issues if switching costs are prohibitively high. With respect to the 
applicable contract law, firms may occur drafting costs as well as the costs of 
identifying advantageous regulations. Although this type of costs can be considerable 
as well, they are probably lower as the cost of setting up a new issuer. Drafting costs 
are particularly low in markets, where financial contracts have undergone a high 
degree of standardization (e.g. the Eurobond market and the commercial paper 
market). Some firms may therefore decide upon the contract law each time a debt 
contract is set up. Others just stick to their initial choices. 
 
Proposition 1: Path dependence with respect to the issuer location is more 
intense than path dependence regarding the applicable 
contract law. 
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Whether legal arbitrage perpetuates itself over time or vanishes at some point is a 
priori not clear. It is evident though, that firms may forgo cost saving opportunities if 
they are not looking for more efficient regulations. Put differently, the probability 
increases over time that regulations have changed and the company ignores the 
benefits from engaging in regulatory arbitrage. The management is therefore more 
likely to revise its initial choice of law as the odds of missing a cost saving regulation 
increase over time. 
 
Proposition 2:  Path dependence fades away as the likelihood of regulatory 
change and cost saving potentials increase over time. 
 
 
6.3. Methodology and data 
6.3.1. Methodology 
 
The first objective of the empirical analysis is to determine why firms opt out of the 
domestic legal framework and engage in regulatory arbitrage. Even though firms 
encounter a variety of options with regard to regulatory arbitrage (i.e. they may adopt 
one out of multiple contract laws available), the decision can be collapsed to a simple 
binary choice: The management either sticks to the domestic legal framework or 
adopts the law of a foreign jurisdiction. A natural estimator to deal with a binary 
dependent variable is the standard probit model, which can be specified as 
 
y௜ ൌ   ܠ௜ߚ௜ ൅ ݑ௜    (6.1) 
 
where i = 1, ..., N and ࢞௜ being a vector of explanatory variables influencing firms 
choice of law. ݑ௜ is the usual disturbance term and ݕ௜ is the unobserved involvement 
in legal arbitrage by the management. What is observed then is the realisation of the 
law the management has agreed upon having followed the decision rule 
 
ݕ௜ ൌ ቄ
 ଵ ௖௛௢௢௦௘ ௔ ௙௢௥௘௜௚௡ ௟௔௪ ௜௙ ௟௘௚௔௟ ௔௥௕௜௧௥௔௚௘ ௜௦ ௕௘௡௘௙௜௖௜௔௟  
଴ ௦௧௜௖௞ ௧௢ ௗ௢௠௘௦௧௜௖ ௟௔௪ ௜௙ ௟௘௚௔௟ ௔௥௕௜௧௥௔௚௘ ௜௦ ௧௢௢ ௖௢௦௧௟௬  
  (6.2) 
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It is worth mentioning that the absence of regulatory arbitrage can be interpreted in 
two ways. Either the management made an informed decision to abstain from 
regulatory arbitrage because the domestic law was identified as efficient or the 
management came to the conclusion that regulatory arbitrage per se is too costly, 
which renders it worthless to check for more efficient regulations.111 
 
In a second step, the empirical analysis investigates whether and to which degree 
firms’ exposure to regulatory arbitrage depends on previous engagement in such 
practices. To identify this effect, a dynamic panel data model has to be estimated. 
Panel data methods not only allow for the incorporation of previous decisions by the 
management, but also to condition on the unobserved heterogeneity that is likely to 
be present in the data. Unobserved heterogeneity could, for instance, reflect the 
ability of a particular lead manager or legal advisor to spot regulatory arbitrage 
opportunities for the firm. A dynamic panel data model for legal arbitrage can be 
written as 
 
y௜௧ ൌ   y௜,௧ିଵ ߛ௜ ൅  x௜௧ߚ௜ ൅ ߙ௜ ൅ ݑ௜௧   (6.3) 
 
where t = 1, ..., T, the coefficient ߛ௜ is a dynamic effect and α୧ are the unobserved 
firm effects. It should be mentioned, however, that ߛ௜ is not a causal effect but 
constitutes the degree of adjustment of the dynamics. Furthermore, the estimates of 
ߛ௜ and ߚ௜ are calculated using the adaptive Gauss-Hermite quadrature following the 
method of Naylor and Smith (1982). 
  
                                                             
111  The empirical analysis relies on the simplifying assumption that firms only engage in 
regulatory arbitrage if they adopt a foreign law. According to a different definition of 
regulatory arbitrage, some firms choosing the domestic law might not only be subject to a 
home bias but find the domestic law most attractive being the law of their choice. The data at 
hand does not reveal whether the domestic law was actively chosen or not. Nevertheless, the 
adoption of the domestic law may not constitute regulatory arbitrage, as any type of 
arbitrage requires per definition the exploitation of differences among two jurisdictions or 
market places. 
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6.3.2. Data 
 
The data on debt security issues was extracted from the Thomson Financial ‘SDC 
Platinum’ database. The database provides detailed descriptive information on the 
location of the debt issuer and the corporate parent. Furthermore, the governing law 
of the debt security, the size, maturity and coupon payment as well as the initial 
Standard & Poor’s rating, the market place that was targeted and the currency of the 
issue were obtained from the SDC Platinum (see Table 6.1 for a detailed 
description). To qualify for inclusion in the sample, debt securities had to have a 
corporate parent located in France, Germany or Italy, but the issuing entity could 
have been located anywhere in the world. The analysis consequently draws on 8,776 
debt issues, 604 issuers and 106 corporate parents. 
 
To control for scale or network effects, the data was merged with macroeconomic 
variables such as the size of the international bond market and total GDP. As a 
measure of country risk, the government bond yield as well as the inflation rate were 
considered. Finally, as the choice of law may be driven by regulatory arbitrage with 
respect to bankruptcy rules and tax laws, the data was merged with withholding tax 
rates, corporate tax rates and the creditor rights index. The creditor rights index was 
taken from Djankov et al. (2007) and aggregates the rights of creditors in a particular 
jurisdiction on a scale from 0 to 4 (with 4 indicating the highest degree of creditor 
protection). To capture the effect of regulatory arbitrage, all variables were specified 
as the gap between the jurisdiction of the corporate parent and the jurisdiction of the 
issuing entity (that is the value of the corporate parent’s jurisdiction minus the value 
of the issuer’s jurisdiction). For instance, the corporate tax gap measures the 
comparative tax advantage the corporate parent obtains from issuing the debt security 
in a foreign jurisdiction. 
 
Finally, to investigate whether firms’ financing decisions are path dependent, the 
data on debt issues was aggregated on the firm level. To qualify for inclusion in the 
panel analysis, the corporate parent did not only have to be located within France, 
Germany or Italy, but also had to be part of the leading stock market indices CAC-
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40, DAX-30 or MIB-30. This refinement was necessary as the data was merged with 
balance sheet information (debt-equity-ratio), which can be obtained from the 
AMADEUS and Hoppenstedt databases. The analysis was consequently reduced to 
84 corporate parents. Finally, to investigate whether regulatory arbitrage is subject to 
path dependence, two new dependent variables were created: First, the percentage of 
debt issues of an issuer that is subject to a foreign contract law (in a given year) and 
second the percentage of debt securities of a corporate parent that was issued by 
foreign corporate entities (in a given year). As a robustness check, the two variables 
were weighted with the transaction volume of the respective debt issues. 
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Table 6.1 Variable descriptions 
Variable Description 
Transaction  
issuer location The nation where the corporate entity issuing the debt security 
is located (0 = equivalent to the location of the corporate
parent, 1 = foreign). 
governing law The applicable governing law as specified in the debt contract
(0 = equivalent to the location of the issuing entity,
1 = foreign). 
amount prospectus The total amount specified on the prospectus in million US
dollar. 
Maturity The years to final maturity as specified in the debt security. 
S&Ps rating The initial Standard & Poor's rating. 
Coupon The coupon payment in percent. 
Marketplace The target market of the debt issue. 
Currency The currency under which the debt security is issued. 
Firm  
debt-equity-ratio The debt-equity-ratio of the firm using consolidated balance 
sheet data. Source: AMADEUS and Hoppenstedt. 
Macro Economy  
international bond 
market gap 
International debt securities by nationality of issuer (in
billions of US dollars) for each year from 1998 to 2008. 
Source: BIS Quarterly Review Statistical Appendix Table
15B: International bonds and notes: Amounts outstanding all 
issuers. 
GDP gap Gross domestic product based on purchasing-power-parity 
(PPP) valuation of country GDP from 1998 to 2008. Source:
World Economic Outlook. 
Risk  
government bond 
yield gap 
Average government bond yield to maturity (in percent per 
annum) for each year from 1998 to 2007. Source: IMF
International Financial Statistics Yearbook. 
inflation dap Average consumer prices (Index, 2000=100, annual percent
change) for each year from 1998 to 2008. Source: IMF World
Economic Outlook Database. 
 
 
 
table continues on the next page 
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Law 
withholding tax gap Withholding tax rates on cross-border interest payments for 
each year from 1998 to 2008. Source: Zentrum für
Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW). 
corporate tax gap Tax rate for the basic central government statutory (flat or top 
marginal) corporate income tax (including surtax if
applicable) for each year from 1998 to 2008. Source: OECD
tax database: Taxation of corporate and capital income Table
II.1 and KPMG Corporate and Indirect Tax Rate Survey. 
creditor rights 
index gap 
An index aggregating creditor rights, following La Porta et al.
(1998). The index ranges from 0 (weak creditor rights) to 4
(strong creditor rights) and is constructed as of January for
each year from 1998 to 2003. Source: Djankov et al. (2007). 
 
 
6.4. Empirical findings 
6.4.1. Descriptive statistics 
 
The underlying economic structure of corporate debt securities in France, Germany 
and Italy appears to be largely identical (see Table 6.2). The average size of a debt 
issue in the overall sample is 212 million Euros, the maturity 6.4 years, the offering 
yield 4.9 percent and the Standard & Poor’s rating AA. Italian deals are slightly 
larger and have a longer maturity, while the offering yield in France is 0.3 percent 
below the sample average. Nevertheless, country specific differences seem to affect 
the economic structure of corporate debt only marginally. 
 
Considering the first step in the corporate decision-making process (see Figure 6.1), 
regulatory arbitrage with respect to the issuer location appears to be intense, with 
around one third of the issues being conducted by a corporate entity abroad. The 
most popular offshore locations are the Netherlands and Ireland (see Table 6.3), 
which provides a first hint that tax law arbitrage is an important factor driving this 
particular choice of law.112 Even though the German central bank did not require the 
issuer of Deutsche Mark (DM) denominated debt to be located within Germany, only 
                                                             
112  Ireland had a statutory corporate tax rate of only 17.7 percent over the period from 1998 to 
2008, while the average corporate rate in the EU-27 and EFTA was 27.7 percent 
(Eidenmüller et al. 2010b). 
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14 percent of DM denominated debt securities were in fact issued by a corporate 
entity abroad. Issues by a foreign subsidiary were mostly denominated in Swiss franc 
(SFR). Furthermore, debt securities that were traded in France are more frequently 
issued by a foreign corporate entity, while the Euromarket shows the most 
pronounced home bias concerning the issuing corporate entity (i.e. the jurisdiction of 
the corporate parent and the jurisdiction of the issuing corporate entity are identical). 
 
Table 6.2 Economic and legal structure of corporate debt issues in France, 
Germany and Italy 1998 - 2008  
  France Germany Italy Average
UK Contract Law 62% 46% 80% 58%
Foreign Contract Law 78% 53% 92% 68%
UK Issuer 2% 6% 0% 4%
Foreign Issuer 29% 37% 15% 31%
ø Amount in Prospect (Mill. €) 214 203 236 212
ø Maturity (Years) 6.3 6.2 7.5 6.4
ø S&P Rating AA AA- AA AA
ø Yield 4.6 5.1 5.1 4.9
Observations 3236 4320 1220 8776
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Table 6.3 Location of corporate entity issuing the debt security 1998 - 2008 
  France Germany Italy Total
Netherlands 163 506 29 698
Rep. Ireland 82 385 71 538
United Kingdom 72 240 3 315
Luxembourg 73 203 20 296
Jersey 120 84 - 204
Belgium 115 52 - 167
Germany 124 - 22 146
Italy 135 - - 135
Austria - 58 31 89
France - 66 - 66
Switzerland 23 2 4 29
Greece 12 - - 12
Poland - 5 - 5
Other 3 6 3 12
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Table 6.4 Contract law governing the debt security 1998 - 2008 
  France Germany Italy Total
United Kingdom 1,947 1,677 972 4,596
United States 51 32 17 100
Switzerland 52 44 - 96
Luxembourg 8 69 1 78
France 15 17 - 32
Hong Kong 11 17 2 30
Japan 10 18 1 29
Rep. Ireland - 25 - 25
Netherlands 1 11 - 12
Australia 5 2 - 7
Canada 3 1 - 4
Germany 3 - 1 4
Singapore 1 2 - 3
Other 2 5 - 7
 
When it comes to the choice of contract law, which is the second step in the 
corporate decision making process (see Figure 6.1), there are significant differences 
among debt issues in the jurisdictions under consideration. Although a majority of 
debt issues specifies a foreign contract law in all three countries, Italian (92%) and 
French (78%) firms make more extensive use of it. The most popular contract law 
appears to be the law of the UK (58%), followed with some distance by the US, 
Swiss and Luxembourgian law (see Table 6.4). Further, the evidence shows that the 
choice of contract law depends on the currency in which the debt security is issued. 
The fact that very few DM denominated debt securities have been subject to a 
foreign contract law demonstrates the impact of path dependence. When the 
requirement to specify German contract law for DM denominated debt securities was 
finally abolished by the German central bank, investment bankers and lawyers were 
still reluctant to adopt foreign law to govern these debt contracts (Gruson and Harrer 
1996). This assumption is impressively confirmed by the data. In the period under 
consideration, only 3 percent of DM denominated debt issues were subject to a 
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foreign contract law.113 At the same time, 93 percent of Yen (¥) denominated debt 
specified a non-domestic contract law. Regarding the marketplace where the debt 
security is traded, debt securities on the Italian market are most likely to specify 
foreign contract laws, while on the Euromarket most debt issues stick to a contract 
law identical to the jurisdiction of the issuing entity (see Table 6.6). 
 
Table 6.5 Currency in which the debt securities was issued and choice of law  
1998 - 2008 
   Issuer location (in %)   Contract law (in %)   Issues 
    Foreign  UK  Foreign UK     
C
ur
re
nc
y 
EUR 29 2   70 66   4,850 
US 37 5   80 43   1,468 
DM 14 1   3 3   394 
HK 23 8   87 55   367 
STG 35 13   71 68   350 
SFR 43 4   81 46   348 
Y 39 6   93 81   286 
 
  
                                                             
113  The DM was available as currency for debt issues until the year 2001.  
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Table 6.6 Marketplace in which the debt securities is traded and choice of law  
1998 - 2008 
   Issuer location (in %)   Contract law (in %) Issues 
    Foreign UK  Foreign UK     
M
ar
ke
tp
la
ce
 
Germany Public 20 14   65 69   340 
France Public 43 0   86 72   310 
Italy Public 34 0   89 71   213 
Euro Public 29 3   65 55   3,370 
Euro Private 28 3   48 39   1,157 
EURO/144A 16 2   27 21   252 
Foreign Public 36 2   75 62   562 
Foreign Private 36 4   84 73   321 
US Private 38 8   75 67   507 
US Public 25 4   56 47   237 
 
 
6.4.2. Results of a multivariate analysis on the choice of law 
 
Before the article sets out to investigate the role of path dependence in regulatory 
arbitrage, the factors influencing firms’ choice of law will be analysed in a 
multivariate context. Table 6.7 and Table 6.8 present the results of the simple probit 
model as laid out in equation 6.1. The model respectively estimates the probability 
that the corporate entity issuing the debt security is located abroad or the debt 
security specifies a foreign contract law. In what follows, all estimates are reported 
as marginal effects as they can conveniently be interpreted in this way. Moreover, 
since the overall sample consists of a broad array of debt securities, a subsample of 
straight bonds was constructed to check for the robustness of the findings. In a 
second step, the analysis specifies dummy variables for the legal advisor 
accompanying the debt issue. 
 
Regarding the location of the debt issuer, only one deal specific variable turns out to 
be highly significant. As in the descriptive analysis, the currency of a debt issue is 
strongly related to the location of the debt issuer. The size and maturity of the debt 
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security fail to be statistically significant, which is also true for the risk, coupon 
payment and marketplace in which the debt contract is traded. However, the probit 
model supports the more pronounced wanderlust among Italian and French issuers as 
compared to German issuers. The empirical evidence also reveals that firms prefer to 
locate debt issuers in larger economies, which could be due to legal or economic 
network effects. 
 
Regarding the legal factors driving the choice of the issuer location in multinational 
firms, Eidenmüller et al. (2010b) have found low withholding taxes to attract more 
cross border debt issues. This result is somewhat puzzling for Germany, as the 
country traditionally had no withholding taxes on debt securities, but local firms have 
issued a large number of debt securities by corporate entities abroad. It is hence not 
surprising that withholding taxes were not found to be a significant predictor for 
regulatory arbitrage in the subsample at hand. While low withholding taxes may 
generally attract debt issues, firms in some jurisdictions may simply use different 
channels to engage in regulatory arbitrage. Two important channels might be 
corporate taxes and creditor rights. 
 
While Eidenmüller et al. (2010b) could not disentangle whether regulatory arbitrage 
with respect to corporate taxation confirms the profit shifting or the tax shield 
hypothesis, the evidence at the micro level clearly supports the assumption that firms 
engage in profit shifting (see Table 6.7). The empirical findings show that the larger 
the (positive) gap in the statutory corporate tax rates between the location of the 
corporate parent and the issuing entity, the higher the probability that the debt issue 
is placed abroad.114 Debt issuers can benefit from such tax differentials by 
overcharging other affiliates for an intra-group loan, thereby effectively siphoning 
off profits from a high tax jurisdiction (Eidenmüller et al. 2010b). Furthermore, by 
exploiting the information on the debt security level, the probit estimates reveal that 
firms preferably choose venues with stronger creditor rights. This result can be traced 
                                                             
114  The tax gap was calculated by subtracting the tax rate of the subsidiary from the tax rate the 
corporate parent is subject to. A positive effect hence indicates that a higher tax rate at the 
corporate parent’s location and low tax rates at the subsidiary’s location attract more debt 
issues in the latter. 
163 
 
back to the fact that stronger creditor rights mitigate the principal agent problem 
between debt holders and managers, thereby reducing agency costs, which in turn 
increases the expected return of the investor. Finally, it is worth mentioning that all 
of these findings are robust for the subsample of straight bonds and the specification 
of legal advisor dummies. 
 
With regard to regulatory arbitrage in contract law, section 6.4.1. already revealed 
that the choice of a foreign law is almost identical to the choice of UK law. For this 
reason, a subsample of debt contracts specifying UK contract law was constructed as 
a robustness check. The multivariate probit regression confirms that French and 
Italian issues specify foreign contract laws more frequently. Unlike regulatory 
arbitrage with regard to the issuer location, deal specific characteristics play an 
important role for the choice of contract law. Larger deals are less likely to be 
governed by foreign or UK law, while debt contracts with a longer maturity more 
often specify UK law (though not foreign law in general).  
 
Moreover, the risk of the debt security and the interest payment turn out to be highly 
significant predictors of the applicable contract law. Riskier debt securities are less 
likely to specify foreign or UK contract law, while firms apparently compensate 
investors for the adoption of foreign contract law with higher coupon payments. 
Finally, debt issues in foreign currencies are positively correlated with the adoption 
of foreign law, but not UK law in particular. As regards the unreported legal advisor 
dummies, the only statistically significant dummy is the in-house legal counsel, 
which indicates that in-house legal departments have a more pronounced home bias 
regarding the applicable contract law.115 
  
                                                             
115  This finding is consistent with the answers of expert interviews, which had been carried out 
as a pretest to this study. 
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Table 6.7 Multivariate probit model estimates for foreign corporate debt issuers 
  all debt issues straight bond issues 
Transaction Variables           
Amount in Prospect * 10³ 0.055   0.073   0.115   0.139   
  (0.579)  (0.469)   (0.280)   (0.189)   
Maturity (Years) -0.002   -0.001   -0.002   -0.001   
  (0.508)  (0.723)  (0.595)   (0.731)   
S&P Rating 0.005   0.006   0.016   0.017   
  (0.585)  (0.519)  (0.251)   (0.216)   
Coupon -0.022 * -0.021 * -0.023   -0.021   
  (0.075)   (0.094)  (0.162)   (0.181)   
Marketplace 0.001  0.001  -0.001   -0.001   
  (0.437)  (0.498)  (0.715)   (0.744)   
Currency -0.010 *** -0.013 *** -0.007 *** -0.008 *** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.000)  
France 0.147 *** 0.155 *** 0.149 *** 0.155 *** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)   (0.001)   
Italy 0.259 *** 0.276 *** 0.300 *** 0.313 *** 
  (0.007)   (0.005)   (0.008)   (0.006)   
Macro Economy              
GDP 0.002 ** 0.002 ** 0.002 *** 0.002 *** 
  (0.012)   (0.011)   (0.000)   (0.000)   
Int. Bond Market * 10³ -0.281   -0.228   -0.565   -0.516   
  (0.498)  (0.579)  (0.225)   (0.243)   
Risk            
Inflation 0.396   0.399   0.282   0.248   
  (0.251)   (0.249)   (0.190)   (0.206)   
Government Bond Yield 2.316   2.849   0.184   0.049   
  (0.547)   (0.472)   (0.596)   (0.881)   
Withholding Tax -0.034   -0.038   -0.020 * -0.017   
  (0.292)   (0.265)   (0.069)   (0.144)   
Corporate Tax 0.012 *** 0.012 *** 0.012 ** 0.012 ** 
  (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.023)   (0.030)   
Creditor Rights -0.577 *** -0.616 *** -0.449 *** -0.434 *** 
  (0.008)   (0.007)   (0.000)   (0.000)   
 
table continues on the next page 
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Legal Advisor Dummies -  Y  -   Y  
Observations 1489  1470  970   946  
Log Pseudolikelihood -183  -179  -108   -106  
Pseudo R² 78.4  78.5  81.3   81.1  
SEs robust  robust  robust   robust  
 
marginal effects, p-values in parentheses 
 
 
Table 6.8 Multivariate probit model estimates for the contract law specified in 
the debt contract 
  Foreign   UK   Foreign   UK   
Amount in Prospect * 10³ -0.191 *** -0.146 ** -0.205 *** -0.116 * 
  (0.001)   (0.016)   (0.001)   (0.064)   
Maturity (Years) 0.001   0.005 ** 0.001   0.006 *** 
  (0.731)   (0.018)   (0.534)   (0.011)   
S&P Rating -0.018 *** -0.012 *** -0.017 *** -0.011 ** 
  (0.000)   (0.006)   ( 0.000)   (0.010)   
Coupon 0.019 *** 0.018 *** 0.018 *** 0.015 *** 
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.001)   (0.002)   
Marketplace 0.001   0.001   0.001   0.001   
  (0.322)   (0.390)   (0.292)   (0.447)   
Currency 0.004 *** -0.002 *** 0.004 *** -0.002 ** 
  (0.000)   (0.000)   ( 0.000)   (0.012)   
France 0.210 *** 0.144 *** 0.222 *** 0.151 *** 
  (0.000)   (0.000)   ( 0.000)   (0.000)   
Italy 0.296 *** 0.268 *** 0.295 *** 0.297 *** 
  (0.000)   (0.000)   ( 0.000)   (0.000)   
Legal Advisor Dummies -   -   Y   Y   
Observations 1560   1721   1524   1681   
Log Pseudolikelihood -912   -1127   -887   -1085   
Pseudo R² 9.7   4.9   10.1   6.2   
SEs robust   robust   robust   robust   
 
marginal effects, p-values in parentheses 
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6.4.3. Results of the panel data analysis on path dependence 
 
Table 6.9 and Table 6.10 present the results of a dynamic panel data model. They 
originate from the structural equation as set out in equation 6.3. The estimates 
confirm the hypothesis that regulatory arbitrage in corporate debt issues is path 
dependent. The lagged dependent variables for the year t minus 1 are highly 
significant for both stages of the corporate decision-making process, i.e. the location 
of the debt issuer and the choice of contract law. Except for one specification, all 
findings stay robust if the data is weighted with the transaction volume of the debt 
issue. 
 
All but one specification confirm proposition 1 stating that path dependence is more 
pronounced for the issuing corporate entity than regarding the applicable contract 
law. This finding is supported by the overall fit of the model as measured by the 
Pseudo-R². Apparently, the lagged issuer location variables have much more 
explanatory power than the lagged contract law variable. This result may be due to 
the switching costs stemming from the incorporation of an investment vehicle, which 
can involve the costs of transferring assets or engaging in real business activities to 
obtain the desired benefits from regulatory arbitrage. 
 
Unlike path dependence with regard to technical standards, legal arbitrage does not 
intensify over time. In all specifications, irrespective of the field of the law, only the 
first lag is a significant predictor for the choice of law. The empirical evidence thus 
confirms proposition 2 indicating that firms trade off the administrative costs of 
deciding upon each debt issue and the potentially foregone costs of not checking for 
advantageous regulations. Interestingly, if one considers the count data specification, 
there is weak evidence that regulatory arbitrage regarding the debt issuer is not only 
more pronounced but also more persistent over time (the lagged variables t minus 2 
and t minus 3 are significant at the 10 percent level). Finally, the debt-equity-ratio 
never turns out to be significant, which indicates that financial leverage is per se no 
reason to issue debt securities abroad. 
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Table 6.9 Dynamic probit model estimates for path dependence in regulatory 
arbitrage (percentage of debt securities issued by foreign corporate 
entities) 
      Foreign Issuer Location    
  Counts Volume 
  Pooled  Panel  Pooled   Panel 
Lag1 1.066 *** 2.847 *** 0.460 ** 1.355 * 
  (0.000)   (0.001)   (0.022)   (0.060) 
Lag2 0.465   1.240 * 0.124   -0.159 
  (0.129)   (0.096)   (0.533)   (0.831) 
Lag3 0.493 * 1.309 * 0.230   0.558 
  (0.084)   (0.085)   (0.223)   (0.378) 
Debt / Equity Ratio 0.001  0.002   0.000   0.001 
  (0.248)  (0.481)   (0.794)   (0.875) 
Firm FE Yes  Yes  Yes   Yes 
Country FE Yes  Yes  Yes   Yes 
SEs r  -  r   - 
Pseudo R² 49.1  -  24.2   - 
Log Pseudolikelihood -39.10  -38.64  -51.80   -45.60 
Observations 118  118  103   103 
 
p-values in parentheses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.10 Dynamic probit model estimates for path dependence in regulatory arbitrage (percentage of debt securities adopting foreign / 
UK contract law) 
  Foreign Contract Law   UK Contract Law 
  Counts   Volume   Counts   Volume 
  Pooled  Panel  Pooled   Panel  Pooled  Panel  Pooled  Panel 
Lag1 0.194 *** 2.088 *** 0.130 ** 1.535 ** 0.210 *** 1.831 *** 0.102   0.757 
 (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.011)   (0.024)   (0.002)   (0.003)   (0.140)  (0.179) 
Lag2 -0.089  -0.953  0.015   0.173  -0.059  -0.512   -0.027  -0.203 
 (0.183)  (0.280)  (0.808)   (0.809)  (0.470)  (0.499)  (0.736)  (0.771) 
Lag3 0.080  0.863  -0.080   -0.947  0.070  0.607  0.164  1.223 
 (0.193)  (0.262)  (0.266)   (0.259)  (0.330)  (0.362)  (0.046)  (0.061) 
Debt / Equity Ratio 0.000  0.002  0.000   0.004  0.000  0.001  0.001  0.004 
 (0.584)  (0.593)  (0.271)   (0.270)  (0.669)  (0.668)  (0.268)  (0.275) 
Firm FE Yes  Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country FE Yes  Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
SEs r  -  r   -  r  -  r  - 
Pseudo R² 28.2  -  23.8   -  25.4  -  19.2  - 
Log Pseudolikelihood -20.94  -20.94  -18.22   -18.22  -25.69  -25.69  -27.01  -27.01 
Observations 98  98  82   90  98  98  90  90 
 
p-values in parentheses 
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6.5. Summary and conclusion 
 
Regulatory arbitrage has become an integral part of the corporate decision-making 
process. This article has investigated regulatory arbitrage in the context of corporate 
debt issues. It has thereby focused on the legal rules governing the debt issuer as well 
as the contract law stipulated in the debenture. The analysis applied a discrete choice 
model to identify the regulatory and deal specific factors which are associated with a 
particular choice of law. In a second step, it applied a dynamic panel data model to 
study the intensity and persistence of regulatory arbitrage. 
 
The data on 8,776 debt issues revealed that French and Italian firms engage more 
frequently in regulatory arbitrage regarding both, the contract law and the location of 
the debt issuing corporate entity. In comparison, German managers are more 
reluctant with respect to such practices. Moreover, the evidence shows that 
regulatory arbitrage concerning the issuer location is less intense (31 percent located 
abroad) than with respect to the applicable contract law (68 percent under foreign 
contract law). While the most popular offshore locations are the Netherlands and 
Ireland, the absolute majority of debt issues specified the contract law of the UK (58 
percent). The credit rating and the coupon payment are important factors regarding 
the choice of the contract law. The currency in which the debt security is issued is 
strongly related to the contract law and the location of the debt issuer. 
 
Regulatory arbitrage with respect to the debt issuer was found with regard to tax law 
and bankruptcy rules. Debt issuers that are located abroad often target a jurisdiction 
with low corporate tax rates. By overcharging inter-firm loans, firms may use such 
tax differences to reduce their profits in high tax jurisdictions. Finally, the empirical 
findings support the assumption that better creditor rights save firms financing costs. 
Stronger creditor protection rights attract significantly more debt issuers. 
 
In the second part of the analysis, the article has set out to investigate the intensity of 
path dependence in regulatory arbitrage. With regard to both – contract law and the 
issuer location – path dependence is present over a period of one year. During this 
period, path dependence with regard to the location of the debt issuer appears to be 
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stronger than with respect to the applicable contract law. However, there is weak 
evidence that path dependence is more persistent regarding the debt issuer. 
 
There are straightforward policy conclusions that can be drawn from these finding. 
While Eidenmüller et al. (2010b) found withholding tax arbitrage to be an important 
driver in cross-border debt issues, countries like Germany do not raise withholding 
taxes but loose debt issuers nevertheless. The evidence shows that better creditor 
rights and lower corporate tax rates can stop debt issues from moving out of the 
country. Moreover, regulatory reforms are only effective if firms take new 
regulations into account. With regard to debt issues there is evidence of path 
dependence in the corporate-decision making process over the period of at least one 
year. Switching firm’s decisions is more difficult with regard to the location of the 
debt issuer than regarding the applicable contract law. If governments want to 
encourage firms to respond to regulatory changes, they have to reduce the search 
costs of identifying advantageous regulation and make firms aware of new legal 
rules. 
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7. Conclusion 
 
Regulatory competition has become an inherent feature of the European legal 
environment. As in the United States, such competition appears in various fields of 
law and very prominently in company, contract and bankruptcy law. The impact of 
regulatory competition on economic welfare is not homogenous. Its desirability 
depends on the rationale of the legal rules, which were initially implemented by the 
state.116 If the legislator intervened in the market to successfully correct for its 
malfunction, the emergence of regulatory competition has adverse effects on 
economic welfare (Sinn 1997, 2003). In stark contrast, if the legislator implemented 
regulation to provide rents for market participants, regulatory competition enhances 
economic welfare because incumbents are no longer protected by national 
legislation. In some fields of the law it is hard to disentangle whether regulation 
works (effectively) against market failure or whether it serves as a rent-seeking 
device in the sense of Tullock (1967, 1971) or Stigler (1971). In those cases, it is 
necessary to look at the specific legal factors which are subject to regulatory 
competition to provide informed policy guidance to the national and supranational 
legislator. This dissertation presented new insights regarding the drivers and impact 
of regulatory competition in two important areas of business law: corporate law and 
the legal rules governing corporate debt securities. 
Corporate charter competition is still a very recent phenomenon in Europe. It started 
roughly a decade ago when the ECJ held that the real seat doctrine violates the 
freedom of establishment laid down in the TFEU. The analysis in chapter 2 revealed 
that shortly after the ECJ opened the market for corporate law European 
governments have been extremely keen to attract incorporations of start-up firms. 
Corporate charter competition was accelerated by the (initial) success of the UK 
Limited, which has been the most popular foreign legal form among European start-
ups until now. Abolishing or reducing the minimum capital requirement for the 
private LLC was identified as the crucial element in national company law reforms. 
The time it takes to incorporate a company as well as the availability of an online 
incorporation procedure were of minor importance.  
                                                             
116  In a second step, its desirability also depends on the effectiveness of the legal rules. 
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Which impact European corporate charter competition has on economic welfare is 
not clear by now. Streamlining administrative procedures is obviously desirable as 
they represent per definition a deadweight loss to the economy. Lowering the 
minimum capital requirement has allowed additional ventures to engage in business 
activities. At least some of these ventures would not have been established under the 
prior regulatory environment.117 As most of these new firms have a relatively low 
equity base (Niemeier 2009; Bayer and Hoffmann 2009), they impose a negative 
externality on vendors and other business partners. For instance, while previously 
business partners were familiar with the financial minimum standards of the LLC 
(e.g. € 25,000 in case of the German GmbH), they now have to reveal the 
capitalisation of every firm which is incorporated under a foreign or one of the new 
domestic legal forms before they engage in business transactions. If creditors or 
suppliers decide to abstain from obtaining this information they may occur additional 
costs due to reduced recovery rates in case a business partner enters bankruptcy.118 
One could therefore argue that the minimum capital requirement served as a 
soundness check signalling the seriousness of business ventures and that corporate 
charter competition in Europe reduces economic welfare by diluting this test. On the 
other hand, the minimum capital requirement had also imposed a barrier to firm entry 
(Djankov et al. 2002), which allowed wealthy entrepreneurs among others to obtain 
limited liability while poorer entrepreneurs were personally liable for their venture or 
had been excluded from business activities altogether. Wealthier entrepreneurs could 
hence earn economic rents due to reduced economic competition as a result of 
keeping some entrepreneurs out of the market. By reducing the minimum capital 
requirement, regulatory competition eliminates such rents and increases economic 
welfare. Whether corporate charter competition generates an overall net welfare gain 
is left to future theoretical and empirical research. 
With the introduction of the legal form SE, charter competition has been extended 
from the horizontal level (nation states vs. nation states) to the vertical level (nation 
states vs. supranational institution EU). Moreover, the SE allowed existing European 
firms which were previously subject to the real seat doctrine for the first time to 
                                                             
117  This argument assumes that entrepreneurs would not have entered business as sole 
proprietors.  
118  Further costs can occur due to the necessity to evaluate and specify collateral in business 
contracts as well as to buy insurance against default. 
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depart from the legal rules of their home country. Because the SE has created certain 
legal differences in relation to national companies it has made legal arbitrage 
opportunities available, which have evidently been utilised. The analysis in chapter 3 
showed that managers have chosen the SE because of its European image, the choice 
it offers between the one-tier and the two-tier board structure, to accomplish a cross-
border merger119 or to shop for a more favourable corporate law. The possibilities to 
abolish or freeze mandatory worker co-determination and to reduce the size of the 
supervisory board have been the two most disputed legal features of the SE. With 
respect to worker co-determination, the virtues of the SE and regulatory competition 
remain ambiguous. While scholars have found that the reduction of board level co-
determination from parity employee representation to one-third employee 
representation may in fact increase firm value (Gorton and Schmid 2002), 
eliminating worker co-determination completely may accomplish the opposite 
(Fauver and Fuerst 2006). Moreover, negotiating worker co-determination only once 
by means of the special negotiations body during the incorporation process can 
impose a time inconsistency problem. While firm owners, managers and current 
employees can benefit from the abolition of worker co-determination, the interests of 
future workers may not be considered in the co-determination agreement. Here again, 
more research has to be conducted. Nevertheless, even though worker co-
determination in the SE is highly disputed in the literature, the abuse of the legal 
rules appears not as relevant in legal practice. The empirical evidence in chapter 3 
has shown that less than 1 percent of currently incorporated SEs has in fact brought 
worker co-determination to an end. Another stakeholder group that is affected by an 
SE incorporation are shareholders. Chapter 4 provided some initial evidence that 
incorporating under the legal form of the SE can unleash additional value benefiting 
this interest group. 
With regard to the location of corporate debt issues regulatory competition is mostly 
driven by tax legislation. The data in chapter 5 supported the prediction that within 
the EEA debt issuers are attracted by a low withholding tax rate. Corporate taxation 
is relevant as well, but here the motives why firms engage in regulatory arbitrage are 
                                                             
119  Meanwhile, re-incorporations among the EEA Member States should also be possible by 
means of a cross-border merger into a shell company of the target jurisdiction under the 
Cross-Border Merger Directive 2005/56/EC. 
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less clear. While firms in some jurisdictions may use out-of-state debt issues as a tax 
shield by issuing more debt locally in high-tax jurisdictions, others issue debt 
securities in low-tax jurisdictions to benefit from profit shifting opportunities. 
Creditor rights were generally not identified as an important driver for regulatory 
competition in Europe, although they have been statistically significant in a sub-
sample of multinational corporations located in France, Germany and Italy. 
Countries that have had traditionally no withholding tax on debt issues (e.g. 
Germany) may thus improve their competitive stance by implementing better 
creditor rights in bankruptcy.  
The reduction or abolishment of withholding taxes as a result of regulatory 
competition can decrease national tax revenues. Obviously, if tax revenues are 
reduced in the course of tax competition and governments hence become unable to 
provide for public infrastructure, this type of regulatory competition is indeed 
harmful. Nevertheless, withholding taxes may be a comparatively inefficient way to 
collect tax revenues, because multinational firms manage to circumvent these taxes 
easily and tax law arbitrage is costly. Moreover, withholding taxes may introduce 
economic distortion if transactions between companies of different Member States 
are subject to less favourable tax conditions than those applicable to the same 
transactions carried out between companies of the same Member State. This is 
because withholding taxes on interest and royalties can result in costly double 
taxation or burdensome administrative formalities. The European legislator has 
therefore aimed to eliminate such unfavourable tax conditions for multinational firms 
in the directive on the taxation of cross-border interest and royalty payments. 
Regulatory competition in corporate debt securities could thus indirectly support the 
efforts of the EU to abolish withholding taxes on interest. However, eliminating the 
distortion from tax law arbitrage may not be easy since regulatory arbitrage is subject 
to path dependence as the analysis in chapter 6 has shown. Regulatory reforms will 
therefore face some degree of sluggishness in the choice of law and may not become 
effective in the short run. 
To put it in a nutshell, regulatory competition in business law has the potential to 
increase as well as to reduce economic welfare in Europe. The lessons that can be 
learned from other regions of the world are limited since the drivers of the 
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competition process are not identical. While in the United States corporate charter 
competition is mostly concerned with corporate governance regulation, the ease of 
incorporating a business has been in the centre of the European reform agenda. 
Moreover, even though the United Kingdom quickly gained considerable shares in 
the market for corporate charters, Europe has not seen a runaway winner comparable 
to Delaware in the United States so far. The drivers of the competition process which 
were identified in this dissertation may change over time, as for instance the 
minimum capital requirement for private LLCs has already been abolished or 
reduced in many European jurisdictions in the recent past. Empirists must therefore 
keep track of these developments, while legal scholars and economists alike should 
in particular consider the normative aspects regarding the various fields of regulatory 
competition. 
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